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Abstract 
 
The Role of Trust in the Divergent Development of Alternative Lending Channels in the 
UK and Germany  
A large body of literature in the social sciences highlights the importance of trust as a 
necessary condition for economic exchange and the functioning of markets.  By contrast, the 
relationship between trust and variation in financial market practices across national 
economies has received relatively little attention.  This dissertation uses two alternative, non-
bank lending channels in the period following the 2008 financial crisis as an empirical case 
study to analyse the influence of trust on the development of small business lending practices 
in the UK and Germany. A nested mixed methods design has been applied to the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of unique, primary source loan transaction data, surveys of internet 
lending platforms, and surveys and semi-structured interviews with individual investors. 
Analysis of lending data finds different growth trajectories for each channel in each market, a 
pattern of development consistent with propositions of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
framework using its assumptions about the different institutional arrangements in liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs).  Analysis of investor survey 
data and interviews provides a complimentary, trust-based explanation for these different 
development trajectories: there are unique social arrangements in the UK and Germany 
underlying their institutional arrangements and producing different forms of trust that investors 
rely on to assess the risk of lending in each channel.  This dissertation argues that the VoC 
explanation for variation in the financing practices of firms across economies is incomplete 
because it fails to explain how societal arrangements and micro-foundations of trust influence 
the financing alternatives available to firms.  This empirical study links comparative 
institutionalism and sociology of finance literatures by providing a more contextualised, holistic 
understanding of cross-national diversity of financial practices. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Context and Aim 
It has been 10 years since the onset of the global financial crisis, the repercussions of which 
are still being felt across the financial system in many national economies. The insolvency of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was a shock that rapidly disrupted the functioning of the 
banking system and capital markets in most of the world’s economies, and required a massive 
amount of funding from national governments in order to stabilise it. The financial crisis that 
began in the US housing market plunged the US into the deepest economic downturn since 
1945 and the longest since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Manibog & Foley, 2017).  
In many respects, the financial crisis was also a crisis of trust. Trust began eroding in 2007, 
well before the Lehman Brothers’ insolvency in September 2008, when financial firms like Bear 
Stearns and Northern Rock suddenly faced liquidity problems, a signal suggesting that 
confidence in the financial system was starting to evaporate as banks began questioning the 
value of the collateral proposed by counterparties in financial transactions. As the crisis started 
unfolding, financial institutions began to hoard funds in the face of uncertainty about the 
creditworthiness of other financial institutions. As Bagehot observed in the late nineteenth 
century: 
The peculiar essence of our banking system is an unprecedented trust between 
man and man; and when that trust is much weakened by hidden causes, a small 
accident may greatly hurt it, and a great accident for a moment may almost 
destroy it. 
       (Bagehot, 1873:158)  
The actions of the banks diminished the trust that virtually every actor in the developed 
economies had placed in these institutions. Many businesses concluded that they could no 
longer rely on banks to be consistent suppliers of financing, and uncertainty rapidly spread 
through the real economy and started a spiralling contraction in production and consumption. 
Individual investors also lost trust in financial institutions as they watched the value of their 
invested assets plummet. This was not just a phenomenon suffered by elites, as most workers 
in developed economies also watched the funds underlying their pension entitlements 
suddenly drop in value.  
The severity of the crisis and the variation in the pattern of recovery between and within global 
regions has attracted the interest of scholars across many disciplines, raising fundamental 
questions about the functioning of financial markets. Some economies, most notably China, 
have grown continuously since the crisis, while others initially grew but then resumed shrinking, 
a pattern that has puzzled economists, particularly since the advanced economies of the US 
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and Europe had the slowest pace of recovery (Arias & Wen, 2015). The US and Germany had 
reached their pre-crisis level of GDP by 2011, followed a year later by the UK and Japan, while 
Portugal, Italy and Greece still haven’t fully recovered (Manibog & Foley, 2017). How and why 
do finance practices vary across national economies, and how do these practices influence 
economic performance? The contagion effect of the crisis across economies in the developed 
world has drawn the attention of comparative institutionalism scholars interested in the role of 
institutions in governing economic activity (Morgan, Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen, & Whitley, 
2010). The social and economic effects of the crisis have been a catalyst motivating 
sociologists to study finance topics and the contemporary financial system (Carruthers, 2011; 
Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2012).  
Despite the voluminous literature analysing the crisis and its consequences, relatively little 
attention has been paid to examining the role of trust in financial crises or in finance more 
broadly (Swedberg, 2010, 2012). Analysing financial market phenomena is a core research 
interest of economists, and explanations involving trust do not fit easily with assumptions about 
financial decision-making in the context of rational expectations and equilibriums (Jovanovic, 
2012; Zucker, 1986). Many traditional economists dismiss the need to incorporate the concept 
of trust because financial decisions are based on the rational expectation of future outcomes. 
One such economist is Oliver Williamson, who famously argued that the word ‘trust’ should be 
banned from the social sciences (Williamson, 1993). To the extent that trust plays a role in 
decision-making, it is characterised as a calculative, utility-maximising exercise that assumes 
that all parties in an exchange are similarly utility-maximising. The prevailing conviction among 
most economists is that a cognitive conceptualisation of trust belongs to the field of psychology 
rather than economics, although this has started to change with the recent emergence of the 
sub-field of behavioural economics (Swedberg, 2010). While there is a large body of sociology 
literature researching trust in a relational context, research into financial markets was largely 
left to economists until recently, with the result that there is little sociological literature 
investigating the role of trust in financial markets. 
This dissertation studies trust in the period following the global financial crisis by analysing its 
role in the development of new lending channels for small firms that emerged following the 
disruption of the financial system. Capital market funding for banks was disrupted soon after 
the crisis began, forcing them to reduce lending to firms, a situation exacerbated by the impact 
of losses in the value of assets owned by financial institutions and the introduction of new 
regulations which reduced the amount of capital that banks could deploy. The impact on firms 
from the contraction in bank lending following the crisis varied depending on the size of a firm 
and its location. Large firms in developed economies quickly regained access to the funding 
they needed as changes to regulatory capital requirements caused banks to shift lending 
towards less risky (i.e. larger) borrowers, and lower interest rates expanded the financing 
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capacity of traditional capital markets and unregulated ‘shadow banks’.1 By contrast, many 
firms too small to access capital markets or shadow banking experienced persistent funding 
problems (Arias & Wen, 2015; Ryan, O’Toole, & McCann, 2014). Beginning in 2009, euro area 
banks perceived an increased lending risk to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
which played an increased role in tightening business credit standards, with smaller SMEs 
most affected (Wehinger, 2014). This funding shortfall has hampered the economic recovery 
following the crisis, since small firms produce the majority of output in most developed 
economies, and these firms cannot produce goods ordered by customers if they cannot finance 
the purchase of raw materials and production costs (Shapiro, 1985). Consequently, SMEs 
began to search for alternative forms of finance. 
This dissertation studies two forms of lending operating outside of the traditional financial 
system in the UK and Germany as an empirical case study to analyse the influence of trust on 
the development of small business lending in these two countries. It situates itself in the 
economic sociology literature, more specifically in the sub-field of sociology of finance (SoF). 
The UK and Germany have been selected for this comparative study because they represent 
the ideal type ‘market-based’ and ‘bank-based’ models, respectively, in the taxonomy 
commonly used in comparative capitalism literature when comparing the financial systems of 
national economies. The traditional financial system is composed of incumbent actors 
authorised to carry on regulated activities within the regulated banking and capital markets 
system.23 By contrast, alternative finance describes finance activity that emerges from outside 
of the incumbent system. Alternative finance has historically referred to finance channels used 
by actors in developing economies with weak or unreliable financial institutions so they can 
function on a day-to-day basis (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). The disruption to bank lending 
produced by the financial crisis, however, has increased the demand for alternative finance in 
developed economies, as firms in developed economies are compelled, like their counterparts 
in developing economies, to utilise alternative financing sources outside of the traditional 
financial system. This dissertation examines two forms of alternative finance used by these 
firms in the UK and Germany, namely Peer-to-Business (P2B) lending4 and mini-bond lending 
	1 Consists of either unregulated financing activity carried on by regulated financial institutions, or financing activity 
carried on by unregulated entities which are exempt from regulation because they are non-deposit-taking 
institutions. Shadow banking entities include hedge funds and private capital funds, insurance companies and 
pension funds. These entities benefited from lower interest rates as investors seeking higher yields were willing to 
accept more risk in providing funding to entities outside of the regulated financial system. 2 There are references in the financial economics literature to ‘informal finance’, defined as ‘credit provision that 
occurs beyond the scope of a country’s formal financial and regulatory institutions’ (Levine, Lin, & Xie, 2016:1). 
Informal finance differs from alternative finance because the focus of the former is only on financial instruments 
(such as trade credit) and the latter on channels of finance. 3 This definition excludes private equity and hedge funds, as these investor types have developed over time to 
become closely connected with the capital markets. 4 Loans of up to 5 million euros, but typically less than 1 million euros. Small institutional investors also participate 
in this activity, but it is dominated by individual investors. 
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(‘mini-bonds’)5. P2B lending consists of internet-based platforms acting as intermediaries to 
present the loans requests of small business borrowers to individual investors, who directly (or 
indirectly6) select loans they wish to finance. Mini-bond lending consists of business borrowers 
obtaining funding (in the form of a bond instrument) directly from individual investors and 
without the involvement of an intermediary in the placement of the bonds with investors.  
SoF7 is a relatively new sub-field within economic sociology that studies practices within and 
between organisations and institutions in the financial system. There are several gaps in this 
literature which this dissertation seeks to address. First, the development of alternative finance 
channels emerging within the digital economies of developed economies is understudied. Most 
SoF literature discusses finance practices within the traditional incumbent regulated banking 
and capital markets system, rather than practices occurring in the alternative finance space 
outside of the traditional system, in developed economies. Alternative channels in advanced 
economies warrant study because they are emerging contemporaneously with the process of 
digitalisation of social and economic engagement, while the finance practices are evolving 
differently from those in traditional finance channels. The digitisation of finance is changing the 
structure of the financial system, and attracting new entrants8 using digital technologies to 
provide financial services in a more efficient way than incumbent financial institutions 
encumbered with high operating costs associated with legacy technology platforms. In the 
case of mini-bond funding, firms seeking to issue bonds can completely disintermediate the 
operational functions for bond issuance provided by financial intermediaries using applications 
on their own corporate website to disseminate information about the bonds, collect the 
investment funding, and communicate with investors during the life of the bond. In the P2B 
lending, internet platforms acting as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers are 
exploiting the advances of information-based technologies, such as machine learning and 
artificial intelligence, to incorporate both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ information9 in investment and credit 
analytics. This raises several important issues regarding the socio-economic repercussions of 
these developments.  
Investigation of how and why finance practices vary between developed economies is also 
understudied by SoF scholars. The sociology of financial literature assumes that institutions in 	5 Bonds smaller than 25 million euros in issuance size. Some small institutional investors also participate in this 
activity, but it is dominated by individual investors.  6 The investor can elect to have the intermediating internet platform select the loan investments on behalf of the 
investor. 7 Also referred to as the sociology of financial markets, and part of a broader multi-disciplinary area of research 
referred to as ‘social studies of finance’ in Europe, which includes a diverse range of social science disciplines 
studying finance-related topics. 8 These firms are commonly referred to as ‘FinTech’ firms because their business models rely on using technology 
to provide financial services.  9 Soft information includes unverified non-financial information, such as information regarding sentiment, behaviour, 
or relationships, while hard information includes verified financial information such as payment history, tax returns 
or audited financial statements.	
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the financial system are dominated by logics produced by a global process of financialisation, 
with developed economies gradually converging towards market-based systems of financing 
dominated by institutional investors (Deeg, 2014; Morgan, 2010). The research agenda has 
analysed macro-level phenomena and largely ignored investigating the practices of individual 
retail investors10 as economic actors in financial markets. As a result, the influence of social 
variables in the development of new finance channels and their role as institutional change 
agents (Welter & Smallbone, 2015) in the incumbent system is not well understood. This 
dissertation conceptualises the market for individual investors collectively lending to firms as a 
set of institutional practices, arguing that these are sustained by trust-producing social 
arrangements in an economy. This conceptualisation is extended to explain the divergence in 
finance practices between economies, using the case of P2B and mini-bond alternative lending 
channels in Germany and the UK to identify the different types and sources of trust influencing 
the lending practices of each country. 
This research is relevant to both academia and public policy. It provides a more socialised 
perspective to the study of financial markets, linking comparative institutionalism and sociology 
of financial markets literatures by providing a more contextualised, holistic understanding of 
cross-national diversity of financial practices. Analysing the development of both intermediated 
(P2B) and non-intermediated (mini-bond) channels provides the opportunity to compare the 
role of trust and how it is produced in economies with different financial systems and historical 
firm-bank finance relationships. In the public policy area, governments in both developed and 
developing economies recognise that SMEs 11  are an important source of growth and 
innovation, yet credit-deserving borrowers are not able to access the finance that they require 
within the incumbent system. Hopefully, these research findings will provide policymakers with 
insight to enable them to strike the right balance between providing firms with increased access 
to alternative sources of financing, while providing adequate regulatory protection for the 
individual investors funding the investments in those channels. 
This research project breaks new methodological ground in the economic sociology and SoF 
literature. There does not appear to be a cross-national study of finance practices in these 
literatures that has collected and analysed primary data at a comparable scale to this research 
project. The dissertation analyses unique, primary source, quantitative and qualitative data 
collected from both Germany and the UK. The collected data sets consist of more than 9 million 
mini-bond and P2B loan investments, more than 1,000 survey questionnaires completed by 	10 Sociology of finance scholars have studied the practices of individual professional investors employed by 
financial organisations. 11	The quantitative criteria used by the European Commission in its definition of an SME: a firm with less than €50 
million of annual turnover or less than €43 million of balance sheet assets and fewer than 500 employees (BMWI, 
2013). The SME segment can be further divided into size sub-segments based on annual turnover: micro SMEs 
(turnover <€1 million), small SMEs (turnover <€1 million to €5 million), medium SMEs (turnover €5 million to €25 
million), large SMEs (turnover €5 million to €25 million). 
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internet P2B lending platforms and mini-bond and P2B investors, and 70 semi-structured 
interviews with individual mini-bond and P2B investors. The methodological approach to the 
data collection and analysis is integrated, utilising a nested mixed method design to gain 
analytic insight from data sets representing different levels of data collection and analysis.  
1.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation conceptualises the adoption of new lending practices by market participants 
as a matter of trust, where the level of trust between economic actors and actors in institutions 
influences the adoption of these practices by both lenders and borrowers. The analysis 
addresses both demand and supply side factors in the development of the P2B and mini-bond 
lending channels in each country. However, the analysis of trust as an explanatory variable 
focuses on the supply side to explain the willingness (or not) of individual investors to provide 
the funding sought by borrowers using these channels.  
There are many definitions of trust, as well as a lack of conceptual convergence across 
academic disciplines (Gargiulo & Gokhan, 2006; Zucker, 1986). Many definitions incorporate 
two notions that are fundamental to this research: (i) the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable 
to a trustee, and (ii) positive expectation regarding the future behaviour of the trustee towards 
the trustor. Therefore, the underlying assumption is that the development of a new channel of 
finance is highly dependent on the willingness of investors to fund the lending opportunities 
offered through the channel, which is influenced by the investors’ expectations regarding the 
future behaviour of the borrower regarding the repayment of the loan. At the macro level, the 
institutional arrangements of Germany and the UK are compared using the conceptual 
framework provided by Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001) within 
comparative capitalism studies. For this analysis, institutional arrangements are assumed to 
consist of the ‘forms, outcomes, and dynamics of economic organisation (firms, networks and 
markets) influenced by other social institutions’ (Morgan, Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen, & 
Whitley, 2010:2).  
This dissertation addresses three research questions regarding the development of these 
alternative lending channels in the two economies. The first question investigates the 
predictive power of the VoC model regarding the development of the alternative lending 
channels in the two economies: 
Research Question 1: How have the mini-bond and P2B lending channels developed in 
each country since the crisis, and do their development trajectories fit with the 
propositions of the Varieties of Capitalism framework?  
The analysis draws on VoC literature to contextualise the development of P2B and mini-bond 
lending in these two countries for several reasons. First, the VoC framework sees firms as the 
central actors in the economy, rather than other actors like governments, trade unions or 
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individuals, and it is the demand for alternative finance by firms that is the necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for alternative channels to emerge. VoC literature claims that institutional 
arrangements influence the behaviour of firms as they solve coordination problems in a manner 
that produces the optimal economic outcome for firms. The VoC thesis identifies five 
institutional spheres relevant to comparative advantage, with the literature highlighting the 
distinctive difference between the financing practices of ‘liberal market economy’ (LME) and 
‘coordinated market economy’ (CME) based firms within the corporate governance sphere, 
and which are highly relevant to the subject of this dissertation. It conceptualises markets as 
‘institutions that support relationships of particular types’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001:9), which 
suggests that this support should be manifested in variation of finance practices if institutional 
arrangement vary between the two countries. In contrast to the VoC emphasis on large firms 
and banks versus capital markets as financing channels, this dissertation will focus mainly on 
SMEs and individual investors as a source of funding. 
The UK and Germany have been selected as the economies for cross-national comparison 
because they embody the ideal type LME and CME economies used in the VoC literature (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001) to illustrate how different institutional arrangements impact the actions of 
firms in an economy. To what extent are the different institutional arrangements and conditions 
in each country reflected in the channel development and institutional change in each 
economy? The VoC model posits that the relationship-lending model in CMEs like Germany, 
characterised by strong trust relations and exchanges of private information between firms and 
their primary bank lender, provides borrowers with a supply of low-cost ‘patient capital’ (Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In contrast, the VoC model assumes that firms located 
in LMEs like the UK use market-based sources of funding, which are not considered ‘patient’ 
(Deeg, Hardie, & Maxfield, 2016). The framework also highlights the importance of reputation 
for CME firms, who must engage in more inter-firm cooperation than LME firms to coordinate 
their activities (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
These differences in institutional conditions claimed by the VoC literature, particularly the 
relationships between banks and firms within the corporate governance sphere, facilitate the 
formulation of propositions for the divergent development of non-bank finance channels in the 
UK (a LME) and Germany (a CME). This provides an opportunity to empirically compare the 
fit of VoC propositions with the development pattern of mini-bond and P2B lending in the two 
countries. In relative terms, P2B lending is more transactional than mini-bond financing, and, 
given the similar characteristics to ‘market-based’ financing prevalent in LMEs, the VoC 
literature would predict more P2B lending activity in the UK market than the German market. 
By contrast, mini-bond financing is obtained by firms via direct response on the part of investors 
to firms’ solicitation for funding, which suggests a social connection between the firm and its 
mini-bond funders. Such a connection is predicated on knowledge about the reputation of the 
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borrower amongst various stakeholder groups, and therefore is likely to be a determinant in an 
investor’s decision to invest in the bond. Greater mini-bond financing activity in Germany than 
the UK, therefore, would be congruent with the propositions in the VoC literature. These 
propositions form the basis for the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The development trajectories of the channels differ between countries, 
and these trajectories are congruent with the propositions of the VoC model.  
The analysis of development trajectories includes assessing the response of the incumbent 
institutions in the banking systems of each country to these new lending channels. The 
sociological interpretation of ‘institutions’ recognises that there are both formal rules and 
informal unwritten rules of the game that shape human interaction. In that context, institutional 
change in the banking system refers to change in the formal or informal practices of incumbent 
banks in how they go about lending to firms. Hall and Soskice contended in their elucidation 
of the VoC framework that firms will seek to retain the institutional arrangements in which they 
have invested (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Some scholars argue that there is an unwarranted bias 
towards institutional continuity over change in the VoC framework, particularly for institutions 
located in CMEs, because this behaviour by firms produces a force which preserves traditional 
structures (Streeck & Thelen, 2005:5). Other scholars have been critical about the VoC 
approach for its underestimation of institutional change and argue that VoC fails to incorporate 
change from outside the macroeconomic system with social or political dimensions (Hall & 
Thelen, 2009:8). This implies that change is unlikely to occur without an exogenous shock 
occurring that is strong enough to offset the forces of path dependency.  
The failure to admit gradual institutional change leads to a second problem with the VoC 
framework: no specification of the types of institutional change processes. Therefore, this 
dissertation draws on the extended explanations of institutional change provided by Streeck 
and Thelen (2005) and Hall and Thelen (2009), which include a taxonomy for describing the 
institutional change process. The types of change identified in the taxonomy reflect institutional 
transformations that result from gradual endogenous processes rather than a single 
exogenous shock. While the financial crisis itself can be legitimately considered an exogenous 
shock to the financial and banking systems of most national economies,12 any change to the 
banking system attributable to new lending channels is assumed to come about through a 
more gradual process. The analysis also draws on studies of institutional entrepreneurship in 
the institutional theory literature to gain understanding of, or gain insight into, the agency of the 
actors engaged in the institutional change process. 
	12 It could be argued that the financial crisis was endogenous to the financial system; however, it can also be 
argued that this was only the case in the US financial system. The effects of illiquidity in the US sub-prime mortgage 
market (and structured credit and derivatives markets for securities related to sub-prime mortgages) subsequently 
spread to the financial systems of other national economies.  
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The second research question addresses the role of trust in the development of these 
alternative channels: 
Research Question 2: What has been the role of trust in the development paths of P2B 
and mini-bond lending in the two countries? 
On the supply side of lending, trust potentially influences the legitimacy of new lending 
practices and the perceived trustworthiness of borrowers, thus influencing the financing 
alternatives available to firms. The role of trust is mentioned in the context of ‘reputation’ in the 
VoC literature as a necessary condition for the functioning of the non-market relationships that 
firms in CMEs rely on for coordinating their activities. However, it is only obliquely mentioned 
in reference to the market relationships of firms located in LMEs (Hall & Soskice, 2001:8). 
While the VoC thesis hints at why trust is needed by firms to coordinate their activities within 
the institutional arrangements in a CME, it does not discuss the form of trust produced by these 
firms. This gap in understanding provides the basis for the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Investors rely on different forms of trust for different types of lending, and 
the presence and strength of these forms varies across the two economies. 
The analysis of trust forms adopts Lynne Zucker’s (1986) framework for sources of trust that 
she identified in her study of the development of the US economy between 1840 and 1920. 
The challenges associated with attempting to directly measure trust are avoided by, instead, 
measuring indicators of trust presence represented by proxy variables in the collected data. 
The analysis also identifies the relationship between the indicators of trust and each type of 
lending to determine the dominant forms of trust relied on by investors in each lending channel, 
and whether this varies between economies. 
The third research question investigates the societal arrangements in the two countries that 
produce the forms of trust identified in the prior research question: 
Research Question 3: How do the social and institutional arrangements in the UK and 
Germany produce the forms of trust influencing the development of alternative lending 
channels? 
Neither the propositions of the VoC model, nor the analysis of trust forms relied on by investors, 
reveals the origin of these trust forms, which is investigated by testing the 3rd hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Different social and institutional arrangements in each country provide the 
foundations for different forms of trust relied on by alternative finance investors. 
The analysis seeks to identify the micro-foundations of the trust forms in a country by 
examining the variations in social practices occurring within two institutional spheres, namely 
the vocational education and training system and trade associations, which SMEs in both 
countries engage with to carry out their business activities. The analysis uses Barney & 
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Hansen's (1994) proposition for trust as a comparative advantage to assess the extent to which 
these micro-foundations, and the trust forms they produce, confer comparative advantage to 
firms’ access to finance. 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 provides the 
context for the empirical analysis presented in this dissertation, drawing attention to the 
structural differences between the German and UK economies, particularly their different 
financial systems. It compares the operating environment of firms and reviews differences in 
the nature of ownership and governance of SMEs. Governance is discussed in the context of 
family vs non-family ownership and the unique characteristics of Mittelstand firms. In the UK, 
categories describing the size of firms, such as ‘SME’, and the form of ownership, such as 
‘family owned’, are not necessarily related. In Germany, these are intrinsically related, with the 
term ‘Mittelstand’ used to describe a small firm which, by implication, is family owned, with 
governance values reflecting a long-term, multi-stakeholder orientation of the decision-making 
of the owners and managers. The essential defining characteristic is the governance values of 
the firm, and therefore ‘Mittelstand’ also describes larger firms in Germany with similar values. 
The chapter also reviews the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on business lending in each 
country, and how it created conditions that accelerated the development of the mini-bond and 
P2B lending channels in the post-crisis period. 
Chapter 3 reviews the academic literature informing the theoretical approach used in this 
dissertation, with three sections separately discussing the economic sociology and SoF, 
comparative institutionalism, and trust literatures. The first section discusses the theoretical 
contribution of embeddedness to the economic sociology literature and highlights gaps in the 
SoF literature related to the study of finance practices and financial markets. The comparative 
institutionalism section discusses the theoretical approaches for comparatively analysing 
financial systems, critically reviews the propositions of the VoC framework, and highlights the 
theoretical insights sourced from other literatures to address its limitations regarding agency 
and institutional change. The review of the trust literature makes evident the complexity of 
conceptualising trust given the different definitions of trust and interchangeable use of 
terminology across disciplines. It summarises the relevant empirical research investigating the 
influence of trust in investment and lending decision-making, including the contribution of 
theoretical and empirical insight drawn from the trust literature, and outlines Zucker’s 
framework for the production of different forms of trust used in the analysis.  
Chapter 4 describes the primary data collected for the analysis, then discusses the research 
questions, hypotheses, and the nested mixed methods approach in the analysis. The primary 
data was collected between 2013 and 2017, and includes individual transaction level data and 
aggregated transaction level data collected from mini-bond issuers and P2B lending platforms, 
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survey questionnaire data collected from P2B and mini-bond investors, and data collected in 
interviews with mini-bond and P2B investors. It also reviews the secondary data sources 
reporting cross-country surveys of organisational and institutional trust used in the analysis. 
The second part of the chapter outlines the methodology for testing the hypotheses for each 
of the three research questions, and outlines the approach used to address the methodological 
challenges associated with measuring trust. 
Chapter 5 presents the data analysis and findings testing the first hypothesis regarding the fit 
of the trajectories of mini-bond and P2B channel development with the propositions of the VoC 
framework. It begins by summarising the growth patterns in each country based on the analysis 
of the collected transaction data and the policies enacted in each country during the post-crisis 
period. The analysis moves to building a set of propositions for the development of the 
channels through the lens of the Coordinated Market Economy (CME) and Liberal Market 
Economy (LMEs) dichotomy in the VoC framework, and compares the observed development 
patterns of the lending channels with the VoC propositions to test the first hypothesis. The 
chapter compares the forms of change process in the financial system in between the two 
countries brought about by the emergence of P2B and mini-bond lending, and discusses the 
role of institutional entrepreneurs in bringing about this change.  
Chapter 6 addresses the second and third research questions explaining the divergent 
development trajectories for mini-bond and P2B lending, as discussed in the prior chapter. The 
analysis identifies the forms of trust relied on by investors in each lending channel and variation 
in the dominance of these forms between Germany and the UK. The second part of the chapter 
reviews the foundations of the forms of trust specific to each country, and links these social 
and institutional arrangements to the financing practices of individual mini-bond and 
institutional investors. 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. It outlines the contribution to the SoF literature research 
by linking macro level comparative institutionalism with micro level analysis of investor trust. 
The chapter suggests some of the limitations of the research project and considers whether 
the Mittelstand, as a classification of firm type, has a comparative advantage versus other 
types of firms in accessing finance. 
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Chapter 2: The Economies of the UK and Germany and the Impact of the Crisis 
This chapter provides a context for the analysis of the peer-to-business (P2B) and mini-bond 
lending channels that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Germany and the UK 
turned to following the 2008 financial crisis. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
section compares the financial systems of the two countries, including their banking and capital 
market systems, the credit bureaus and rating agencies supplying information to banks and 
debt investors, and the regulatory environment for financial services in each country. The 
second section compares the nature of the participation of SMEs in the two economies, and 
highlights the particular role that the family-governed ‘Mittelstand’ firms and related institutions 
play in the German economy. The third section discusses the factors that led to the emergence 
of mini-bonds and P2B lending as alternatives to bank financing prior to the onset of the 
financial crisis. The concluding section investigates how the financial crisis unfolded in the two 
countries, and how this set the stage for the divergent development of the two channels in the 
post-crisis period. 
2.1 Comparison of UK and German Financial Systems  
This section highlights the differences in the banking and capital market system of the two 
countries, including an overview of the regulatory regime and the ecosystem of rating agencies 
and other entities supplying information about the creditworthiness of firms. 
2.1.1 Banking Systems 
National financial systems are often compared using the framework for categorising the 
structures of capitalist financial systems proposed by Zysman in his seminal work 
Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change 
(1983). In this context, the German system is generally categorised as a bank credit-based 
system, in which banks play a central role in the economy by intermediating between 
household savers and firms needing debt finance. In contrast, the UK financial system is 
categorised as a capital markets-based system, in which the supply of finance is determined 
by the response of financial investors responding to market or price signals. In simple terms, 
a firm’s access to financing in a bank-based system is relationship oriented, whereas a firm’s 
access to financing in a capital markets-based system is more transaction oriented. Bank loans 
are the dominant form of financing for non-financial firms in Germany, both in absolute terms 
and relative to GDP, while institutions for financing equity and debt financing for firms are much 
more prevalent in the UK than in Germany (Klagge & Martin, 2005).  
The reality is much messier than what these dichotomous categorisations imply given the 
evolution of capital markets development in the (almost) 50 years since the publication of 
Zysman’s work. In their cross-national analysis of the financing structures of banks, Hardie and 
Howarth point out that most banks in developed economies now use a mix of deposit funding 
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and market-based sources of funding to finance their lending activities, thereby blurring the 
distinction between bank credit-based and capital markets-based financial systems (Hardie, 
Howarth, Maxfield, & Verdun, 2013). Another issue is the variation in the relevance of the 
model to firms of different sizes, because access to capital markets is directly related to the 
size of a firm and its financing needs. Zysman’s framework is much more relevant to large 
firms than small firms; this is because the former are large enough to tap either banks or capital 
markets for their financing requirements, and typically use a mix of bank and market financing, 
regardless of where they are located.  
In theory, firms have several options with which to finance their activities. Firm owners, 
regardless of the size of their firm, generally prefer to finance with retained earning or debt 
rather than with equity13, because the former is lower cost and enable owners to retain control 
over governance. The financing needs of SMEs, however, are too small to interest 
intermediaries or investors in capital markets and are, therefore, highly reliant on bank credit 
financing, regardless of which national economy they are based in. Firms too small to access 
capital markets depend almost entirely on banks for their external financing needs, because 
only banks possess the expertise and scale needed to overcome information asymmetry and 
reduce the adverse selection risk inherent in lending to small borrowers (Behr & Güttler, 2007). 
Mid-sized firms fall somewhere in between, with most being too small to directly access capital 
market funding, but large enough to participate in structures that provide indirect access. For 
example, despite Germany being considered a bank credit-based economy, approximately 
700 German mid-sized firms borrowed €4.5 billion via mezzanine loans that were funded by 
pooling, securitising, and selling securities to institutional investors in Germany between 2004 
and 2007.14  
Notwithstanding these limitations, there are distinct differences between the German and UK 
financial banking systems that do reflect some of the characterisations of bank-based 
(Germany) versus capital markets-based (UK) financial systems as described Zysman. The 
German banking system is commonly described as a three-pillar system, composed of three 
groups of banks with different forms of ownership, governance, and organisational purpose. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relative size of each pillar with respect to the number of banks, 
branches and employees for 2014 and 2015.  
 
	13	The ‘pecking order’ theory of financing preferences of firms is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.	14	All of the large German banks operated programmes for originating these loans, but the banks were not 
responsible for funding any of the loans. 
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Figure 2.1: Three-pillar German Banking System (Handelsblatt, 2017)  
The first pillar is a group of 280 privately owned commercial banks, a heterogeneous collection 
of profit-oriented organisations ranging from large international commercial banks to small 
local banks. The second pillar is the group of government-owned banks providing financing to 
support economic development at three geographic levels. The KfW development bank, 
owned 80% by the German government and 20% by the 16 federal states, supports economic 
development at the national level by providing financing to firms both directly and indirectly (via 
other banks). The government-owned savings banks operate at the regional and local level. 
There are six large Landesbanken,15 owned by the federal states, which support economic 
development within their respective regions. The 420 relatively small Sparkassen banks are 
owned by cities and towns within an administrative region and support economic activity within 
their respective areas. They are territorially restricted to operating within their local areas, and 
must solely rely on deposits to fund their financing activities since they are barred from using 
capital market funding sources. The group of 1,000+ cooperatively owned (Volksbanken) 
banks also operate only within their respective local municipal areas, and rely only on the 
deposits of their members to finance their lending activities. They try to support economic 
activity within their area of membership, while, at the same time, provide a financial return to 
those same members. The relatively large number of Sparkassen and Volksbanken reflects 
the strong growth of these banks relative to commercial banks following World War II, as the 	15 There are 13 federal states in Germany, excluding the three city states (Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin), all of 
which had a Landesbank at one point. The number of Landesbanken has been reduced to six over time as a result 
of consolidation. 
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former were less implicated in the Nazi regime than the latter banks (Behr & Schmidt, 2015). 
While the cooperative banks constitute the largest pillar measured by the number of institutions 
and branches, the largest share of assets is controlled by the commercial banks, as illustrated 
in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: German Banking System Share of Banking Assets (International Monetary Fund, 2011) 
A low level of market concentration, a relatively small market share for profit-oriented banks, 
and the important role played by small local banks with a focus on supporting economic 
development are distinguishing characteristics of the German financial system. The share16 of 
the domestic market for the commercial banking segment of the German banking system is 
approximately 30% and is dominated by two17 large banks, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank 
(Deutsche Bank, 2013). However, the commercial banks’ aggregated share of banking system 
assets is smaller than the share of assets controlled by the state-owned and cooperative 
banks, with the result that the majority of assets in the German banking system are controlled 
by banks that are not seeking to maximise profits. This is particularly relevant at the local level, 
since the Sparkassen and the Volksbanken control about 35% of German banking system 
assets and are the primary lenders to small firms operating within their local regions.  
UK firms are also highly reliant on bank loans to finance their activities (CBI, 2012). However, 
there is no UK equivalent to the Sparkassen and Volksbanken that provides small firms with 
an alternative to borrowing from commercial banks as the UK banking system is much more 	16 Measured as a share of total banking industry balance sheet assets. 17 HVB merged with Italy-based Unicredito in 2005. Postbank was effectively controlled by the German state until 
30% was sold to Deutsche Bank in September 2008 – just as the financial crisis began. 
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concentrated than the German banking system. In the UK, the five largest banks control 43% 
of domestic market assets versus less than 1/3 of domestic market assets controlled by the 
five largest German banks (Deutsche Bank, 2013). The political factors influencing the 
development of the German banking system have contributed to creating one of the most 
overbanked economies in the world. Germany has approximately 45 bank branches per 
100,000 adults, almost double the 25 bank branches per 100,000 adults in the UK market 
(World Bank, 2018). In contrast, the level of digital banking penetration is lower in Germany 
than the UK, with 56% of 16 to 74-year-olds in Germany accessing online banking services 
versus 68% of 16 to 74-year-olds in the UK in 2017 (Statistica, 2017). 
Critics of the dominant market position of non-profit focused banks competing for loans in the 
German market have forced banks to under-price the lending margins needed to sufficiently 
compensate lenders for any risk of non-repayment. These critics point to the poor financial 
performance of German banks relative to banks in other European countries as evidence. 
Figure 2.3 compares the 5-year average18 ‘return on assets’ and ‘return on equity’ for the 
banks in eight European countries. The financial return of the German banks is lowest with 
both measures, although it should be noted that the finance performance of the UK banks is 
also lower than several of the other European countries.  
 
Figure 2.3: Financial Performance of Banks in European Countries  (IMF, 2011) 
Defenders of the German three-pillar model argue that the low-interest margin charged on 
lending benefits the German economy. They argue that the higher lending margin forgone by 
the German Sparkassen banks is effectively subsidising the cost of credit for German firms, 
and producing eternities benefiting the German economy. This subsidisation enables the 
	18 For the five years ending 2010. 
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supply of low-cost patient capital to German firms investing in projects generating incremental 
innovation with long investment return horizons. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) analysis 
of lending by local Sparkassen and Volksbanken confirmed that the loan pricing of the 
Sparkassen is structurally lower than the pricing of the Volksbanken, despite both bank types 
lending to very similar clientele and, in many cases, lending to the same clients (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). The Sparkassen are also significant sponsors of local social activities 
within their communities, which puts pressure on their profit margins. Table 2.1 summarises 
an IMF estimate of the annual share of GDP attributable to credit subsidisation and social 
spending by Sparkassen, which was estimated to exceed 0.5% annually. The cost-
effectiveness of using the Sparkassen as a state-funded channel to produce these social 
benefits in comparison to other channels is an open question.  
Table 2.1: Summary of Sparkassen Social Spending and Implicit Subsidies (IMF, 
2011) 
 
Another factor negatively impacting the profitability of German banks is the frugality of 
individual German households. German households have the fourth highest savings rate in 
the EU, at approximately 10% of both GDP and household disposable income, which follows 
the Dutch, the Danes and the Swedes (OECD, 2018). Since deposits are the sole source of 
funding for the local German banks, an elevated level of deposits creates an incentive for the 
banks to make loans, even at lending margins below the risk-adjusted market rate, to avoid 
idle cash positions on which they must pay interest to depositors. As a result, the interest 
margin earned by German banks, calculated by dividing interest income by total assets, has 
been declining over the past 30 years (Lawton & Stevens, 2014). 
In contrast to German households, households in the UK have saved on average about 2.5% 
of disposable income over the same period, fluctuating between -1% and +5% in any given 
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year (OECD, 2018). Banks in the UK, however, are not solely reliant on deposits to finance 
their lending activities. Hardie and Horwath compared the deposit funding gap for banks across 
national economies and found that the loans made by German banks were close to being 
funded by customer deposits, while banks in the UK funded a significant share of loans by 
borrowing in capital markets (Hardie & Howarth, 2013a). 
2.1.2 Capital Markets  
Capital markets are markets for the buying and selling of equity and debt instruments issued 
by governments and corporations to sophisticated institutional investors. Using Zysman’s 
categorisations, the UK system is considered a capital markets-based financial system 
because a larger share of the financing of firms is provided by capital markets investors, 
primarily through the intermediation of financial exchanges. Figure 2.4 illustrates the market 
capitalisation of firms listed on the main domestic stock exchanges of four countries. The 
market capitalisation of the London Stock Exchange (LSE), measured as a percentage of GDP, 
is approximately four times greater than that of the Deutsche Boerse exchange in Germany. 
In the case of the LSE, the market capitalisation is larger than UK GDP because of the equity 
value of non-UK firms electing to list their shares on the LSE as a result of the deep financing 
capacity of the UK capital markets. Over 50% of the value of listed shares of companies on 
the LSE are owned by non-UK investors, with almost half of that amount owned by North 
American investors (Williams-Grut, 2015). 
Figure 2.4: Market capitalisation of Domestic Listed Companies as % of GDP (Kaserer, Fey, & Kuhn, 
2011) 
The concentration of the UK banking system and the regionalism of the German banking 
system is reflected in the organisation of capital markets in the two countries. While the UK 
has only one financial exchange trading stocks and bonds, namely the LSE, there are five 
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regional German exchanges, in addition to Frankfurt, on which investors can trade stocks and 
bonds: Stuttgart, Munich, Hamburg/Hannover, Dusseldorf, and Berlin/Bremen. All of these 
exchanges, with the exception of Frankfurt, have an explicit mission to support regional 
economic development, but are able to compete with each other for companies and investors. 
Consolidation has been occurring very slowly despite relatively low levels of trading volume, 
in part because of operating cost subsidies provided by the regional and local governments 
where the exchanges are based. The regional exchanges act as ‘crystallisation points’ 
supporting financial actors in the regions through their association with public and quasi-public 
institutions, most importantly the banks within their regions (Klagge & Martin, 2005). Despite 
their mission to support the regional economics in which they are based, the regional 
exchanges have had very limited impact on improving access to equity financing for SMEs 
within their regions, with the exception of the Munich exchange (Klagge & Martin, 2005). This 
is partly due to the regional exchanges embarking on strategies aimed at appealing to investors 
in niche market segments aimed at increasing trading revenues. Only the Munich exchange 
actively manages a strategy focused on attracting local firms to list on the exchange. 
The differences in the role of capital markets in Germany and the UK are also reflected in the 
investing behaviour of individual (‘retail’) investors in the two economies, as reflected in their 
respective domestic stock market participation rates. The participation rate of individuals in 
Germany has ranged from 8% to 15% of the population over the past 15 years, while the UK 
participation rate is more than double the German rate (Giannetti, 2010). Scholars cite two 
factors for the low participation rate in Germany. German households don’t need to invest in 
the stock market because of the relatively generous state-backed pensions plans; plus, their 
risk aversion to capital markets increased following losses they suffered buying listed equities 
during the dotcom bubble on the ill-fated Neuer Markt exchange for early stage tech companies 
(Lawton & Stevens, 2014). 
Capital markets transactions can also be bilateral private placement debt financings involving 
one or more institutional investors, which can also include banks and insurance companies. 
One form of private debt financing, known as a Schuldschein instrument, has long been used 
in Germany to finance relatively low-risk corporate borrowers. Unlike corporate bond offerings 
distributed via capital markets, Schuldschein loans do not require borrowers to have credit 
ratings, have more limited disclosure requirements, and are executed using much less 
documentation. Private placement debt financing also occurs in the UK market, but with much 
greater disclosure and loan documentation, including a requirement for a credit rating. 
2.1.3 Providers of Credit Information 
Bank lenders and investors in debt instruments use credit ratings to determine the repayment 
risk associated with a loan or bond. The rating reflects the probability that the borrower will 
default on repaying the loan and the loss likely to be incurred by the lender in the event of 
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default, based on a quantitative analysis of past and current financial and qualitative forward-
looking analysis of the borrower’s business (Scope Ratings, 2018). Ratings consist of a 
numerical or letter-based designation that reflect the financial and operational strength of the 
borrowers, and range from ‘investment grade’ (the lowest likelihood of non-repayment), 
through ‘sub-investment grade’ to ‘speculative’ (the highest likelihood on non-repayment).  
Bank lenders have credit analysts that review information about the borrower to produce an 
internal rating, usually not available to parties outside the bank, which is used to determine 
whether the bank is willing to make the loan and, if so, the terms of the loan. The information 
used to calculate the rating is primarily quantitative rather than qualitative, and is obtained from 
both internal and external sources. Bond investors rely on publicly accessible ratings produced 
by rating agencies. The ‘big three’ rating agencies (Standard & Poors, Moody’s, and Fitch) 
have their own credit analyst teams that produce corporate ratings using proprietary credit 
rating models for large firms undertaking bond issues to be placed with institutional investors 
via capital markets intermediaries.19 The big three credit rating agencies do not produce 
ratings for the SME segment20 of the market because these firms are too small to issue debt 
instruments to investors. 
The accessibility of credit-relevant information for SMEs is different for Germany and the UK. 
In Germany, there are three local credit agencies (Creditreform, Euler Hermes, and Scope) 
that collect data about German SMEs and mid-sized companies; this data is used to calculate 
various forms of credit scores and ratings of mid-sized companies not covered by the big three 
rating agencies. These ratings are used by SMEs to determine the creditworthiness of their 
suppliers and customers, as well as by providers of credit insurance to determine the risk of 
insuring an SME. One of these agencies hosts a reciprocal German debtors’ register that 
contains information about the historical payment performance of SMEs, with contributions by 
organisations like banks, with large debtor portfolios. Access to the register is restricted to the 
organisations contributing to the register. With the exception of reciprocal access to pooled 
credit information, the three German credit bureaus do not make their data sets used to 
calculate their scores and ratings available to third parties. The banks and the credit bureaus 
use extensive networks of local offices across Germany to collect credit-relevant information 
about SMEs. For example, the oldest of the three bureaus, Scope, has 129 local offices (Scope 
Ratings, 2018).  
	19 These ratings are paid for by the bond issuer, leading to potential conflicts of interest between the rating agency 
and investors relying on the ratings for investment decisions. This misalignment of interests can lead to inflated 
ratings produced by ‘ratings shopping’, and is often cited as a factor contributing to the 2008 financial crisis (see 
Skreta & Veldkamp, 2009). 20 In 2004, one of the big three agencies, Moody’s, launched a credit rating model for SMEs called KMV RisCalc 
for use by banks and other credit investors in SME loans. It has not been widely adopted. 
		 22	
The supply of credit information about SMEs is significantly greater in the UK market. In one 
respect, the UK market is more concentrated since there is one large dominant supplier 
(Experian). Like its credit bureau counterparts in Germany, Experian provides a probability of 
default score for SMEs, and also participates in hosting a debtors’ register with a similar 
reciprocal access arrangement to the German debtor register model. Despite the greater 
supplier concentration in the UK, access to credit-relevant data is more open, because 
Experian’s small business subsidiary also sells its financial information dataset for SMEs, 
called PH Megafile, to any entity willing to pay for it. As a result, both banks and non-bank 
credit providers can use this data in their own internal credit rating models. While there are 
fewer firms suppling SME credit information in the UK market, non-bank entities have access 
to more credit-relevant SME data that non-bank entities in the German market. While the 
German model benefits firms by providing them with greater privacy regarding their financial 
performance, the increased access to UK credit information should reduce barriers to entry for 
non-bank lenders and increase firms’ access to finance. 
2.1.4 Regulatory Environment  
The approach to financial services regulation in Germany and the UK, as it relates to corporate 
lending, is consistent with the bank-based and market-based orientation of the former and the 
latter, respectively. Regulatory oversight of lending in the UK is provided by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA).21 In essence, any investor investing its own capital qualifies for an 
exemption from the authorisation required to conduct a lending activity. In Germany, financial 
services are regulated by the Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, or BaFin. 
Regulation of lending in Germany differs from the UK regulation in two important respects: (i) 
the definition of loan instruments, specifically what constitutes a loan versus other types of 
debt securities; and (ii) the nature of how a lender initially engaged the borrower (the 
‘origination’) prior to making the loan. A loan is a debt instrument that cannot be traded to a 
third party without the permission of the borrower (unless the loan is in default), and only a 
credit institution holding a bank licence22 can solicit a borrower for the purpose of making a 
loan. Debt securities, such as bonds, are tradeable by definition and any investor can purchase 
them without the need to be regulated. 
Securities and other investment products may not be offered for sale to investors in Germany 
without a prospectus, and the publication of any such prospectus requires the prior permission 
of BaFin. BaFin checks whether the prospectus contains the minimum information required by 
law and whether it has been written in a way that is readily understandable. BaFin also ensures 
that the prospectus contains no contradictory statements. However, BaFin does not verify the 	21 The FCA succeeded the Financial Services Authority in 2012. This transition is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 22 The relevance of this point is discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
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respectability of the issuer, nor does it examine the product itself. Issuers of investment 
products must make an explicit reference to that fact in their sales prospectuses. Issuers of 
securities are expressly prohibited from making advertising statements that may give a 
misleading impression about the scope of BaFin's examination. There is a similar prospectus 
requirement in the UK, although it is not approved by the regulator.  
In summary, the financial systems of Germany and the UK appear to fit the characterisation of 
bank credit versus capital markets financial systems, respectively, and the structure of credit 
information and the regulatory environment appears to reinforce this. The following sections of 
this chapter describe how these systems correspond to financing needs of SMEs, and how the 
financial crisis has led to the accelerated development of channels that emerged from outside 
of the banking and capital markets system in each country. 
2.2 Small and Medium-Sized Firms 
This section of the chapter discusses small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) as they are the 
borrowers using the alternative lending channels discussed in this dissertation. It also 
discusses the governance characteristics that distinguish family owned firms, particularly the 
German Mittelstand firms. This section also discusses the institutions in the economy of each 
country that influence SMEs’ access to financing. 
2.2.1 Contribution of SMEs  
The most frequently referenced definition for SMEs is the one provided by the European 
Commission, as illustrated in Table 2.2. The categories used to segment SMEs on the basis 
of size suggest significant variation in their financing. A medium-sized firm with €50 million in 
annual turnover has very different needs, and will access different financing channels, as 
compared with a micro-enterprise employing less than 10 people. 
Table 2.2: SME Classification by Size Category  
 
Source: European Commission (2016) 
SMEs are an important, yet often underestimated, contributor to economic output, given they 
typically account for more than 99% of firms, employ a majority of workers, and produce a 
majority of the goods and services in most economies. Table 2.3 summarises the percentage 
share of enterprises, employment and the value of goods and services (GVA) in Germany and 
the UK. While SMEs represent a similar proportion of firms in both economies, the German 
Company(
Category #(of(Employees Turnover
Balance(
Sheet(Total
Medium'sized <+250
Small <+50
Micro <+10
!+€+10+m !+€+10+m
!+€2+m !+€+2+m
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SMEs employ a larger share of the German workforce and contribute a higher share of output 
to their economy than UK SMEs.  
Table 2.3: SME Contribution to German and UK Economies in 2012 
 
        Source: Eurostat (2018) 
In both countries, a firm is considered to be a family firm if members of the owning family 
control a majority of its voting shares and also directly participate in its management. Firms in 
the UK are considered family firms if any number of family members collectively have voting 
control, and any number of family members are involved in either the management or 
administration of the firm (Oxford Economics, 2014). The German criteria are more stringent, 
and reflect a stronger linkage between ownership, managerial control and individual 
accountability: voting control must be held by no more than two family members and these 
same individuals must be directly involved in the management of the firm.  
Despite family ownership of almost all SMEs in the both the UK and Germany, describing a 
firm as an ‘SME’ or ‘family owned’ has different connotations in the two countries. In the UK, 
the two labels reflect separate attributes, with the former referring to firm size and the latter 
referring to the ownership and control structure of a firm. In Germany, the term Mittelstand is 
used to describe a small firm and a family owned firm as they are considered to be one and 
the same. ‘Mittelstand’ in German refers literally to an ‘entrepreneurial self-employed middle 
class’. However, the term Mittelstand also describes firms that are much larger than SMEs, 
because 95% of German firms, regardless of size, qualify as being family owned. Hence, 
Germans do not have a concise and uniform definition for what constitutes a Mittelstand firm 
(Simon, 1996). For many Germans, the more important defining characteristics are qualitative, 
with firms considered as being Mittelstand having governance structures that reflect a long-
term, stakeholder-values orientation in the decision-making of the owners and managers.  
2.2.2 Institutional Environment 
SMEs in both the UK and Germany rely on a number of institutions to carry on their day-to-day 
activities. Differences in two institutional spheres, the vocational education & training systems 
and industry associations, between the two countries are particularly relevant to the analysis 
of the alternative lending channel development. Chapter 6 discusses how these institutional 
practices contribute to the production of trust relied on by mini-bond and P2B lenders in each 
economy. 
Country Total SME.Share Total SME.Share Total.(€.bln) SME.Share
Germany 2,189,737 99.50% 26,401,395 62.50% 1,385,501 53.30%
United9Kingdom 1,703,562 99.70% 17,784,620 53.00% 1,037,293 50.90%
Enterprises Employees Gross.Value.Added.
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2.2.2.1 Vocational Education and Training 
The vocational education and training (VET) system in both countries has historically made 
firms rather than the state school system primarily responsible for training workers. However, 
VET schemes in the UK are largely populated by school leavers, whereas most German 
participants are enrolled in VET programmes while they continue to attend school. In Germany, 
a large proportion of teenage students, over 50% in some German regions (Frietsch, 2003), 
are streamed into occupational training paths and subsequently spend two to three years 
working as apprentices in local Mittelstand firms while continuing their secondary education in 
vocational schools. In comparison to Germany, a very small proportion of young people23 in 
the UK participate in apprenticeship programmes. Over the past 15 years, approximately 3% 
of 15 to 19-year-olds on average started an apprenticeship in any given year (Powell, 2018). 
The average length of UK apprenticeships, at less than two years, is significantly shorter than 
most apprenticeships in Germany. 
A characteristic differentiating the UK and German systems historically has been the periodic 
interventions by the UK government in introducing new policy-driven VET initiatives. Many of 
these initiatives have targeted skill development for the unemployed in an effort to increase 
employment, with the result that skill development in the UK has focused on the low end of the 
skills spectrum (Crouch, Finegold, & Sako, 1999). In contrast, skill development in the German 
apprenticeship system has consistently focused on the higher end of the skills spectrum. Highly 
skilled German workers have historically had little incentive to change employers to advance 
their careers and increase earnings, because employers place a high value on tenure and 
experience directly relevant to the activities of the firm. As a result, fewer Germans than Britons 
move to take another job (Dustmann & Pereira, 2008). The combination of deep, local roots 
and a strong apprenticeship system means that, in Germany, only 7.8% of those aged 25 or 
under are unemployed in 2013, a rate far lower than non-German-speaking countries on the 
European continent24. Mittelstand firms also inspire loyalty: on average, only 2.7% of their 
workers leave each year, versus 30% of workers at some large American companies (The 
Economist, 2014). 
2.2.2.2 Industry Associations  
Industry associations are structured quite differently in the UK when compared to Germany, 
with different levels of influence on the behaviour of firms and, in particular, in the area of inter-
firm relations. Industry associations in the UK have evolved over the course of time in an 
‘incremental and piecemeal manner’, resulting in a heterogeneous collection of associations 
	23	Defined as under 19 years of age at the start of the apprenticeship.	24 This unemployment rate includes the former East Germany region, and had dropped to 6.3% in 2017. In 2013 
the ‘under 25’ unemployment rate in Sweden was 22.1%.  
		 26	
with weak representation at the national level (Lane & Bachmann, 1997: 234). The UK has 
more than 3,000 associations claiming more than 4 million members, with the typical SME 
employing 10 to 99 employees belonging to more than five different organisations (Bennett & 
Ramsden, 2007). Instability and insufficient operating scale and professionalism in operations 
appear to be the defining characteristics of UK business associations. The annual churn rates 
exceed 10% of members in some associations (Bennett & Ramsden, 2007), and approximately 
70% of associations employ less than 5 staff, with about half of that number employing no staff 
(Lane & Bachmann, 1997:237).  
In contrast, the organisation of industry associations in Germany is highly centralised, as well 
as being a model of stability, with a hierarchical structure of large-scale, professionalised 
associations having an influential voice with national policy-makers. At the macro level, the 
Federation of German Industries (BDI) acts as an umbrella organisation for 35 industry 
associations representing more than 100,000 firms employing more than 8 million workers 
(Federation of German Industries, 2018). One of the member associations of the BDI is the 
largest trade association in Europe, the VDMA, which represents more than half of all 
companies in the German mechanical and systems engineering industry, most of which are 
SMEs. The VDMA alone has more than 500 employees working in eight global offices, with 
more than 50 trade associations and departments representing different industry sectors 
(VDMA, 2018). 
The contrasting characteristics of industry associations in Germany when compared to the UK 
have resulted in the associations providing different functions in each economy. Lane and 
Bachmann outline a framework of goods provided by trade associations, ranging from: (i) social 
interaction between members; to (ii) political representation of members and indirectly non-
members; to (iii) services exclusively available to members as an alternative to open market 
procurement; to (iv) self-regulation and decisions on behalf of members (Lane & Bachmann, 
1997:238). The authors argue that the German trade associations can attract and retain a large 
base of members because they are able to provide all four functions, whereas the relatively 
weaker UK associations can only offer the much more limited benefits derived from (i) and (iii) 
(Lane & Bachmann, 1997). The relevance of the German associations’ ability to provide self-
regulation and bind its members to the production of trust is discussed in Chapter 6. 
2.3 Alternative Lending Channels 
Borrowers turn to alternative channels when they are unable to obtain financing from traditional 
banking or capital market sources because of factors that are either exogenous or endogenous 
to the borrower. Exogenous factors can be structural, such as a dysfunctional financial system 
in a developing economy that cannot be relied on by firms to meet their financing needs. 
Exogenous events, like regulation changes, can occur that negatively impact a bank’s capacity 
to lend and reduce lending to potential borrowers, including to those firms with creditworthiness 
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unaffected by the events. Insufficient creditworthiness is an obvious endogenous factor limiting 
the ability of a firm to obtain a bank loan; however, there are other characteristics of otherwise 
creditworthy borrowers which limit access to bank lending because they do not conform to the 
lending criteria of a regulated lender. In both Germany and the UK, for example, firms which 
have not been operating for at least two years are generally unable to obtain a bank loan, and 
firms which cannot provide tangible assets available as loan collateral have more difficulty 
borrowing from banks. 
2.3.1 Description of Mini-Bond and P2B Lending 
This dissertation applies a deliberately broad definition of channel to mini-bond and P2B 
lending, which encompasses both the form of the financial instrument and the method of 
distribution for each channel. A financial instrument is defined as ‘a contract that gives rise to 
a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity’ 
(ACCA, 2018). A mini-bond or P2B loan instrument creates an asset for the lender and a 
liability for the borrower, and the contractual rights and obligations contained in each 
instrument are important determinants of its regulatory and legal status. As a loan instrument, 
most P2B loans are structurally equivalent to a bank loan,25 which is typically a senior-ranking 
loan secured by the assets of the borrower. A mini-bond is typically a loan which is not secured 
by the assets of the borrower and therefore subordinated to any secured loan obligations of 
the borrower. If a mini-bond borrower is unable to repay its loan obligations, then its senior-
ranking secured lender has a claim for repayment that will rank ahead of the unsecured mini-
bond lender. As instruments, P2B loans are substitutes for bank loans, while mini-bonds are 
complements to bank loans. Given its subordinated ranking and lack of loan collateral, a mini-
bond is considered by knowledgeable investors as a higher risk loan instrument than a senior-
ranking secured loan for a given borrower.  
The mini-bond channel is a direct method of distribution, with the bond issuers placing their 
bonds directly with investors and, in some cases, arranging to have the bond issue listed on a 
financial exchange following the placement. The P2B lending channel is an indirect method of 
distribution with online platforms acting as intermediaries between borrowers and investors. 
The platforms make loan requests of borrowers available to investors who would otherwise be 
unaware of a borrower’s desire for a loan. The platforms also screen loan applicants to assess 
their creditworthiness, allowing only borrowers meeting the platforms’ credit standards to seek 
a loan on the platform. The P2B platform employ risk analysts formerly employed by bank 
lenders and advertise this to support claims that their credit assessment process is at least as 
rigorous as the incumbent bank lenders. The intensity of the intermediation also varies by 
	25 The structural equivalence of loan instruments does not imply that P2B lenders and banks make loans to 
borrowers with similar risk profiles. 
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platform. The intermediating role of some platforms is limited to acting as a bulletin board 
matching investors and borrowers. Some platforms go further by providing investors with 
analytic tools and ratings of loan risk to inform investment decisions, while other platforms use 
algorithms to select the portfolios of loans for investors based on these investors’ expressed 
risk/return preferences. Platforms are responsible for the administration of loan payments as 
well as monitoring the repayment performance of their borrowers. Most P2B platforms are 
compensated by investors rather than the borrowers, in a deliberate effort to align their 
interests with the former rather than the latter. The typical annual fee charged to each investor 
is 1% of their outstanding loan investments on the platform. In the event of default, the 
individual investor in the defaulting loan bears the loss. 
2.3.2 Mini-bond Lending Before the Financial Crisis 
The origin of mini-bond lending is a German story, as there were no mini-bonds issued in the 
UK market before the onset of the financial crisis. Mini-bonds emerged in Germany in the 
1980s as a means for funding the small-scale infrastructure projects of member-governed 
community organisations, such as utilities or sports clubs, which needed to invest in the 
refurbishment of distribution infrastructure or a new football pitch. Traditional forms of financing 
were difficult for these organisations to obtain. Member-governed structures were unable to 
raise funding by selling shares, and these entities did not easily fit the lending criteria of bank 
lenders, given that their stated purpose is to maximise community benefit rather than to 
maximise profits. The regulatory requirements for issuing mini-bonds was relatively light, so 
compliance obligations were manageable for small and financially unsophisticated 
organisations. While a prospectus had to be submitted to the BaFin for approval, the 
disclosures contained in the prospectus were much less extensive than those of a traditional 
corporate bond offering,26 and the BaFin provided assistance to small applicants in completing 
the required prospectus documentation. 
In many respects, a mini-bond issued by a community organisation and purchased by 
individuals in the community was an early form of social impact investing, which provided the 
investors with an opportunity to support their local community while generating a financial 
return. Bonds were sold locally via direct private placement by the organisations issuing the 
bonds, which advertised their sale in local newspapers and at local community events. One of 
the earliest confirmed cases of a mini-bond issued by a commercial company occurred during 
the 1998 emerging markets financial crisis, when firms doing business in emerging markets at 
that time were experiencing a contraction in their access to funding. One such firm was 
PCCSE, a company based in Duisburg and which generated almost 100% of its revenues from 	26 The general manager of one German mini-bond issuer, that issued a 10 million euro mini-bond and provided 
transaction data for this research project, stated that he and his administrative assistant competed the prospectus 
in less than six weeks without the assistance of a lawyer. 
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petrochemical commodity trading and distribution in Poland. After its bank lenders suddenly 
withdrew their credit lines to the company in late 1998, the founder placed an advertisement 
in the local newspaper offering to pay 2% more interest than the local Sparkassen savings 
bank for savers placing their funds with PCCSE, and received almost 5 million Deutschmarks 
in funding as a result. In 2002 and 2003, the banks began to tighten their lending criteria as 
the German economy slowed, and this motivated other small firms to issue mini-bonds. One 
issuer from that period was Zimbo, a second generation-owned and managed meat and 
sausage processor based in the Ruhr Valley. The company estimated that it saved between 
two and five per cent on the cost of a bank loan by issuing a 5-year 15 million euro mini-bond 
to finance the expansion of its sausage-making operations in the Polish market (Brors, 2003).  
The pre-2008 period also saw alternative energy firms adopt mini-bonds as a form of financing 
as local German communities began implementing the German government’s decision in 2000 
to phase out nuclear power and increase the use of renewable sources of energy.27 Firms 
seeking funding for wind and solar power projects, taking advantage of generous feed-in tariffs 
offered by the German government for renewable-sourced electricity, found it difficult to borrow 
the full amount needed to fund projects from banks because they were typically relatively 
young firms that had a limited amount of equity available to invest. Alternatively, some of the 
energy firms had cooperative ownership structures that made it structurally difficult to raise 
equity for new projects. For example, three-quarters of the households of Jühnde, a rural 
village of 750 people, formed a cooperative to build a bioenergy plant to produce heat with 
local biomass produced by the local farmers, partly financed with mini-bonds purchased by the 
cooperative members (Adam, 2013). The awareness of mini-bonds grew as small-scale 
energy producers began to aggressively advertise mini-bonds offerings to individual investors; 
this attracted the interest of the mainstream financial press, which began publishing articles 
about the higher risks associated with this new form of ‘private placement’ bond in comparison 
to the relative security of depositing money in a bank account28.  
The growing use of mini-bonds for financing SMEs stalled in 2004 following the introduction of 
a new loan instrument, which proved to be very popular with firms, banks, and investors alike. 
That year, the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation, the multi-lateral group responsible for 
coordinating global banking regulation, published its Basel II guidelines changing the risk-
weightings for regulatory capital reserves held by banks. One stipulated change was an 
increase in the amount of regulatory capital that banks needed to reserve for small business 
loans, so the banks devised a loan instrument that would reduce their small business lending 	27 This was an outcome of Germany’s commitment to implement Article 21, a non-binding action plan produced 
during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro for the UN, other multi-lateral bodies and national government to 
engage in sustainable development at the local and regional level. Germany began implementing this at the local 
level in earnest in the early 2000s. 28 For example see Frankfurter Algemeine, 2004. 
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while retaining relationships with these borrowers. The banks created securitised pools of 
relatively small29 ‘mezzanine’ loans funded by third party investors, with the proceeds of these 
loans used by borrowers to repay part of their outstanding indebtedness to their primary 
relationship bank (hausbank) lender. Unlike traditional loan SME loan securitisations, the loans 
were not placed with the borrowers until after the funding was provided by investors30 so that 
these loans never appeared on the balance sheets of the banks. In addition to reducing their 
lending exposure, the banks benefited by earning an origination fee of 3% to 4% of the value 
for each mezzanine loan it placed with a borrower. These mezzanine loans were popular with 
borrowers, since the higher interest rates were only slightly higher than those on their bank 
loans, but with long maturities of seven years, as opposed to three to five years for a bank 
loan, and with no principal repayments during the term of the loan. The German banks placed 
almost 900 loans with a total volume of 5 billion euros with 743 firms between 2004 and 2007 
(Brinkmann & Herbertz, 2010). The demand for funding to repay these mezzanine loans when 
they began maturing in 2011 as a factor influencing the development of the German mini-bond 
channel is discussed in Chapter 5. 
2.3.3 P2B Lending Before the Financial Crisis 
The earliest applications of online crowdfunding financed arts and music projects, which 
offered non-financial rewards to the individuals making financial contributions to projects. 
Arguably, the first instance of online crowdfunding occurred in 1997 when the British rock group 
Marillion raised £40,000 in donations from its fans to fund a US tour (Betti & Gherardini, 2013). 
The first online crowdfunding platform dedicated to soliciting funding for the projects of multiple 
artists, called ArtistShare, was launched in the US in 2003 (Belleflamme, Lambert, & 
Schwienbacher, 2012). 
In contrast to mini-bond lending, P2B lending prior to the financial crisis is a UK story. Online 
crowdfunding platforms that provided a financial return to investors, as opposed to a non-
financial reward, did not exist until March 2005, when Zopa was launched in the UK market. 
Zopa, the world’s first ‘peer-2-peer’ (P2P) lender, launched its platform to provide loans to 
individuals funded by individual investors, and many of these borrowers obtained loans to 
finance their business activities. The Zopa platform lent approximately £25 million from its 
inception until the financial crisis in September 2008 (Andrews, 2014). The loans made via the 
Zopa platform performed relatively well during the financial crisis, with net returns (gross 
interest less defaults) earned by investors falling from 7% in 2007 to 4.7% in 2008 before 
recovering to 7.5% in 2009. Lending via online platforms began in Germany about two and a 
half years later, in 2007, with the launch of the Auxmoney P2P consumer lending platform. 
	29 The loans ranged from €3 million to €10 million each. 30 Normally, SME loan securitisations refinance loans that have already been made by a bank lender. 
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Auxmoney had a slower start than Zopa, having lent only one million euros by September 
2008. 
In summary, mini-bond lending was a more prevalent form of financing in Germany than the 
UK prior to the crisis, while the reverse was true for P2B lending in the UK market, ‘Pure’ P2B 
lending, i.e. lending to firms rather than to individuals for business purposes, had not begun in 
either country prior to the onset of the crisis. However, the lending volumes generated by both 
of the channels in the pre-crisis period were relatively insignificant compared with traditional 
bank lending and other forms of non-traditional debt financing, such as the securitised 
mezzanine loans that emerged during the same period. 
2.3 The 2008 Financial Crisis in Germany and the UK 
This section provides an overview of the financial crisis and its role as a catalyst for the 
development of alternative finance channels in Germany and the UK after the crisis subsided. 
It discusses the impact of the crisis on the banking system of the two countries and changes 
in the availability of bank financing to firms that occurred as a consequence of the crisis.  
The financial crisis that began in September 2008 following the failure of Lehman Brothers was 
an exogenous shock to all economies in the developed world. Soon after the onset of the crisis, 
financial institutions began hoarding funds in the face of uncertainty about the creditworthiness 
of other financial institutions. This uncertainty rapidly spread through the real economy and 
started a spiralling contraction in production and consumption, which ultimately led to a 
contraction in the supply of financing by banks. The financial crisis eroded the level of trust that 
virtually every actor in developed economies had placed in these institutions. Corporate 
lending in the euro zone was 43% lower in 2012 than in 2011, and 68% lower than it was in 
2008 despite European Central Bank monetary policies aimed at injecting liquidity into the 
banking system (Ball, 2012). The contraction in corporate lending was similar across European 
economies in the initial stage of the crisis, but subsequently diverged as the interest rates 
charged by the banking system in countries that implemented fiscal restrictions as part of 
austerity programmes. This had two effects on businesses’ access to funding. First, borrowers 
located in those countries with austerity programmes were harder hit than those in other 
countries (Smaghi, 2013). Second, small businesses were hurt more than large businesses 
because the latter were able to access the liquidity that flooded into global capital markets as 
a result of quantitative easing and other monetary and fiscal policies. 
In the UK, banks faced higher regulatory capital requirements, with the result that borrowing 
conditions for all but the largest and most creditworthy companies became more onerous 
following the crisis (Billington, 2013). An analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on bank 
lending to UK SMEs commissioned by the UK government shortly after the crisis found higher 
rejection rates, higher loan margins and more onerous collateral requirements for UK SMEs 
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seeking loans in 2008/9 when compared to similar firms seeking loans prior to 2008 (Fraser, 
2012). Figure 2.5 illustrates the sharp increase in term loan margins originated in 2009, more 
than double the loan margins for loans originated in 2005. The pattern of loan margin increase 
between 2008 and 2009 suggests that there were two distinct phases of the financial crisis in 
the 2007-9 period: a liquidity crisis in 2007-8 followed by an insolvency crisis in 2008-9, with 
the latter causing a more severe tightening of lending to SMEs (Fraser, 2012:66). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Term Loan Margins (% over UK Base Rate) by Year of Loan Origination 
The German economy consistently outperformed the UK economy from the onset of the crisis 
from 2008 through to 2013, and there was significantly more financing available to German 
firms during this period. Figure 2.6 shows the cumulative change in both annual GDP and 
corporate lending volume for the UK and Germany between 2007 and 2013. Over this period, 
German corporate lending volume increased 30% and GDP increased 6%, while UK corporate 
lending and GDP declined by 15% and 2%, respectively.  
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Figure 2.6: Annual Change in GDP and Corporate Lending From 2007 to 2013 (Bank of England, 
German Bundesbank) 
In comparative terms, German firms retained relatively better access to bank financing 
compared to UK firms, but this relative advantage was concentrated in the small firm segment 
of the market. The local banks, both the state-owned Sparkassen and cooperatively owned 
Volksbanken, sailed relatively unscathed through the crisis because they were restricted to 
funding their lending activities with deposits and so were not exposed to the liquidity problems 
associated with market-based forms of financing. German clients moved their deposits from 
commercial banks to the local banks during the crisis as they became concerned about the 
solvency of the large commercial banks. Figure 2.7 illustrates the ‘flight to safety’ of bank 
depositors during the crisis in Germany, as individuals and companies moved funds out of the 
commercial banks and into the local banks. From 2004 to 2008, the commercial banks 
aggressively competed for deposits and increased their relative share of bank deposits 
significantly. This trend reversed in 2010, when depositors began moving funds from the 
commercial banks to the local Sparkassen savings banks and cooperative banks in response 
to the Eurozone crisis. This reduction in deposits exacerbated the balance sheet problems 
faced by the commercial banks. 
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Figure 2.7: Deposits to Total Assets of German Banks from 2003 to 2013  (Grossl & Arnold, 2013) 
This increase in deposits helped the local banks to actually increase their lending volume 
during the crisis (Wilson, Atkins, & Bryant, 2012). Figure 2.8 illustrates the amount of 
outstanding loans to assets for the three pillars of the German banking system over time. 
Despite increasing their share of bank deposits, the local Sparkassen and cooperative banks 
also increased their loan to asset ratios, indicating that their lending volumes increased by a 
significant amount over the period. This loan growth happened for several reasons. First, in 
the retail business, where Sparkassen and cooperative banks traditionally have a strong 
position, they benefited from higher demand for mortgage loans in the low-interest rate 
environment (Koch et al., 2016). In the corporate market, the Sparkassen and cooperative 
banks benefited from the more restrictive lending practices of the other banks, while continuing 
to get steady loan demand from their core base Mittelstand clients. Hence, German SMEs 
generally enjoyed better access to financing than firms located in other European countries. In 
2013, only 3% of German borrowers were rejected in their loan application and 86% of the 
applicants got the full amount that they requested. By contrast, 18% of loan applications made 
by UK SMEs were declined, and only 66% got the full amount they requested (European 
Commision, 2013). 
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Figure 2.8: Loans to Total Assets of German Banks from 2003 to 2013 (Grossl & Arnold, 2013) 
Large German firms faced reduced bank lending and, like large UK firms, could turn to capital 
markets if they had a funding requirement large enough to satisfy institutional investors, which 
is generally considered to be a bond issue of at least €200 million. Small firms with borrowing 
needs that could be fully satisfied by the relatively healthy local savings and cooperative banks 
were able to continue borrowing on terms that were similar to the pre-crisis period (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2009). However, the small local banks have limited funding capacity and typically 
do not lend more than €3 million to any single borrower (Holliday, 2012). Assuming local banks 
have lending capacity of €6 million to a single borrower, lend on a ratio of 2.5 times EBITDA,31 
and EBITDA margins are 12% of revenues for a small German firm, then firms with below €20 
to €25 million in annual revenue had little need to source alternative funding.  
Not all German firms avoided adverse funding challenges during the crisis, despite enjoying 
better lending conditions than their UK counterparts. Many mid-sized German firms that were 
reliant on the five main commercial banks32 and the regional state-owned Landesbanken faced 
a contraction in loan financing. This segment of borrowers had financing needs that were too 
large for the small local banks to satisfy, yet they were not large enough to have direct access 
to capital markets-based sources of funding. One negative consequence of the crisis for these 
borrowers was the consolidation of the large German commercial banks In September 2008. 
One of the commercial banks, Dresdner Bank, was acquired by Commerzbank and 30% of 
another, Postbank, was acquired by Deutsche Bank.33 A third, HVB, completed and agreed a 	31 Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation. It is a proxy for the cash flow of a borrower and 
a common metric used to determine the loan amount that can be serviced by a borrower. 32 The five main banks were Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, Postbank and HypoVereinsbank. 33	Deutsche Bank acquired the remaining 70% from Deutsche Post in 2012.  
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merger with Unicredito, an Italian bank. The two remaining players were forced to tighten 
lending standards because of increased capital requirements for corporate loans in response 
to regulatory changes introduced by the Basel Committee. The Landesbanken experienced 
even greater financial stress than the commercial banks. Their balance sheets were much 
weaker after the crisis, having suffered severe credit downgrades, and they required €166 
billion in state aid to avoid insolvency (Stevens, 2011).  
In summary, firms in both countries faced reduced access to bank financing as the peak of the 
crisis had passed. In the UK, the affected firms included SMEs of all sizes. In Germany, it was 
the larger SMEs34 with needs that could not be met by either the local banks or capital markets 
that were most negatively affected. These differences in access to bank finance by type of firm 
and by country influenced the demand for alternative finance channels in each country in the 
aftermath of the crisis. 
  
	34 The use of the term ‘large SMEs’ in this dissertation includes some firms with annual revenue exceeding the 
upper limit of €50 million revenue for the SME category as defined by the EU. 
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Chapter 3: Sociology of Finance, Comparative Institutionalism and Trust 
This dissertation investigates the role that trust has played in the development of alternative 
(non-bank) sources of lending to firms in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. It examines 
finance practices through a sociological lens and draws on theoretical insights from 
multidisciplinary research regarding trust. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section discusses the economic sociology literature, particularly the sociology of finance35 
(SoF) literature, which is relevant to the practices of finance within the financial systems of 
national economies. While the growing influence of finance within society produced by 
financialisation has been attracting more attention from sociologists, the SoF literature remains 
relatively sparse and, therefore, the first section focuses on highlighting the gaps in the 
prevailing literature which are addressed in this dissertation. The second and third sections of 
this chapter discuss the theoretical insights from the trust and comparative institutionalism 
literatures incorporated into the dissertation’s methodological approach in order to link 
institutional analysis at the macro level, with investor behaviour analysis at the micro level. To 
summarise, the chapter highlights the opportunity offered by a more broadly-based 
sociological approach to comparing cross-national finance practices than the approaches 
historically used in either the SoF or the comparative institutionalism literatures. 
3.1 Sociology of Finance 
3.1.1 Defining the Field of Study 
The object of study in this dissertation is the financing practices of actors in the financial 
systems of the UK and Germany, which place this research within the field of economic 
sociology and, more specifically, the ‘new’ economic sociology that has emerged as a sub-
field within sociology over the course of the 1980s and 1990s.36 What is now referred to as 
‘old’ economic sociology reflected the work of Durkheim and Weber and largely complemented 
the work of neoclassical economics, whereas the ‘new’ version directly challenges the 
ideological orientation and explanatory power of homo economicus in explaining economic 
phenomena like market and price formation (Granovetter & Swedberg, 2011:5). Dodd et al 
contend the two fundamental theoretical propositions informing new economic sociology are 
‘that economic action is embedded in social structure and/or other variants, such as political 
processes and cultural practices; and, second, that the economic system is embedded 
in society’ (Dodd, Aspers, & Anderberg, 2015:1). 
	35	Also referred to as ‘sociology of financial markets’.  This dissertation uses ‘sociology of finance’ rather than 
sociology of financial markets because the object of the study is the finance practices of individual investors as 
opposed to the actions of organisations in financial markets.	36 Economic sociology was formally recognised as a section of the American Sociological Association in 2001 and 
had more than 800 members at the end of 2018. 
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While economic sociologists focus on understanding production, consumption and exchange 
in a broad social and economic context, scholars in the sub-field of SoF are primarily 
concerned with examining the roles of individuals, organisations and institutions in the financial 
system and the consequences of the financial system for the welfare of society (Epstein, 2005; 
Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2012). SoF has been gradually coalescing as a distinct area of research 
over the course of the past 10 to 15 years, following the publication of compendiums like The 
Sociology of Financial Markets (Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2005) that assembled sociological 
research investigating financial markets phenomena. Interest in studying the financial system 
through a sociological lens increased following the financial crisis, as neoclassical economics 
approaches that used to analyse market efficiency began to experience a loss of credibility.  
An eclectic collection of scholarship was assembled in 2012 for The Oxford Handbook of The 
Sociology of Finance (Knorr Cetina & Preda, 2012) which, in addition to sociology, included 
contributions from anthropologists, geographers, political economists, ethicists, and 
accountants. Many of the contributors to the Oxford Handbook publication are based in 
Europe, where ‘social studies of finance’ (SSF) is used to describe the sub-field focused on 
understanding the dynamics of financial markets through a social science lens. Regardless of 
whether the field is described as SoF or SSF, the clusters of research being undertaken by the 
two groups of scholars are broadly similar, so the term SoF will be used throughout this 
dissertation. This dissertation makes a contribution to the SoF literature by examining financial 
practices using theoretical concepts of sociological inquiry to analyse the actions and 
motivations of actors in the financial system. 
3.1.2 Embeddedness in Economic Sociology 
The concept of embeddedness is possibly the most important theoretical concept to have 
developed within economic sociology, and in many respects has been the impetus for the 
emergence of economic sociology as a sub-discipline. Embeddedness was initially 
conceptualised by Polanyi ( Polanyi, 1945; Polanyi, Arensberg, & Pearson, 1957) as a macro-
level phenomenon integrating economic activities within the broader social system with the 
latter constraining economic activities. Granovetter’s conceptualisation of embeddedness 
came later, placing economic action in social contexts at the micro and meso levels and 
abandoning the constraining nature of embeddedness conceptualised by Polanyi 
(Granovetter, 1985).  During the 1980s and 1990s, sociologists began pursuing a research 
agenda linking the influence of social embeddedness and social network structures to the 
internal functioning of firms and the performance outcomes of inter-firm relations (e.g. Portes 
& Sensenbrenner, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997; Burt, 1992). In the Granovetterian perspective, 
markets are perceived as networks and groups, with trust relationships underpinned by social 
networks and, thereby, enabling the processing of uncertainties (Preda, 2007). Actors within 
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these networks send and receive signals that influence the decisions of those in the network 
about the quality and price of goods (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2004).   
While some of these models are difficult to empirically test, some scholars have done so quite 
effectively using primary and secondary data sets. One of the early studies of social 
embeddedness and financial practice is Brian Uzzi’s analysis of firms’ access to bank loan 
financing, examining ‘the degree to which commercial transactions take place through social 
relations and networks of relations that use exchange protocols associated with social, non-
commercial attachments to cover business dealings’ (Uzzi, 1999). Uzzi found that transactions 
between firms and banks that are embedded in relationships increase firms’ access to 
financing and lower borrowing costs; and that, the more commercial transactions between a 
firm and the bank it borrows from are embedded in social attachments, the more expectations 
of trust and reciprocity shape the transacting, thereby promoting governance benefits and 
transfers of private resources that are inaccessible merely through market ties (ibid: 500). Ezra 
Zuckerman’s studies investigating the influence of categorisation of the price of financial 
securities is another example (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999),37 and is discussed in more detail in the 
trust section of this chapter. 
The theoretical concept of embeddedness is attractive because it presents an intuitively 
appealing challenge to the assumptions underlying neoclassical economics. However, it has 
also been criticised for being theoretically vague, and thereby failing to be an organising 
framework for economic sociology (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). One reason 
embeddedness is problematic is because it has multiple meanings that are either derived from 
the individual level enabling conceptualisation of Granovetter, or the societal level constraining 
influence of embeddedness envisioned by Polanyi (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). For example, 
Zukin and DiMaggio identify four types of embeddedness – cognitive, cultural, structural and 
political – which refer to both micro and macro levels of analysis (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). 
Unlike the field of economics, which managed to provide a theoretical system unifying 
microeconomics and macroeconomics, the two conceptualisations of embeddedness have not 
been linked in economic sociology. 
The theoretical concept of embeddedness informs the hypotheses for the research questions 
posed in this dissertation. The methodology attempts to reconcile the macro-micro dualism of 
embeddedness by addressing the comparative analysis of finance practices at both the 
Polanyian, or institutional level, and the Granovettarian individual level. At the macro level, 
scholars have drawn parallels between Polanyi’s concept of 
embeddedness/disembeddedness and the coordinated market economy versus liberal market 
dichotomy in the Varieties of Capitalism model, as discussed in section 3 of this chapter 	37 Zuckerman’s work is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.6 of this chapter. 
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(Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). Several sociologists have called for more investigation into the 
influence of trust at the micro level to direct attention towards the role of agency in institutional 
developments (e.g. Fligstein, 2001). Jens Beckert observed that the focus on embeddedness 
has ‘led economic sociologists to pass over the question of the foundation in action theory from 
which to understand action in economic contexts’ (Beckert, 2003:782). He argues that a 
sociological understanding of systematic links between macro structures and micro-level 
action is necessary for the concept of embeddedness to move from merely offering a critique 
of the rational actor model to offering a theoretical alternative (Beckert, 2003:770). 
3.1.3 Review of the Sociology of Finance Literature 
The SoF literature covers a broad spectrum of research topics and methodologies, yet the 
body of literature is understandably limited given it has only evolved as a distinct field of inquiry 
over the past 15 to 20 years. In 2011, Bruce Carruthers published an article titled ‘Sociology 
of Finance’ in the Annual Review of Sociology which summarised the relevant strands of 
research and identified the gaps and the direction for future research (Carruthers, 2011). The 
nascent state of the field at the time was evident to Carruthers, who described the research 
undertaken to date as ‘more an assemblage of scholarly activity than a sustained, coherent, 
and unitary enterprise’. All but 11 of the 142 references in the article had been published since 
2000, and the referenced literature reflected a wide range of disciplines and research methods 
cutting across law, history, economics, finance, geography, and development.  
The term ‘financial markets’ is broadly defined to include finance-related activities both inside 
and outside of the formal financial system, with financial markets being the ‘fourth pillar’ of 
economic activity alongside production, consumption and exchange (Knorr Cetina, 2012). The 
SoF literature investigating finance practices, like the embeddedness literature in economic 
sociology, can be usefully categorised based on the level of analysis and methodological 
approach. Many SoF scholars assume financial markets tend to be global markets and the 
financial system to be a global system constituted by micro-level practices. Knorr Cetina 
argues that a ‘financial market’s institutional foundation is microsociological in nature… 
converging with interaction-level structures’ (Knorr Cetina, 2012:124). As an example, she 
cites the ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) market, a global market in which transactions for the buying 
and selling of securities occur outside of formal exchanges directly between traders on trading 
floors of banks located around the world. In the OTC market, the traders themselves maintain 
market practices through the ‘structural use of interaction’ as they engage in sanctioning, 
warning and reprimanding. These micro-level practices complement the regulatory framework 
at the macro level in shaping the global OTC market (Knorr Cetina, 2012:124).  
A relatively small body of SoF literature has investigated the global financial crisis in 
comparison to the volume of economics-related or business studies disciplines. An exception 
has been the work of Neil Fligstein, who, along with co-authors, has studied the social structure 
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of the mortgage market in an effort to better understand the origins of crisis. In one study, 
Fligstein and Goldstein analysed the organisational structures of firms operating in the 
mortgage securitisation market as a factor contributing to the severity of the crisis (Goldstein 
& Fligstein, 2017). The ‘meso-structure’ approach used in both of these studies complements 
the macro level approaches used by scholars in adjacent disciplines, such as political 
economy, to explain the crisis in the context of broader institutional shifts (Schwartz, 2009). 
However, there remains a gap in micro-structure analysis using an empirical approach to 
understand how the actions and motivations of the individuals within these financial 
organisations influence their structures. Fligstein and Roehrkasse also draw attention to this 
research gap, calling for more detailed attention to social interaction and organisational 
structure (Fligstein & Roehrkasse, 2016:636). 
A macro-level approach has been adopted by Richard Swedberg in his study of the loss and 
subsequent restoration of confidence in the 2008 and 2009 period of the crisis (Swedberg, 
2012). Swedberg uses the VIX Index, a measure of investors’ expectations about the volatility 
in the price of the S&P 500 Index in the coming 30 days, as a proxy for investors’ confidence 
in the financial markets. Swedberg makes an important sociological contribution to our 
understanding of the interaction between society and the actors in the finance system during 
the crisis, and his work is discussed in more detail in the last section of this chapter that reviews 
the trust literature. However, his article only proposes a theoretical framework for 
understanding trust, leaving the validity of the proposition as an open question. To date, no 
empirical work has been pursued by other SoF researchers to test his hypothesis. There has 
been little work published by SoF scholars investigating the impact of the crisis on the practices 
of finance. 
There is also little SoF literature examining ‘alternative finance’. Moreover, the existing 
literature considers alternative practices of finance in a context which is quite different from the 
definition of alternative finance used in this dissertation. In the first context, ‘alternative’ is 
generally interpreted as ‘different from Western’, thus framing alternative finance as a set of 
practices not engaged in by actors in developed economies unless they are in groups 
marginalised within these economies, such as criminal gangs. For example, Bill Maurer has 
studied a range of alternative finance practices at the macro level, such as socially embedded 
forms of community finance in developing economies (Maurer, 2012).  Maurer argues that the 
essential characteristic of ‘alternative finance’ is its proximity to people’s lives, reflecting the 
concept of embeddedness that is closer to Polanyi than Granovetter (Maurer, 2012:426). Other 
scholars have contributed to the understanding of how alternative finance is practised. Aaron 
Pitluck has produced several studies of Islamic forms of finance, exploring how moral and 
ethical norms have influenced investor behaviour in this alternative form of finance (Pitluck, 
2008) and Leung-Sea Sui has studied the influence of state structure and political power in the 
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behaviour of actors in the financial markets in China (Sui, 2012). While these studies provide 
valuable insight into the variation in finance practices within non-Western cultures and political 
systems, a number of analytic gaps remain. First, these studies focus on either the macro or 
the micro level, without linking the two by examining micro-structures as a complement to 
macro-level analysis. Second, the approach tends to be theoretical, and, to the extent it is 
empirical, the methodology is ethnographic.  Both of these factors limit the opportunity to 
comparatively analyse finance practices across countries or regions. 
There additionally exists a sociological literature examining the role of institutions both inside 
and outside of the financial system in shaping the financial system, the functionality of its 
components, and the actors engaged in it. These research projects conceptualised global 
finance as a collection of institutional spaces constituting an ‘operational field’ (Sassen, 2012). 
There is some SoF literature comparatively analysing national finance systems from an 
institutional perspective, but much of it draws on the theoretical frameworks developed in 
adjacent disciplines like political economy (Davis, 2012:40). The theoretical insights from 
comparative institutionalism literature used in this dissertation are discussed in more detail in 
the third section of this chapter. 
An institutional approach is also used in Guseva and Rona-Tas’ comparative study of a finance 
channel38 examining the credit card lending practices by Russian and American banks in the 
late 1990s (Guseva, A. and Rona-Tas, 2001). While American banks could rely on well-
developed institutional sources of consumer credit information for a rational calculation of 
cardholder risk, the Russian banks had no such institutional infrastructure and needed to rely 
on trust produced by strategies exploiting the cardholders’ social networks. The authors 
conclude that institutional arrangements enable rational calculation of risk and argue that this 
is a necessary condition for the development of large-scale financial markets that transcend 
local geographies. While the study makes a valuable contribution to the SoF literature, there 
are some weaknesses. First, although the research methodology is empirical, the data 
collection used in the analysis is limited to only 17 interviews with Moscow-based banks and 
an unspecified number of other actors in the Russian credit card market. No data was collected 
from the individual cardholders, either in the form of transaction data, survey data, or interview 
data. Without credit card default data, for example, testing the claim regarding the relationship 
between rational calculation and trust-based approaches to assessing uncertainty is not 
possible. Secondly, the study is ‘comparative’ but uses different data for each country, relying 
only on publicly available secondary data rather than conducting interviews with banks in the 
US market. As a result, the comparative analysis is not ‘apples-to-apples’. The authors justify 
the lack of US interview data by framing the US credit card market as an ‘active ideal type’ 	38 Credit card issuance is not within the definition of alternative finance as used in this dissertation because it is 
an activity undertaken within the incumbent regulated banking system.
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(Guseva, A. and Rona-Tas, 2001). However, this is debatable because it does not exclude the 
possibility that US credit card issuers also use trust-producing social network mechanisms 
similar to those used by the Russian banks, particularly for so-called ‘thin file’ credit borrowers 
in the US market with little credit history, such as recently graduated university students or 
immigrants.  
Another group of SoF scholars examines the social and material construction of financial 
markets, focusing on the influence of information and communication technologies on finance 
practices. These scholars seek to understand the micro-structures that, in aggregate, form 
financial markets and influence the behaviour of market participants producing price formation 
and valuation outcomes for financial instruments.  Two theoretical propositions from this body 
of literature are relevant to this dissertation. The first is the concept of a market device, which 
refer to the ‘material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets’ 
(Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 2007:2). The intermediating role played by P2B lending platforms, 
including the algorithms used to allocate loans to P2B investor portfolios are powerful devices 
influencing the performance of the P2B lending market.  Developments in alternative finance 
offer a rich source of research opportunities for exploring how market devices shape these 
new markets that are less encumbered by incumbent practices. A growing number of 
algorithmic-based tools using artificial intelligence and machine learning are deployed on P2B 
lending platforms targeting individual investors, while the financial system infrastructure is 
evolving to a more distributed model as a result of distributed database and cryptography 
technologies. 
Limitations of the Sociology of Finance Literature 
The theoretical and methodological insight offered by the SoF literature to the comparative 
analysis of alternative finance channels is limited. This is partly attributable to heterogeneity in 
the perspectives applied to research, described as ‘economic sociology’. Neil Fligstein 
attributes this to the motivations of the scholars that came together in the late 1990s to define 
the economic sociology as a field of study (Neil Fligstein, 2015). Fligstein recalls that the 
formation of the main organisational bodies in the field of economic sociology, namely the 
Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics in 1989, and the Economic Sociology 
Section of the American Sociology Association in 2001, drew scholars from a wide range of 
disciplines united by a common desire to challenge the orthodoxy of the neoclassical 
economics model, rather than to share a common disciplinary perspective. 
SoF as a sub-field within the discipline of sociology is at an even earlier stage of development 
than economic sociology, which has consequences for this research project. First, there is a 
relatively small body of existing literature and, therefore, several gaps have been identified 
which are addressed in this dissertation. These are most predominantly: (i) finance practices 
in national economies have not been comparatively analysed; (ii) there has been little empirical 
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research using primary data undertaken to date beyond small-scale ethnographic studies – 
few studies have used large-scale data sets to test hypotheses, as is common in other 
disciplines; (iii) research conceptualising what constitutes ‘alternative finance’ presumes it is a 
developing economy phenomenon and ignores the examination of finance practices within 
developed economies; (iv) the level of analysis tends to be at macro or meso rather than at 
the micro level, including studies that analyse micro-structures as a complement to macro-
level analysis; (v) to the extent that finance practices have been studied, the objects of study 
are finance professionals employed by organisations operating in financial markets rather than 
individuals engaging in finance in a non-professional capacity; and (vi) while SoF scholars 
have investigated factors that are causing and exacerbating the global crisis, there is a lack of 
literature exploring changes in the practices of finance as a result of the financial crisis. These 
are the gaps this dissertation seeks to fill. 
The following two sections discuss the trust and comparative institutionalism literatures that 
make a theoretical and methodological contribution to this dissertation. 
3.2 Comparative Institutionalism 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This dissertation is concerned with comparative institutionalism (CI) scholarship as it compares 
the institutional arrangements of national financial systems, with the aim of explaining how 
different institutional environments influence socio-economic outcomes across national 
economies. Morgan et al. define the CI field ‘in terms of how forms, outcomes, and dynamics 
of economic organisation (firms, networks and markets) are influenced and shaped by other 
social institutions’ (e.g. training systems, legal systems, political systems, and educational 
systems, etc.) and the consequences for economic growth, innovation, employment and 
equality (Morgan, Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen, & Whitley, 2010:2).  
CI research has grown over the past 20 years as economic crises, particularly the Asian 
financial crisis during the late 1990s and the more recent global financial crisis, drew attention 
to the importance of institutions in governing economic activity (Morgan et al., 2010:6).  The 
field has emerged from the ‘new’ institutionalism movement that began in the 1970s, when 
scholars began questioning the viability of institutional analysis founded on assumptions of 
rational coordinated and controlled technocratic behaviours, and developed new theoretical 
models that introduced social influences to the study of institutional development. Meyer & 
Rowan (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) proposed a theoretical approach that was less functionalistic, 
and which incorporates a norm-based explanation of institutional behaviours that influence 
collective action.  In this context, institutional legitimacy was not a given, but a result of efforts 
of actors to conform to the societal norms of the broader society. To protect business borrowers 
in Italy, for example, if the interest charged by a lender, including the traditional bank lenders, 
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exceeds an interest rate cap set by the Bank of Italy then the loan agreement is void and the 
borrower has no obligation to make interest payments (Morgese, 2015). 
While there is general agreement among CI scholars that institutions are ‘rules of the game’ 
(North, 1997), the breadth of theoretical orientations has resulted from varying conceptions of 
what those rules encompass. This dissertation adopts a relatively broad definition of 
institutions in its analysis of Germany and the UK as ‘formal and informal rules, regulations, 
norms and understandings that constrain and enable behaviour’ (Campbell, 2004). This 
definition recognises that, while lending is an activity governed by regulation and other formal 
rules, it also involves normative processes in alternative lenders’ acceptance of imperfect 
information in making lending decision.   
The CI field is a broad church, and includes contributions from scholars in economics, 
sociology, organisation studies, and political economy.  Despite this academic heterogeneity, 
these disciplines bring complementary perspectives to a shared view of institutions that links 
CI scholarship. The review of CI literature  by Hotho & Saka-Helmhout (2016) identifies three 
common features that characterise CI scholarship. First, CI scholars focus on studying 
institutional arrangements at the societal level, the impact of which transcends the 
organisational level. These arrangements are broad, and include the political, financial, and 
education systems within economies. CI is well suited to the study of lending practices because 
it compares institutional arrangements at the national level, rather that the regional or local 
level, as it assumes institutional arrangements are influenced by regulatory processes 
instituted by the nation state. Small business lending is an activity which is conceptualised 
differently across nation states, and these conceptual differences have produced different 
regulatory requirements across national economies without in-country variation.  In some 
countries, business lending is seen as an exploitive activity putting borrowers at risk and, 
hence, only entities with a full bank licence are permitted to engage in the solicitation of 
borrowers for the purpose of lending.  In contrast, business lending in other countries is 
perceived as an activity putting the lender at risk, and so any entity can engage in soliciting 
and lending to business borrowers without regulatory restriction. Regulation of lending 
activities can be seen as a set of formal rules applicable at the national level, with social norms 
influencing the perception of business lending as being a predatory activity (or not).  
Second, CI scholars recognise that there are inter-relationships between societal institutions 
which can produce complementarities between these institutions. The forms of 
complementarity can vary, ranging from mutual support and reinforcement to compensation 
for deficiencies (Crouch, 2010), with both implying that institutions do not evolve in isolation. 
The concept of institutional complementarity is a prominent theme in CI literature, and has 
underpinned the development of typologies describing national economic systems 
differentiated by the complementarities resulting from different institutional arrangements.  One 
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criticism of CI literature relevant to this dissertation is its under-appreciation of the conflict 
between social movements and the ‘corporate world’, as each seeks to exert a dominating 
influence on economic, cultural and social life (de Bakker, den Hond, King, & Weber, 2013).   
Diverging interests among these groups have certainly been played out in the period following 
the 2008 financial crisis and influenced the institutional context for alternative lending. 
Third, CI scholars are attuned to the linkage between societal institutions and firm and societal 
outcomes. For example, two firms operating in different sets of institutional arrangements will 
have different operating strategies to optimise firm performance and result in each firm 
developing different competencies over time. These competencies, when aggregated, could 
provide firms in an economy with comparative institutional advantage and help explain 
differences in economic performance across national economies. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
emphasise the role of social norms, arguing that organisational legitimacy is a necessary 
condition of organisational survival, which in turn rests on social arrangements (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  As actors engage to acquire legitimacy, they argue, they tend to adopt 
templates used by legitimate organisations, resulting in a tendency towards isomorphism.  
Isomorphism appealed to scholars seeking to identify a coherence in reconciling how widely-
shared norms and values influence institutional legitimacy, and potentially explains the 
longevity of common institutional forms within national economies. However, the isomorphism 
theory also implies an inertia that under-estimates the role of agency, suggesting outcomes 
that are overly-deterministic and failing to adequately account for the processes of institutional 
change. Agency and institutional change are discussed in more detail in sections 3.4.2.1 and 
3.4.2.2 of this chapter.  
3.2.2 Comparing Financial Systems 
Comparing the arrangements of the financial institutions in different countries is a focus of CI 
scholarship, given the central position of the financial system in a capitalist economy and its 
resulting inter-connectedness with all other institutions. More of this research has been 
undertaken in the domain of comparative political economy than sociology, given the focus 
within sociology on studying financial institutions in a given economy rather than comparing 
financial systems (Hardie & Howarth, 2013b). A commonly used model compares financial 
systems along three dimensions (Deeg, 2010). First, the structure of financial markets and 
their regulation can be compared, where the conceptualisation of financial services activities 
can be quite different from market to market (recall the example of how lending to small firms 
in some economies can be perceived as predatory).  Second, the types and forms of corporate 
governance that define how authority is distributed amongst the owners, managers and 
employees of firms is a focus of comparison.  Third, the types and forms of financing provided 
to households, governments, and firms can vary between markets.  John Zysman’s (Zysman, 
1983) seminal framework described three forms of financing within national capitalist systems, 
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and characterised national economies based on the dominant type of financing present within 
that economy: government-led credit-based, bank credit-based, or capital market based. Each 
type of finance shaped the institutional environment in which households, firms and 
governments operated and produced different constraints and opportunities for the economic 
actors in these markets.  The relevance of government-led credit-based systems has been 
reduced in highly developed economies over the course of time as centrally controlled 
economies have diminished39 .  The two remaining types, bank credit-based and capital 
market-based, continue to be the dominant paradigm used to classify economic systems in 
developed economies.   
Scholars have begun to question the usefulness of the bank-based versus capital markets-
based dichotomy in a globally integrated economy, which operates with a financial system that 
is much more complex than what existed more than 30 years ago when Zysman published his 
book.  Hardie and Horwarth point out that blindly assuming the institutional arrangements 
associated with a bank-based credit system, such as a supply of more patient capital that 
enables longer-term investments on the part of firms, rests on an assumption that the source 
of funding to banks is patient, stable customer deposits – which is no longer the case for most 
banks (Hardie & Howarth, 2013b). They point out that a growing share of funding for the loans 
made by banks is sourced from capital markets rather than customer deposits, including many 
banks in Germany which have been traditionally viewed as the archetype providers of patient 
capital.  Since funding from the capital market is considered a less patient form of funding than 
bank customer deposits, Hardie and Howarth contend that an impatient form of finance has 
come to undermine what continues to be perceived as patient forms of finance, changing the 
relationships between capital market-funded banks and their borrowers. Richard Deeg’s 
argues that this effect is segmented by type of firm, with the relationship for large German firms 
becoming more transactional while the supply of patient capital to smaller firms has remained 
relatively intact over time (Deeg, 2005). 
This structural change in bank funding suggests that, over time, the financing practices of 
economies with funding dominated by bank-based systems are likely to become more like 
economies dominated by capital market-based systems of finance. The long-term outcome will 
be the homogenisation of the global financial system dominated by financing from capital 
markets (Deeg, 2010), with the latter system becoming the dominant model. However, 
scholars are sharply divided in their view of the likelihood of this convergence occurring. 
Goyer’s comparative analysis of equity investment in France and Germany suggests that 
investors with short-term versus long-term investment horizons allocate investment to markets 
	39 This should not be interpreted as the state has no role in making credit available to firms in highly developed 
economies.  In countries like Germany the state continues to play a role, albeit a smaller role as a result of EU 
competition rules and other factors.   
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with institutional arrangements that reflect their preferences, and thereby reinforces the legacy 
institutional arrangements (Goyer, 2012) that vary between economies. Different levels of firm 
ownership concentration between economies is another factor sustaining variation in 
institutional arrangements, with more highly concentrated ownership levels in bank-based 
economies perpetuating the supply of patient capital to firms in those markets. Adherents of 
one framework used in CI analysis, Varieties of Capitalism, are resistant to the convergence 
hypothesis, arguing that the operating practices of firms, the key actors in an economy, are 
deeply intertwined with the key institutions in bank credit-based economies to an extent that 
makes it difficult to change.  
3.2.3 The Varieties of Capitalism Framework 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) thesis advanced by Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) 
has emerged as the most widely adopted framework for categorising national economies by 
the institutional forms that influence how firms solve ‘coordination problems’ – the challenges 
that firms face in dealing with other economic actors in seeking to develop and exploit their 
capabilities. Part of the appeal of the VoC framework has been the central role that firms play 
as the key economic actors and ‘agents of adjustment’ in an economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001:6). 
The particular institutional arrangements in an economy produce comparative advantage for 
firms as they develop specialisation to optimise coordination efficiencies for a given set of 
institutional arrangements.  
In the VoC model, markets emerge within institutional arrangements. Following the Zysman 
model characterisation of capital market-based and bank-based financial systems, the VoC 
thesis argues that institutional arrangements can be clustered into ‘liberal market economy’ 
(LME) and ‘coordinated market economy’ (CME) types, with the former relying on competitive 
market arrangements and the latter relying more on non-market arrangements to solve their 
coordination problems.   Hall and Soskice outline five ‘spheres of coordination’ that define the 
institutional forms in an economy: industrial relations, vocational training and education, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and a firm’s employees.  These institutional 
arrangements are ‘sticky’ according to the VoC thesis, and this limits the degree to which LME 
and CME types converge in a globalising economy.  Each type of institutional arrangement 
provides firms in its economy with a set of comparative advantages and helps explain why 
LME firms in the US (or UK) and CME firms in Germany tend to dominate certain sectors of 
the global economy.  For example, the global competitiveness of the manufacturing sector in 
Germany, a CME, is often linked to the willingness of German banks to supply patient capital 
to firms via their Hausbank relationship (e.g. Lane & Quack, 2001; Geppert & Martens, 2008).   
The VoC thesis holds that firms in CMEs like Germany engage in high levels of cooperative 
behaviour to solve their coordination problems.  Inter-firm cooperation is high relative to LME 
firms, because CME firms tend to be specialists with high reliance on sub-contracting and, 
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therefore, need to participate in collaborative technical development.  Trade associations 
provide firms with technical assistance and set standards within an industry that all firms must 
adhere to. Individual firms delegate the bargaining with the labour force in an industry to 
national employer associations.  CME firms support a system of education and vocational 
training without poaching apprentices in order to ensure that the training system can support 
the future needs of all firms within an industry sector.  Within the firm, decision-making is more 
consensual because of stakeholder representation in works councils and, in the largest firms, 
on company boards.  
In the sphere of corporate governance, relations of trust provide for exchanges of private 
information, allowing firms to develop reputations that enable some firms access to capital on 
terms that depend more heavily on reputation than share value (Hall & Gingerich, 2009:453). 
It is on this basis that the Hausbanken in Germany have historically provided ‘patient capital’ 
to firms that enables investment in projects generating returns only in the long run (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). As stated previously, there is growing criticism of the assumption that bank-
based credit systems in CMEs have a greater capacity to provide patient capital than market-
based financing systems, when the former are increasingly reliant on capital market funding.  
While this criticism is justified in the case of the commercial and regional state-owned 
Landesbanken banks in Germany, the local state-owned Sparkassen and cooperatively owned 
Volksbanken have continued to rely on customer deposits and demonstrated the capacity to 
provide patient capital financing over time. 
The LME and CME characterisations are ideal types, with the US and UK economies held out 
as archetypes of LMEs and Germany held out as the archetype CME.  There has been a 
chorus of criticism about the dichotomous nature of the framework since Hall and Soskice 
proposed it in 2001, with many scholars arguing that there are many more ‘varieties’ of 
capitalism than the LME and CME types.  For example, another widely cited model for 
comparative institutional analysis for understanding global financial systems is Whitley’s 
Business Systems framework, which identifies six varieties (Whitley, 1999). For the purpose 
of this dissertation, however, the parsimony introduced by two types in the VoC framework is 
very useful for comparing alternative financing practices in the UK and German economies, 
because these economies are diametrically opposed on the VoC spectrum.  Also, the VoC 
assumption that firms are the key agents in an economy provides a basis to examine 
alternative finance practices, as it specifically relates to the financing of firms.  
However, this dissertation also departs from the VoC framework in three respects.  First, it 
examines the financing practices of smaller firms, which typically have different governance 
characteristics than larger firms.  VoC authors tend to generalise the actions of ‘firms’ as the 
actions of large firms, and privilege formalised norms and sanctions of institutional 
embeddedness over the informal social embeddedness (Streeck & Thelen, 2005) that is 
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relevant to the decision-making of SMEs. These firms merit separate study, because they are 
important actors in the economy (CBI, 2011) and because they diverge from large firms in how 
they engage with the institutions in an economy (Bluhm & Schmidt, 2008; Deeg, 2012; Lane & 
Wood, 2012).  Second, the unit of analysis is the relationship between groups of individual 
investors and firms seeking finance in alternative finance channels.  The VoC framework 
assumes the relationships relevant to institutional change are inter-firm and firm-government 
relations and excludes other relationships surrounding the firm that can also influence the 
behaviour of the firm.   
The economic changes brought about by the digitalisation of the economy are creating more 
horizontally distributed and less centralised channels of social and economic engagement for 
all economic actors. The influence of this change is becoming more important as internet-
based technologies increase individuals’ access to information about firms, and is vitally 
important for gaining a complete picture of the opportunity sets that firms face in making their 
decisions. Finally, this dissertation also considers institutional change in the context of both 
structure and agency. Since it is the set of institutional arrangements that defines the behaviour 
of firms, the VoC model is criticised for being a deterministic model which under-weights the 
role of other influences, such as social movements, on the agency of firms. The following 
section discusses institutional change literature in both the CI and institutional theory fields 
relevant to agency in alterative lending practices, and the impact of these alternative lending 
practices on indigenous institutions. 
3.2.4 Institutional Change 
The failure of the VoC model to explicitly address institutional change raises a number of 
questions related to alternative lending channels.  First, which institutional practices are 
vulnerable to change as a result of alternative finance channels?  The lending practices of 
banks to firms is an obvious candidate, but there may be other, less obvious, institutional 
change underway. Second, what form of change process is unfolding, and is there more than 
one form of change underway? Third, what is the time frame needed for observing institutional 
change? Alternative lending channels have emerged only a few years ago, and it may be 
premature to assess either the processes or the outcomes of change to the incumbent 
institutional practices. Fourth, what actor, or actors, are instigating the change process?  
Institutional change is a topic that is hard to avoid in a discussion about comparative 
institutionalism. While this dissertation seeks to comparatively analyse the variation in 
alternative lending practices between the UK and Germany since the global financial crisis, the 
research questions do not explicitly address change to incumbent institutional practices as a 
result of the alternative channels. Therefore, no primary data was collected from actors within 
the incumbent system.  While an assessment of institutional change is particularly challenging 
given the very recent emergence of mini-bond and P2B lending channels, the analysis does 
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draw on theoretical insights in the institutional change literature to speculate about the forms 
and trajectories of change (or not) involving incumbent institutions in the two economies.  
The topic of institutional change embodies a number of theoretical challenges that stem from 
a general problem in comparative institutional analysis: a bias towards emphasising structural 
constraints and continuity (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).  This bias implies an inherent stability of 
institutions, leading to the assumption that change, when it does arrive, must be the result of 
an exogenous shock which forces an otherwise stable institution to adapt.  Hence, many early 
accounts of institutional change portray a path-dependent institutional environment with long 
continuities periodically ruptured by radical shifts (Pempel, 1998). The more recent literature 
reflects more strongly the view that most institutional change is a gradual process precipitated 
by internal actors (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). 
3.2.4.1 Institutional Change in the VoC Framework 
The VoC approach has been criticised for failing to provide a coherent explanation about how 
institutions change over time.  One of the strengths of the VoC model is its conceptualisation 
of institutional complementarity: the inter-relationship between institutions that produces 
synergy value in the overall functioning of institutions in an economy.  The cost associated with 
complementarity is a resistance to change, as change to any one institution will have a knock-
on effect on other institutions and, therefore, requires substantial effort to overcome 
institutional inertia. The force preventing CMEs from converging towards the LME model is the 
reluctance of CME firms to abandon their investment in strategies designed to optimise their 
coordination efforts in their institutional environment, resulting in a tendency for institutional 
arrangements to remain in equilibrium. While the VoC thesis recognises that institutions in an 
economy will change as firms respond to changes in the operating environment, it implies that 
firms in an economy have a collective bias towards path dependency and maintenance of the 
status quo.  Explaining when institutions change, or the factors that drive change, or the 
process by which institutional change occurs, was not clearly spelt out by Hall and Soskice in 
the introduction of the framework in 2001.  Many critics over the intervening years have argued 
that the framework has become outmoded as a result of the continuing liberalisation of the 
world economies (Streeck, 2009), and that it is overly functionalistic in explaining change by 
its macroeconomic effects (Crouch, 2005). The real world, it is argued, is much more chaotic 
than the VoC thesis suggests. 
Authors following the Hall and Soskice paradigm have tried to articulate a thesis for institutional 
change in response to their critics.  Subsequent to their 2001 article, Hall and Soskice wrote 
that institutions are not ‘a rigid grid of sanctions and incentives’ but, instead, are malleable and 
subject to renegotiation and challenge, which may result in the introduction of some elements 
of liberalisation that do not result in a convergence to an LME (Hall & Soskice, 2003: 246).  
Kathleen Thelen, separately with both Hall and Wolfgang Streeck, has also made an effort to 
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articulate a theory of institutional change that is aligned with the propositions of the VoC model. 
The definition of institutions excludes the role of social norms and conceptualises institutions 
as a more constraining than enabling force impacting on actors, consisting of ‘sets of 
regularized practices with a rule-like quality in the sense that the actors expect the practices 
to be observed; and which, in some but not all, cases are supported by formal sanctions’ (Hall 
& Thelen, 2009:9). This narrower definition of institutions facilitates a model of change that 
assumes actors facing constraints imposed by formal rules make decisions based on rational 
choice. This allows for the notion that actors interpret rules and consciously act to break and 
redefine them, if it is in their interest to do so. Streeck and Thelen’s theory of institutional 
change tries to address the deterministic characterisation of VoC by conceptualising change 
as a gradual process rather than a process instigated by an exogenous shock. Institutional 
change can, therefore, emanate from gaps that emerge over time between formal institutions 
and their actual implementation and enforcement (Streeck & Thelen, 2005:19).  
Streeck and Thelen (2005) also distinguish between the process and the result of change, with 
an abrupt process resulting in either the survival of an incumbent institution or its replacement, 
and an incremental process resulting in either the adaptation of the institution or its gradual 
transformation (Streeck & Thelen, 2005:9). They identify five types of gradual institutional 
change : (i) displacement; (ii) layering; (iii) drift; (iv) conversion; and (v) exhaustion. Institutions 
can drift when they cease to retain their relevance, as their economic or political environment 
changes around them. Conversion describes institutions changing as a result of being 
redirected to new goals, functions or purposes in response to changes in their environment. 
Finally, exhaustion describes a process of gradual institutional breakdown that results in 
institutions becoming both irrelevant (as with drift) and illegitimate as their practices feed into 
undermining their own legitimacy over the course of time. The forms described by drift, 
conversion and exhaustion are more the result of endogenous than exogenous institutional 
change processes and are, thus, less relevant to the changes in incumbent practice introduced 
by alternative channels of finance. 
The two remaining forms, displacement and layering, are processes involving alternative 
institutions co-existing with dominant incumbent institutions, which is the case with alternative 
channels of finance. Displacement can occur when new models emerge and challenge 
previously accepted organisational forms and practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
Displacement is the result of defection when a growing number of actors migrate to a new 
institutional form, either through ‘invasion’ of an existing dominant form by foreign practices or 
through the ‘rediscovery or reactivation’ of an institutional form (Streeck & Thelen, 2005:21). 
Layering involves the introduction of additions or amendments to an existing set of institutions, 
with the new element eventually crowding out the incumbent practices if it has a higher rate of 
growth than the incumbent.  
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These process forms can occur simultaneously during periods of institutional change. Deeg 
describes a ‘hybrid’ process of change that took place in the German financial system in the 
1990s, bifurcating into two subsystems as banks responded to shifts in the financing 
preferences that differed between large and small firms. He describes how some 
institutionalised banking relationships were being repurposed (conversion) at the same time 
as new institutions were introduced (layering) (Deeg, 2005). This hybrid view of the change 
process is a useful lens by which to consider multiple forms of change that may be emerging 
during the early stage of the change process when actors are jockeying for advantageous 
outcomes. Graf builds on the theoretical base of change processes of institutional change by 
incorporating ‘process tracing’ over a longer historical period, to show how forms of change in 
the German training and education system have progressed from layering to conversion to drift 
over time (Graf, 2018).  The role of the actors as institutional entrepreneurs in the change 
process is discussed in the following section.  
3.2.4.2 Institutional Entrepreneurship 
The alternative finance channels analysed in this dissertation have emerged since the global 
financial crisis to provide financing to firms, hence literature providing insight into the role of 
investors and firms as agents of institutional change is relevant.  Hall and Sosckice describe 
firms as ‘agents of adjustment’; however, it does not follow that firms are also ‘agents of 
institutional change’ in the VoC framework (Hall & Soskice, 2001:6).  Streeck and Thelen’s 
approach has also been criticised for simply shifting structural determinism from institutions to 
the underlying social structures in which the institutions are embedded (Herrigel & Zeitlin, 
2010).  
Overall, the discussion of institutional change within the CI literature tends to be theoretical, 
and perhaps incorporating more empirical research into CI scholarship could contribute to a 
more convincing explanation of agency and institutional change. Some of the literature uses 
the term institutional change agents rather than institutional entrepreneur to capture a broader 
concept of agency form, for example social movements (Welter & Smallbone, 2015). Actors 
do not operate in a vacuum, and the realisation of institutional change is contingent on other 
actors embedded in the broader economic and social environment, including existing 
institutions (Merrey & Cook, 2012; Qureshi, Kistruck, & Bhatt, 2016).  
While institutional theory has been criticised for a lack of attention paid to human agency 
(Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002), a more empirical examination of agency and institutional 
change is contained in the literature addressing institutional entrepreneurship which has 
appeared over the past 15 years (Qureshi et al., 2016).  Institutional entrepreneurs are defined 
as ‘change agents who, whether or not they initially intended to change their institutional 
environment, initiate, and actively participate in the implementation of changes that diverge 
from existing institutions’ (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009:70). For example, rather than 
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seeking profits based on arbitrage derived from patents or other sources of competitive 
differentiation, institutional entrepreneurs seek to ‘exploit institutions to one’s economic 
advantage’ (Douhan & Henrekson, 2010:641). Institutional entrepreneurs triggering 
institutional change can be individuals, for example gourmet chefs (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 
2005) or environmentalists (Kisfalvi & Maguire, 2011), organisations, for example individual 
banks which change industries (Lawrence, Pazzaglia, Sonpar, Lawrence, & Sonpar, 2011), or 
fields such as accountancy or management consultancy (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
Chapter 2 discusses a number of supply and demand side factors in the economic and social 
environment that contributed to the emergence of alternative lending following the crisis, which 
recognises the complexity of unpacking how these channels were created. Tracey et al. 
contribute insight into the creation of new organisation forms with their empirical study of a 
social enterprise in the United Kingdom (Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Their paper has 
relevance to the creation of alternative lending channels, in that it combines different 
established institutional logics, individuals deposit in banks and firms borrow from banks, to 
create a new, hybrid logic of firms borrow from individuals. The authors draw attention to the 
multi-level nature of the institutional process at the individual, organisational and societal 
levels, which also informs the analysis of alternative lending channels. 
The comparative institutionalism and VoC literature contributes to the macro-level analysis of 
alternative lending channels, despite the limitations and weaknesses described in this section.  
It remains an influential analytic framework, and has been cited by economic sociologists as 
an identifiably coherent body of research reflecting the Polanyian strand of embeddedness 
(Krippner & Alvarez, 2007:232). Some of the VoC limitations, particularly in the areas of 
institutional change and agency, are addressed by incorporating theoretical insights from the 
institutional theory literature.  However, neither of these literatures provide insight into the 
behaviour of the investors supplying the funding in these channels, without which there would 
be no alternative lending. The next section discusses the theoretical insights in the trust 
literature relevant to analysing the micro-foundations of trust and its influence on the practices 
of these investors and firms they are lending to. 
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3.3 Trust 
Alternative lending channels in the form of mini-bond and P2B lending would not have 
developed in either the UK or Germany if individuals in those countries were unwilling to lend 
to the firms using these channels to obtain funding. Lending exposes the investors to the 
possibility that their loans will not be repaid, and so trust is a necessary condition for the 
investors accepting uncertainty regarding the future behaviour of the borrowers. Any analysis 
seeking to understand the development of mini-bond and P2B lending, and their different paths 
of development in Germany versus the UK, would be incomplete without also analysing the 
types and sources of trust that influence the lending decisions of mini-bond and P2B lenders.  
The review of the relevant trust literature in this section begins by distinguishing the 
sociological conceptualisation of trust adopted in this dissertation from concepts of trust used 
in economics and psychology. This leads to a discussion of the sources and forms of trust, and 
then defines the theoretical concepts used in the analysis, including trust versus confidence, 
signalling of trustworthiness, and categorisation. The section concludes with a review of the 
‘trust as a comparative advantage’ theoretical proposition and discusses empirical research 
findings that inform the determinants of trust in alternative lending practices. 
3.3.1 Conceptualising Trust in Lending Relationships 
Scholars generally agree that trust has an important role in economic life.  An extensive body 
of recent literature in the social sciences has confirmed the positive effect of trust on 
transaction costs  (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995), the functioning of markets and the economic 
system (Arrow, 1972; Zak & Knack, 2001); economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; 
(Fukuyama, 1995), stock market participation (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2007), efficiency 
of local government (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993), and judicial efficiency (LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). However, there are diverging perspectives across 
academic disciplines regarding the conceptualisation of trust. In economics, most scholars 
view trust as rational and calculative, with an actor weighing costs versus benefits in deciding 
whether to trust and, in some cases, even questioning the relevance of trust in economic 
relations (Williamson, 1993). Psychologists frame trust as internal cognitions based on the 
attributes of trustors and trustees (e.g. Tyler & Blader, 2000), while sociologists view it in the 
context of socially embedded norms that govern relationships (Granovetter, 2005; Zucker, 
1986). This heterogeneity reflects not only disciplinary differences, but also the intrinsic 
complexity and multi-faceted nature of trust as a concept.  A recent review of organisational 
trust literature by de Jong et al. (2017) concluded that the field suffers from fragmentation and 
overlapping research as a result of differences in disciplinary backgrounds, research traditions 
and levels of analysis that create silos of disconnected trust scholars (de Jong, Kroon, & 
Schilke, 2017).  As a result, trust scholars disagree on and debate a number of fundamental 
issues regarding the study of trust.  
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Notwithstanding differences in disciplinary approaches and research traditions, de Jong et al. 
found that most definitions of trust used by scholars in recent trust research are built on 
definitions provided by either Mayer et al (1995) or Rousseau et al. (1998:395). The latter 
group of scholars provide a multidisciplinary definition of trust that encompasses the theoretical 
traditions of economics, psychology and sociology. Both definitions include the preparedness 
of a party to be vulnerable under conditions of risk and interdependence with another party. 
Interdependence reflects the reliance that each party in a relationship has on the actions of the 
other party to achieve their individual objectives. Risk has been defined as ‘the probability of 
loss as interpreted by a decision-maker’ (Chiles & Mcmackin, 1996). This definition of trust 
describes the situation faced by a P2B or mini-bond lender: vulnerability to suffering a loss of 
the loaned funds in the event that the borrower elects to not honour its loan repayment 
obligation when due. 
In deciding whether to extend a loan, the lender faces an information asymmetry problem 
similar to the one described by George Akerlof in his characterisation of the used car market: 
the seller (in this case, the issuer) knows much more about the quality of what is being offered 
than the buyer, and so there is a good chance that many ‘lemons’ will be offered to investors 
(G. Akerlof, 1970). The investor needs to acquire information about the issuer in order to 
reduce the risk of adverse selection. Credit analysis as undertaken by banks and rating 
agencies reduces the risk of adverse selection by analysing quantitative ‘hard’ information to 
assess the capability of the borrower to repay the loan when due (the ‘probability of default’), 
as well as the monetary loss to the lender in the event of default (‘loss given default’). Banks 
engaged in relationship lending supplement such an analysis with ‘soft’ qualitative information 
about the borrower, such as the personal reputation of the firm’s owner within the local 
community. If the bank determines that the likelihood of repayment is high and also determines 
that the potential loss resulting from a failure to repay is low, then it is willing to accept the 
vulnerability of not being repaid because the expected income from the loan exceeds the cost 
associated with the residual risk. Individuals engaged in lending lack the capacity to access 
the output of ‘hard’ credit analysis and are, therefore, more reliant on using ‘soft’ information 
to assess the capability as well as the intent of the borrower to repay the loan when due.  When 
information asymmetry is high, trust-relevant information is sought and scrutinised (Hardin, 
2002). 
While this dissertation draws on empirical research that examines the influence of trust in 
bilateral lending relationship between banks and small business, it breaks new ground by 
examining the role of individuals rather than banks as lender to firms: P2B and mini-bond 
lending involves relationships between individuals and firms, with many individuals (who may 
or may not know each other) entering into lending relationships with borrowers directly or, in 
the case of P2B lending, via an intermediary platform. How do individuals investing in mini-
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bonds overcome information asymmetry and reduce adverse selection risk, given that they do 
not have the analytic and monitoring resources of banks and credit rating agencies? This 
dissertation investigates the role that trust plays in the willingness of investors to take a ‘leap 
of faith’ regarding a borrower’s commitment to honour its repayment obligation. The sources 
and forms of trust relied on by investors investing in mini-bond and P2B lending are discussed 
in the next section. 
3.3.2 Sources and Forms of Trust  
There is a large literature exploring the relationship between trust and national economic 
performance focusing on the role of generalised trust – the level of trust that individuals have 
towards other individuals collectively in society, including strangers. Most of this literature uses 
data from a trust question contained in the World Values Survey40 (WVS) for the measurement 
and cross-country comparison of generalised trust, and seeks to establish a positive 
correlation between the level of a country’s generalised trust and the performance of its 
economy (Knack & Keefer, 1997). This body of literature views trust as a collective 
phenomenon rather than as a property of an individual (Newton, 2001), and hence individuals 
are trustors without the capacity as individuals to modify the level of generalised trust in an 
economy (Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011). Hardin describes generalised trust as ‘nothing more 
than an optimistic assessment of trustworthiness and willingness therefore to take small risks 
on dealing with others whom one does not yet know’ (Hardin, 2002:62).  
Despite its prominent position in the trust literature, the WVS as a source of data and 
generalised trust as a theoretical concept are not used in this dissertation. The reasons are 
two-fold. First, there is conflicting empirical evidence about what the WVC questions actually 
measure, and hence its validity as an accurate measure of trust is questioned (Sapienza, 
Toldra, & Zingales, 2010:2). Second, the influence of generalised trust is likely to be relatively 
small in comparison to forms of trust relied on by an individual lender assessing the 
trustworthiness of a specific borrower. For the purpose of this dissertation, generalised trust is 
considered as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an individual to engage in 
alternative lending.  
Lynne Zucker argues that trust has two components: (i) background expectations, being a 
general framework for behaviour encompassing the ‘taken for granted understandings’ shared 
by members of communities having the same ‘interpretive frame’; and (ii) constitutive 
expectations defined by a specific context of an exchange, where parties to the transaction 
share intersubjective meaning of the rules of the exchange (Zucker, 1986:58). Both 
components exist in any exchange; however, as one component increases in importance, the 	40 The WVS question is: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?’  Some researchers have also used the trust question in the European Values 
Survey and the question contains identical wording in both the WVS and the EVS. 
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other tends to become less important. In Zucker’s construct, generalised trust is dominated by 
background expectations, while lending transactions are dominated by constitutive 
expectations. The analysis of alternative lending focuses on the constitutive expectations 
produced by the social and institutional arrangements in an economy.  
An analysis of trust risks conflating objects, types and levels of trust. This dissertation 
incorporates the parsimonious categorisation of trust types and levels contained in Lynn 
Zucker’s seminal study of sources of trust during the development of the United States 
economy between 1840 and 1920. Her empirical research broke theoretical ground by 
adopting a sociological view conceptualising social variables ‘as causes rather than 
consequences of economic change’ (Zucker, 1986:54), offering an alternative approach for 
explaining economic organisation from that proposed by transaction cost economics. Zucker 
describes three forms of trust, each associated with levels of trust defined by geographic and 
social distance.  Two of these forms are produced at the local level reflecting close proximity 
of the trustors and trustees, either as individuals or firms, involved in economic exchange.   
3.3.2.1 Process-Based Trust 
The first intra-local trust form is process-based trust produced by the experience of prior 
exchange, with information about a ‘record of prior exchange’ obtained by a trustee through 
either direct experience or through the second-hand experience of others (Zucker, 1986:60). 
The trustor engages in information-based choice, where the trustor’s rational expectation of a 
trustee’s future behaviour is based on knowledge acquired via direct experience or by the 
reputation of the trustee as referenced by a third party known to the trustor. This rational 
approach to trust is variously referred to as strategic trust (Uslaner, 2008), contractual trust 
(Sako, 1998), calculative trust (Lane, 1998), and calculus-based trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Possibly the most under-socialised example of knowledge-based trust that has developed 
within sociology is Coleman’s Rational Choice model, which assumes that a rational actor 
seeks to maximise utility under risk. If the risk-adjusted gain (probability of outcome x payoff) 
resulting from the placement of trust exceeds the risk-adjusted loss (probability of loss x loss) 
resulting from a breach of trust, then the trustee will proceed to place trust (Coleman, 1990:99).   
3.3.2.2 Characteristic-Based Trust 
The second intra-local form of trust production conceptualised by Zucker is characteristic-
based trust and the mechanism for its production is societal (Zucker, 1986:63), reflecting close 
social distance of trustees and trustors connected by shared values within the same community 
(Zucker, 1986:60).  
While Coleman assumes that only rational knowledge-based determinants influence trust in 
commercial relations, other sociological accounts of trust posit forms of trust can be produced 
by cognitions shared by trustors and trustees. Socially embedded norms can infuse 
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relationships with ethical or moral connotations (Banerjee, Norman, & Carla, 2006) and 
therefore norm-based trust can be either rational or emotion based depending on the role of 
information in the decision-making process (Lane, 1998).  Extensive knowledge about the 
values of the trustee may be a good predictor of future behaviour and, therefore, be a rational 
basis for the placement of trust. Alternatively, a decision to trust is emotion based if the trustor’s 
confidence in how the trustee should act in the future is based on an assumption that the trustor 
and trustee share the same framework of norms, perhaps to the extent that other potentially 
relevant information is excluded from the decision-making process. Beckert argues that, when 
acting morally, an actor must be willing to engage in irrational behaviour which, by definition, 
deviates from individual utility maximisation (Beckert, 2005:7). If motivated by altruism, for 
example, an actor will engage in this behaviour deliberately and without regret despite inflicting 
a cost on oneself to the benefit of others. While knowledge informs the altruistic trustor’s 
decision to trust,  the decision can incorporate emotion-based components, such as a ‘fairness’ 
principle or assuming people we don’t know are trustworthy (Uslaner, 2008).  
Mayer et al. (1995) identify three dimensions of trustworthiness41  and this approach has 
become the dominant model used by many organisational trust researchers in reference to 
characteristic-based trust individuals, collective actors, or firms (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011): 
(i) ability refers to the trustee’s perceived capabilities to perform a specific task; (ii) 
benevolence refers to the trustor’s perception that the trustee has the trustor’s best interests 
at heart; and (iii) integrity refers to the trustor’s perception that the trustee’s action are guided 
by a set of principles that are aligned with the trustor’s principle’s. In the context of Zucker’s 
conceptualisation of characteristic-based trust, these are ‘value-laden’ characteristics, 
reflecting the belief of the trustor in the intentions of the trustee  (McKnight & Chervany, 
2001:39:49).  
There is evidence in trust research that different trust determinants act as mutually reinforcing 
complements in the production of trust (Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Paul & McDaniel, 2004). 
Schilke & Cook compared calculative and relational orientations in 171 strategic alliances and 
concluded that neither approach is superior per se, and that the strength of their explanatory 
role depends on the circumstances characterising the exchange relationship at stake (Schilke 
& Cook, 2015). The methodological approach used in this dissertation incorporates both 
rational and emotional perspectives in the analysis of the forms of trust relied on by mini-bond 
and P2B investors. 
3.3.2.3 Institutional-Based Trust 
Zucker argues that the combination of demographic changes increasing cultural heterogeneity 
and technological changes, such as railroads, thus increasing the physical distance between 	41	Sometimes referred to as the ABI-framework (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011).	
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transacting parties, disrupted local trust forms and increased the need for forms of trust that 
were not contingent on trustors and trustees having prior exchange experience or shared 
characteristics (Zucker, 1986:63). Sources of institutional-based trust emerged which 
embodied the ‘constitutive expectations’ of the intra-localised forms of trust, without being 
contingent on close geographic or social distance, and made repeatable by common 
understanding (Zucker, 1986:63). Institutional-based trust can be either firm-specific or 
associated with intermediary mechanisms. In the case of the former, it is produced by formal 
mechanisms such as ‘credentialisation’42, that provide information about the trustworthiness of 
parties in exchange, such as membership in industry associations or standards accreditation.43 
The strength of these credentials is derived from their perceived legitimacy in the context of 
the social system in which they are embedded. Trust in intermediary mechanisms is produced 
by guarantee mechanisms that mitigate the risk of non-completion for the parties in an 
exchange (Zucker, 1986:64), such as the role played by insurance and regulation. 
Zucker’s conceptualisation of institutional-based trust has been extended and refined by other 
scholars in their research of trust. Neu effectively sub-divides the intermediary mechanism 
form of trust described by Zucker to create three categories of institutional-based trust (Neu, 
1991b, 1991a), which are more explicit than the ‘intermediary mechanisms’ described by 
Zucker. His first type of institutional-based trust is quite similar to Zucker’s concept of 
credentialisation, with individuals or firms adopting institutional forms such as educational 
degrees, or ‘best practice’ tools, to signal legitimacy. The second type is a type of intermediary 
entity, rather than a mechanism, that provides a warranty or guarantee for the functioning of 
the relationship, even when the exchanging parties have had no prior exposure to each other. 
Neu cites auditors as an example of these intermediaries through the verification services they 
provide, which are relied on by third parties transacting directly or indirectly with the audited 
firm (Neu, 1991a). Neu singles out regulatory bodies as a distinct source of institutional-based 
trust, arguing that the monitoring and control of rule following leads to more predictable 
behaviour of market participants (Neu, 1991b). 
Zucker argues that process-based, characteristic-based, and institutional-based trust forms 
are not evolutionary and can be produced simultaneously; however, she does imply that 
process-based trust is likely to be replaced by institutional-based trust over time (Zucker, 
1986:101). Lane & Bachmann built on Zucker’s empirical work and found all three forms of 
trust building in their empirical study of supplier relations among firms in Germany and the UK 
	42 This includes certification by third parties. A credential is issued by a third party with authoritative power, and is 
proof of qualification or competence. Certification are earned by professional or industry organisations and verify 
an achieved a baseline level of competence following training or education. 43 An example is the International Standards Organisation, which publishes ISO standards for quality management 
of products, management systems and industrial processes. It then certifies companies that meet these standards. 
Many companies will not commercially engage with organisations that are not ‘ISO certified’. 
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(Lane & Bachmann, 1996). Their findings suggest that context is important for the creation and 
adoption of trust mechanisms, with evidence of greater trust production in the German 
operating environment as a result of a more stable environment, a finding consistent with Neu’s 
proposition regarding regulation and the predictability of firm behaviour. Zucker’s more recent 
research, analysing how types of trust vary across institutional and organisational contexts, 
recognises the agency of organisations and their ability to choose modes of trust production 
(Schilke, Wiedenfels, Brettel, & Zucker, 2016).   
3.3.3 Empirical Research Informing Intra-Local Forms of Trust Production 
The dissertation also draws on three areas of empirical research from the broader finance, 
sociology and psychology literatures to inform the two intra-local forms of trust production 
conceptualised by Zucker: (i) the work of financial economists studying local bias in investing 
decision, or the predisposition of investors to invest in companies located near the investor; (ii) 
the work of sociologists studying how the social relationships between firms and banks affect 
the availability and terms of loan financing; and (iii) the work of psychologists studying the 
influence of affective impression and decision heuristics on the purchase and investment 
decisions made by individuals. Each of these areas of research is discussed in the context of 
process-based and characteristic-based forms of trust production as follows. 
3.3.3.1 Local Bias  
Several studies in the finance literature use distance between investor and investee as a proxy 
for the degree of information asymmetry, making the assumption that investors’ information 
about the investee is negatively correlated with distance. Finance scholars have been 
researching what has come to be known as the local bias phenomenon44 in behavioural finance 
for the past 20 years. For example, Ivković & Weisbenner found that the average share of local 
investments (located within 50 miles of the investor) by individual investors in the US was 
approximately 30% of their portfolios, which is 20% higher than the average percentage of all 
firms within the local area of investors, while the local investment returns were 3.2% higher 
than non-local returns (Ivković & Weisbenner, 2007).  They attribute this effect to the ability of 
local investors to exploit local information not accessible to non-local investors. Similar results 
regarding the behaviour of individual investors have been found in Finland (Grinblatt & 
Keloharju, 2001) and among institutional investors in the US (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001).  
Finance scholars generally agree on the existence of a local investment bias, but do not agree 
on what causes it. While some research studies conclude that local investors have access to 
value-relevant ‘soft information’ about local firms that produces higher local returns, this 
proposition has been challenged by other research finding local bias effect, but without a 
	44	Also	known	as	‘home	bias‘.	
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corresponding outperformance of local investment returns (Seasholes & Zhu, 2010). For 
example, Ivković & Weisbenner found that the average share of local investments by individual 
investors in the US was significantly higher than the average percentage of all firms within the 
local area of investors, and the local investment returns were higher than non-local returns 
(Ivković & Weisbenner, 2007).  They attribute this effect to the ability of local investors to exploit 
local information not accessible to non-local investors which, in Zucker’s framework, could be 
considered a product of process-based trust. The findings of other studies suggest that a 
positive correlation between superior investment returns and soft information can be attributed 
to cultural affinity. Grinblatt and Keloharju found that investors in Finland were predisposed 
towards investing in firms where either the nationality of the CEO or the official language of the 
firm was shared by the investor (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000), which is more consistent with 
Zucker’s conceptualisation of characteristic-based trust.  Other scholars have viewed the 
affinity thesis more critically, arguing that the local bias associated with cognitive ‘familiarity’ 
can cloud investment judgement and thereby produce lower returns for locally-biased 
investment portfolios (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Huberman, 2001).  
The analysis in this dissertation also investigates the influence of information on the lending 
decisions of mini-bond and P2B investors by assuming that investors and investees are more 
likely to share similar norms and values if they live in close proximity to each other and thus 
facilitating characteristic-based trust. However, while the analysis is concerned with identifying 
local bias in the investing behaviour of mini-bond and P2B investors to indicate the presence 
of intra-local trust production, it is not concerned with the relative performance of the portfolios 
of locally biased mini-bond and loan investments. 
3.3.3.2 Social Relationships 
The influence of social relations between banks and SME lenders is more an indicator of 
process-based trust than characteristic-based trust given the relatively high level of importance 
placed on relationship experience by local bank lenders in making credit decisions. Brian Uzzi’s 
study of the influence of personal relationships between the managers and owners of small 
firms and their bankers in terms of lending was discussed earlier in this chapter in the context 
of embeddedness. A small number of economics and finance scholars in Europe have explicitly 
examined the influence of trust on lending terms in small firm banking relationships. In their 
study of SMEs in Northern Italy, Horworth and Morrow found a direct relationship between a 
lending bank manager’s perceived trustworthiness of an SME owner and the interest rate 
charge on a loan to the SME (Howorth & Moro, 2012).  They found that much of the information 
used to determine an SME owner’s reputation for trustworthiness was captured though 
networks of relations within the local community of the firm and the banker, and the credit rating 
of the firm had little influence on the cost of credit (ibid: 174).   
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Harhoff and Korting’s study of SME and bank relationships in Germany found a highly 
significant relationship between the level of trust between lenders and borrowers and the 
interest rate of loans made to the borrowers (Harhoff & Körting, 1998). They found small firms 
tended to have long-duration relationships with a single bank which contributed to higher levels 
of perceived mutual lender-borrower trust and more favourable lending terms for the borrower. 
The authors also found evidence of regional variation in the interest rate paid by SMEs in 
different regions, with SMEs in Eastern Germany paying almost 1% more interest for a line of 
credit than comparable firms (based on credit statistics) in Western Germany45.  These findings 
are consistent with the findings of scholars studying the impact of relationship duration on 
levels of trust in business relations between firms (Sako, 1998:92).  
3.3.3.3 Affective Impression Heuristics  
An investor’s prior experience with a mini-bond issuer or P2B borrower may be as a consumer 
of the firm’s products or services rather than as an investor, however the consumer experience 
can still be a source of process-based trust. Luhmann’s thesis regarding the complexity-
reducing role of trust through shared meaning (Luhmann, 1979) has been echoed over the 
past 30 years by consumer behaviour researchers studying the purchasing behaviour of 
consumers.  Psychological studies of consumer decision-making have found that consumers 
draw on a readily available ‘affective impression’ as a mental decision-making shortcut, or 
heuristic, in judgement and decision-making in order to avoid estimating all the pros and cons 
of various alternatives, especially when the required judgement or decision is complex and/or 
one’s mental resources are limited (see Zajonc, 1980).  These affective impressions are based 
on positive and negative feelings with the product or supplier (Damasio, 2006; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Zajonc, 1980), while the large body of psychology 
literature analysing consumers’ pre-purchase considerations informs the widespread 
development of ‘brand image’. 
Researchers have also examined the influence of affective impression heuristics on the 
investment preferences of individual investors (Statman, 2004).  Researchers have found 
evidence that familiarity with, and recognition of, a company’s products and brands has a 
positive effect on an individual’s preference to invest in the company’s stock (Frieder & 
Subrahmanyam, 2005).  Understanding the factors determining stock prices and the pieces of 
related information is complex for most individual investors, which makes it difficult to 
accurately estimate the financial returns/risks (Aspara & Tikkanen, 2010; Statman, Fisher, & 
Anginer, 2008).  If individuals lack information about the future and are unable to form 
expectations of the financial returns with great accuracy, individuals are able to make only 
	45 Some of this difference is likely explained by the shorter duration of lending relationships of firms based in the 
former East Germany given they would not have entered into banking relationships until the 1990’s. 
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rough approximations of the return-risk profiles of stocks. Consequently, they may simply 
decide to invest in the stock of companies that they feel positively about, in preference to 
investing in stocks of companies for which they have less positive feelings, despite the source 
of positive feelings being unrelated to the financial performance of the companies. This 
proposition is supported by Aspara’s (2013) analysis of psychometric data collected from 
consumers. He found that a greater relevance of a given company’s products to an investor 
reduced the influence of alternative investment targets, and the affective evaluation of that 
company’s brand increased the investor’s optimism about the financial return from investing in 
the company’s stock (Aspara, 2013). 
3.3.4 Trust versus Confidence 
Trust and confidence are overlapping concepts, and most studies of trust do not distinguish 
between them (Swedberg, 2012:3). As a topic of research in the social sciences, trust is 
mentioned almost three times more frequently than confidence.46 By contrast, non-academic 
discussion of the economy and financial markets typically refers to confidence rather than trust.  
For example, the Bank of England and departments of the UK government refer to confidence 
as a factor explaining the changes in the supply and demand of consumer and business 
finance (The Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2013; Bank of England, 2014), and 
surveys of business and consumer confidence are widely watched by financial markets (Yale 
SoM, 2017).   
One of the earliest economists who discussed the role of confidence in finance was Keynes, 
who viewed confidence47 as a matter for business psychology (Walters, 1992:424) and defined 
it as ‘how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast being wrong’ (Keynes, 1936:138). 
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, both Nobel laureates in economics, also highlight the 
irrational dimension of confidence, which diverges from the neoclassical micro-economic view 
of confidence as a state of mind derived from a rational, cognitive process for dealing with 
uncertainty, producing predictions of future outcomes based on binary conditions of either 
‘confidence’ or ‘no confidence’ (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009).  
Nikolas Luhmann’s analysis of system trust offers an approach for understanding the 
relationship between trust and confidence. Luhmann suggests that they are neither perfect 
complements nor perfect substitutes, because complex social systems ‘require more 
confidence as a prerequisite for participation and more trust as a condition of the best utilisation 
of chance and opportunities’ (Luhmann, 1988:99). In Luhmann’s terms, confidence is related 
to an actor’s perception of the larger system and leads to the production of system trust. In this 
	46 8,560 mentions of trust versus 3,260 mentions of confidence between 2012 and 2016 according to a Web of 
Science topic search. 47 Keynes used the terms confidence and trust interchangeably.	
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context, an actor’s feeling of confidence influences the decision to trust, with the interaction 
between trust and confidence highlighting the need to understand both psychological 
(emotional) and social (relational) determinants influencing the decision to trust. 
This dissertation analyses the role of trust rather than confidence as a factor in the 
development of mini-bond and P2B lending because confidence, like generalised trust, is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for lenders’ willingness to invest. There are a number 
of reasons why a borrower may not pay a loan in the future, some of them knowable and some 
unknowable.  In principle, the financial condition of the borrower and his intention to repay the 
loan when due are knowable risk factors, while a geopolitical event that potentially disrupts the 
capacity of all borrowers to repay represents an uncertainty. If confidence is related to 
assessing uncertainty, then having confidence is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
enter into a trust-based relationship, because the prospective trustor must have sufficient 
confidence and trust to accept being vulnerable in the relationship.  
3.3.5 Signalling Trustworthiness 
The decision by an actor to trust an ‘object of trust’ is based on the actor’s perception of that 
object’s trustworthiness (Stolowy, Messner, Jeanjean, & Richard Baker, 2014). A trustworthy 
party is one which will not exploit the vulnerability of a trustor (Banerjee et al., 2006). 
Understanding how trustworthiness is produced is, therefore, essential to understanding the 
role of trust in the alternative lending practices of individuals. While the consequences of 
trustworthiness are viewed in a broadly consistent manner in trust literature, there is less 
agreement on how trustworthiness develops. 
Signalling of trustworthiness is a necessary condition for trust, since actual trustworthy qualities 
and intentions are insufficient to produce trust if unobserved by a trustor. An important 
theoretical implication for the analysis of trust in this dissertation is the perceptions of 
trustworthiness, rather than the actual trustworthiness of a trustee that influence the trustor. 
Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) link the concept of trust with the theory of signalling (Spence, 
1973), arguing that it is not possible for a trustor to know whether a trustee has qualities of 
trustworthiness, so a trustor can only perceive signs about the behaviour of the trustee and 
draw inferences about his actual trustworthiness (Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). The possible 
sources of these signs are wide ranging, from biological indications, to verbal communications 
to commercial brands.  
Swedberg distinguishes between signalling, an intentional act, and a proxy sign representing 
something one can rely on to make a decision to act when dealing with incomplete knowledge 
(Swedberg, 2012:6). At the outset of a relationship, these signals can take a significant amount 
of time to emerge, and hence an intermediary known and trusted by each party can play a 
crucial role in accelerating the establishment of a trusted-based relationship. This has 
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relevance to the P2B lending channel with internet platforms acting as intermediaries between 
firms seeking borrowers and investors seeking to lend. Signals can be misleading and 
potentially lead to the unwarranted erosion of trust between parties. Noteboom highlights the 
important role that trusted intermediaries can also play in maintaining trust in situations when 
parties have misinterpreted the signals of transaction counterparties (Nooteboom, 2011). 
Trustworthiness can also be associated with negative outcomes when trustors extend 
excessive or unwarranted trust.  Excessive trust in a relationship can be produced by the 
behaviour of either the trustee or the trustor. A reputation for being trustworthy based on past 
behaviour is not a guarantee that a trustee will not engage in opportunistic behaviour in the 
future (Barney & Hansen, 1994:187). From the perspective of the trustor, excessive trust can 
result in insufficient monitoring of trustee behaviour as a result of blind faith, tolerance of sub-
optimal performance by trustors because of complacency, and over-commitment of resources 
to the relationship because of over-embeddedness (Gargiulo & Gokhan, 2006:180). From the 
perspective of the trustee, the benefits that a reputation for trustworthiness can reap are an 
incentive for the trustee to invest resources in the production of stronger signals of 
trustworthiness than are warranted by its actual trustworthiness . This is an observation that 
informs the analysis of the listed mini-bond market that emerged in Germany. 
3.3.6 Categorisation  
The relevance of categorisation to this dissertation, including the empirical work of Ezra 
Zuckerman in the context of institutional analysis, was discussed earlier in this chapter.  Other 
empirical research more explicitly investigates categorisation as an antecedent to the 
production of trust. During his trip to the United States in 1904, Max Weber observed the 
tendency of people in the United States to trust individuals who were members of certain 
religious sects (Weber, 1963). Weber encountered a person who wanted to become a banker 
and who, therefore, became a Baptist because he believed that by becoming a Baptist people 
would trust him with their money (Weber, 1963:304). This is representative of Zucker’s 
conceptualisation of characteristic-based trust, in which a trustor perceives similar 
characteristics in another party which can be relied on to predict that party’s behaviour. In 
effect, the anecdote provided by Weber and the process described by Zucker are both 
examples of social categorisation, a cognitive process of identifying similarity in others 
(McKnight & Chervany, 2006:42).  
While Zucker and others attribute social categorisation to personal relationships between 
individuals, other scholars have extended the relevance of categorisation to trust formation 
from individual to organisational relationships. For example, firms can be categorised by 
prospective customers on the basis of their size, with large suppliers signalling competence-
based trustworthiness because they are more likely to have the resources and support systems 
needed to meet their obligations to the customer (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2008:48). Several 
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academic studies have also found that family firms have better reputations compared with non-
family firms, particularly in developed economies (Sageder et al., 2016). Trust scholars offer 
an explanation: through categorisation processes, individuals can apply the characteristics of 
a general category to an organisation identified as being part of the category (McKnight, 
Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). The family business literature also provides evidence of a 
categorisation process in trust development between individual stakeholders and 
organisations. Hauswald and Hack concluded that family control/influence in an organisation 
positively influences individual stakeholders’ perception of benevolence, separate and distinct 
from perceptions of competence, and this perception is derived from a categorisation process 
based on group membership of the organisation (Hauswald & Hack, 2013) .  
The role of categorisation in the production of trust between firms and individuals is highly 
relevant to understanding the behaviour of individual investors engaged in alternative lending.  
The study investigates the extent to which firms using the alternative lending channels are 
seen by investors as members of a category, and whether attributes of the category are 
attributed to individual borrowers and influence the level of perceived trustworthiness of the 
borrower. 
3.3.7 Trust and Comparative Advantage  
Several academic studies have found that family firms have a long-term orientation which 
motivates family owners to acquire a good reputation for both financial and non-financial 
reasons, such as social status and family interests (Zellweger et al., 2013).  Firms with a better 
reputation can more easily hire employees and charge more for their products (Fombrum & 
Shanley, 1990), and more easily access financial resources than comparable businesses with 
worse reputations (Yang, 2010).  These benefits accruing to firms with good reputations 
suggest that trustworthiness is an asset that can provide reputable firms with a competitive 
advantage (Fink, 2010; Sageder et al., 2016; Steier, 2001). 
In Zucker’s conceptualisation of trust forms, reputation is a source of process-based trust for 
individuals and firms. Barney and Hansen adopt Zucker’s concept and propose trustworthiness 
as a potential source of competitive advantage in economic exchange (Barney & Hansen, 
1994:188).  They identify three forms of trust differentiated by the strength of the competitive 
advantage they confer to a firm: weak form trust, when firms invest in costly governance 
mechanisms; semi-strong form trust, when firms have difficult-to-imitate skills and abilities; and 
strong form of trust, also referred to as ‘hard core trust’, when exchange partners share values 
and principles that are consistent with trustworthy behaviour and, thereby, exclude 
opportunism. Strong form of trust provides firms with difficult-to-duplicate sustained 
competitive advantage, either through reduced governance costs incurred by their partners, or 
a greater willingness of partners to collaborate on opportunities that they considered as too 
risky with less-trusted partners. Barney and Hansen argue that the transaction cost efficiencies 
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gained by strong trust relations are as economically valuable to a firm as any other asset that 
produces a cost advantage (Barney & Hansen, 1994:189). 
Barney and Hansen’s theoretical proposition is lacking in two respects.  First, they cite concrete 
examples of weak and semi-strong forms of trust but no example of strong form trust, which 
confers the most sustainable competitive advantage. They claim that the individual and 
organisational attributes that make strong form possible are ‘rare’ and ‘socially complex’ 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994:188), which does suggest that this form may not exist. Second, their 
conceptualisation of trust forms does not address possible differences between macro, meso 
and micro levels of trust relationships. Of direct relevance to this dissertation is the question of 
whether trustworthiness as a competitive advantage is relevant at the institutional level, 
specifically whether trustworthiness in a category of firms, such the Mittelstand in Germany, 
confers a competitive advantage to firms identified as a member. The relationship between 
categorisation, access to finance and competitive advantage is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
The trust literature is vast, with contributions from scholars in a wide range of social science 
disciplines contributing fundamentally different perspectives on the sources, forms and 
outcomes of trust. The section reviewed the literature analysing trust from the sociological, 
psychological and financial economics perspectives. It discounted the usefulness of 
generalised trust to the analysis of mini-bond and P2B lending, despite it being a frequently 
referenced trust form in the literature. In particular, forms of trust have greater relevance. It 
reviewed Lynne Zucker’s framework of process-based, characteristic-based, and institutional-
based sources of trust used as the basis for identifying the dominant trust forms relied on by 
lenders to assess the trustworthiness of firms seeking loans in the mini-bond and P2B lending 
channels. The methodological approach draws on literature comparing rational and emotional-
based forms of trust, concluding that these are co-existent and complementary forms of trust 
production rather than substitutes. It provided a review of empirical research examining lending 
relationships from economics and psychology, in addition to sociology, that provide support for 
the theoretical framework used to identify the sources of trust that are relevant to the analysis 
of alternative lending. This section concluded with a summary of the theoretical concepts used 
in the analysis including signalling of trustworthiness as distinguished from trust, and the role 
of categorisation in the production of trust.  
Despite a large body of literature conceptualising trust from a theoretical perspective there are 
relatively few empirical studies examining of the role of trust in finance practices. This research 
contributes both empirical and theoretical insights to the literature by examining variation in the 
production of trust from a multi-level perspective in a cross-national context. It also examines 
both intermediated and direct alternative lending channels to contribute a fuller understanding 
of the influence of intermediation on trust relations. 
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This chapter reviewed the three bodies of literature that this dissertation draws on to address 
the research questions presented in this dissertation.  The economic sociology literature 
contributes theoretical insight regarding embeddedness, both in an institutional and 
organisational context.  The dissertation adopts the most-cited framework for cross-national 
economic comparison, namely Varieties of Capitalism, to compare the development of 
alternative lending practices between Germany and the UK. It also incorporates insight from 
the institutional theory literature regarding institutional entrepreneurship to address the 
limitation of the VoC model in explaining institutional change. The third and final section of the 
chapter reviewed theoretical and empirical contributions drawn from the trust literature to 
identify the social arrangements underpinning the institutional environment in each country. It 
reviewed the contribution of Lynne Zucker’s categorisation of trust forms to the methodological 
approach for identifying the forms relied on by investors lending to firms in the mini-bond and 
P2B channels in the two countries.  The following chapter discusses the data types and 
methodological approach used to undertake this analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Data and Research Methods  
This chapter is divided into two sections. It begins with a discussion of the data collected for 
the analysis, then discusses the research questions, hypotheses, and the methodology used 
in the analysis. The dissertation uses a nested mixed methods research design, which 
analyses three levels of primary data (interview, survey and transaction data), and is 
supplemented with secondary data sources to identify the behaviour of individuals investing in 
mini-bond and P2B loans. 
4.1 Description of the Data  
This section describes the types and sources of the data used in the analysis. Data was 
collected from both primary and secondary sources in the UK and Germany between late 2013 
and early 2017. Primary data includes transaction-level data collected from firms issuing mini-
bond and Peer-to-Business (P2B) lending platforms, data collected from questionnaires 
completed by P2B and mini-bond investors, and data collected in interviews with mini-bond 
and P2B investors. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the unique, primary data sets collected 
for this dissertation.  
Table 4.1: Summary of Primary Data Sets 
 
Secondary data primarily consists of cross-national surveys of trust48, and economic data 
collected from the internet web sites of government and inter-governmental organisations. A 
description of the data and the collection methods follows. 
	48 The questions used in the analysis include questions about trust in institutions and types of organisation and do 
not include questions about generalised trust. 
Description & 
Level of Data UK German UK Germany
Aggregated 
investment & lending 
activity
Survey of platfrom 
lending volume       
(17 platforms)
Survey of 
platfrom lending 
volume      (6 
platforms)
New issue data 
(hand collected)
New issue data   
(supplied by 3rd 
party)
Investment by 
individual investors
Transaction data      
(6 platforms) N/A
Transaction data      
(3 corporate 
issuers)
Transaction data        
(5 corporate issuers)
Survey 
questionnaire    
(405 respondents)
N/A
Transaction data      
(3 corporate 
issuers)
Transaction data        
(5 corporate issuers)
Interviews                
(20 investors) N/A
Interviews               
(30 investors)
Interviews                  
(20 investors)
P2B Lending Mini-bond Lending
Investing behaviour of 
individual investors
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4.1.1 Peer-to-Business Lending Data Sets  
P2B lending is an intermediated form of lending, in which online internet platforms act as 
intermediaries between borrowers and investors to make loan requests of borrowers available 
to investors who would otherwise be unaware of a borrower’s need for a loan. Primary data 
was collected for P2B lending activity in UK and Germany from 2013 through 2015. The data 
was collected via a survey questionnaire distributed to P2B lending platforms in early 2016 by 
the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance49 (CCAF). A list of the questions used in the 
survey is provided in Appendix 1. The survey did not seek to collect lending volume data prior 
to 2013 because P2B lending did not begin in Germany until 2012. The survey was completed 
by five German and 17 UK lending platforms, and these platforms are estimated, by the CCAF, 
to represent more than 90% of the P2B lending volume in each country during the 2013–2015 
period.  
The reported lending data is aggregated at the platform level, so platforms did not provide 
detailed data about either the loans made on their platforms or the individuals investing in 
these loans. The data set for the three-year period includes the following descriptive variables 
of the lending activity on each platform:  
(i) Number of loans: the total number of individual loans funded (by year);  
(ii) Total lending volume: total monetary value of the loans funded (by year); 
(iii) Average size of loan: the average monetary value of the loans funded in a given year; 
(iv) Number of investors registered on the platform (by year); 
(v) % of loan volume funded by individuals: the percentage of total lending volume in a 
given year funded by individual investors (versus institutional investors). 
The CCAF also collected detailed information about individual P2B loans, and individual 
investor participation in these loans, from UK P2B lending platforms in late 2016. This data 
was collected as part of a research collaboration with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
the UK financial services regulator. The CCAF was commission by the FCA to conduct analysis 
of P2B lending as part of its review of the regulatory framework governing this lending channel 
in the UK market, and the CCAF sent a data request to six P2B lending platforms, which 
collectively were estimated to represent more than 95% of the P2B lending volume in the UK 
market. All six platforms provided transaction data related to their lending activity from 2012 to 
2016, which in aggregate exceeded more than more than 9 million investments made by 
investors in more than 36,000 P2B loans to SMEs during the period50. The data is contained in 
four linked tables within the data set, with approximately 50 attributes associated with the 	49 An inter-disciplinary research centre within the University of Cambridge Judge Business School. The author of 
this dissertation is the Director & Co-Founder of the CCAF and was one of the research team members the 
developed the survey questionnaire.  50 Data was collected from 2010, when P2B lending activity began in the UK market. 
		 73	
borrower, the lender, and the loan instrument for each loan processed by the platforms51. The 
data field items for each processed loan are listed in Appendix 252. The loan transaction data 
sets do not contain identifying information about the borrowers or lenders, and all postcodes 
in address data fields were shortened to the 4-digit postal district level to comply with 
requirements of the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) Privacy Impact Assessment 
(PIA) for the protection of personal information. The platforms agreed to provide their data on 
the understanding that: (i) presentation of research findings will present findings in aggregated 
format without disclosing platform-specific information; and (ii) the data will be used for 
academic research purposes only. 
In December 2016, the six UK P2B platforms that provided loan transaction data also sent an 
email to all the individual investors registered on their platforms inviting them to complete an 
internet survey. The invitation email contained a link to an online questionnaire developed in 
consultation with the FCA53.  Appendix 3 contains a copy of the survey questions. The online 
survey consists of 26 questions asking investors about their investing process, return 
expectations, understanding of P2B loans as an asset class, and demographic characteristics. 
A total of 405 P2B investors completed the online questionnaire. The internet questionnaire 
also asked respondents if they were willing to be interviewed for their views on P2B lending.  
A total of 114 survey respondents agreed to be interviewed, and 20 of these investors were 
randomly selected and interviewed by telephone in January 2017. The invitation for the 
interview and the list of the structured questions for the interviews are contained in Appendices 
4 and 5, respectively. The interviews covered three question areas: (i) motivations for investing; 
(ii) investing behaviour; and (iii) the influence of trust in the decision-making process of the 
investors. Each interview lasted from 45 minutes to 1 hour 15 minutes. The interviews were all 
recorded with the agreement of interviewees, and transcribed using a commercial audio 
transcription service.  
4.1.2 Mini-bond Data Sets  
The name ‘mini-bond’ is a term of art within the corporate finance community, and is used to 
describe a corporate bond with an issuance size that is much smaller than a traditional 
corporate bond sold by investment banks to investors in capital markets. Mini-bonds, like larger 
corporate bonds, can be either unlisted or listed instruments on a bond listing segment of a 
regulated financial exchange. Data was collected for both listed and unlisted mini-bonds from 
both secondary and primary sources to get a more complete picture of the mini-bond lending 
activity in each country. A description of the mini-bond data and collection methods follows. 	51 The dissertation author was part of the research team and led the development of the data field specification 
distributed to the platforms. 52 Not all platforms were able to provide information for all data fields.	53	The dissertation author was part of the research team which developed the survey questions.	
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4.1.2.1 German Mini-Bond Data Sets 
In Germany, mini-bond issues can be listed on the specialised mini-bond (or ‘Mittelstand bond’) 
segments of five regional financial exchanges following the placement of the bonds with 
investors, providing the issue meets the listing criteria of the segment of the exchange. While 
information about listed mini-bond issues is publicly available and relatively easy to access 
from secondary sources, information about unlisted mini-bond issues is more difficult to obtain 
because many issuers are reluctant to disclose any information about their financing activities. 
Data must be acquired from primary sources, which is challenging given that the issues are 
highly reluctant to disclose information to third parties.   
Information about both listed and unlisted mini-bond issues in the German market was 
provided by a German internet platform called Anleihen-Finder GmbH (A-F), which specialises 
in the collection and analysis of information about mini-bond issuances in Germany and 
Austria. A-F provides publicly available information on its website to German-speaking 
investors; 54  however, the data it provided for this dissertation included non-public data 
obtained from unlisted issuers through its strong relationships with mini-bond issuers and their 
advisors55. The data set provided by A-F includes aggregated mini-bond volume data for 117 
listed and 144 unlisted issues56 between 2009 and 2015 with the following attributes: 
(i) Total mini-bond lending volume (annual);  
(ii) Number of mini-bonds issued and average issue size (annual); 
(iii) Industry segment of issuers; 
(iv) Number of issues and issuance volume by financial exchange listing segment (if 
mini-bond is listed on an exchange); 
(v) Credit ratings of the issues (if rated); 
(vi) Interest rate coupon paid of each bond; 
(vii) Duration (term) of each mini-bond issue. 
Despite this challenge in accessing information about unlisted mini-bond issues, five German 
firms that issued mini-bonds agreed to provide primary source transaction data57. The data sets 
contain mini-bond data at the level of the individual investor transaction, with approximately 
	54 The language used for the website is German only. 55	The dissertation author met with executives at each of the firms assisted by a German-speaking employee of A-
F, and also attended the Summer Garden Party for G5 mini-bond investors in July, 2013.	56	The unlisted mini-bonds in the A-F data set do not include small mini-bond issues of typically less that €5 million 
issued by firms to local investors. These issues are place with investors via locally-based financial advisors and are 
very difficult to source. Firm G3 in the transaction data set is an example of a small local mini-bond issue which is 
not included in the A-F dataset, and was sourced via a personal relationship with one of the G3 investors.		57 Only one company requested the execution of confidentiality agreement to prohibit disclosure of the firm’s 
identity, however the names of all companies contributing data companies have been anonymised. 
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25,818 mini-bond investments made by 12,633 individual investors in 39 mini-bond issues.58 
Each individual investment includes descriptive variables for the bond instrument purchased 
by the investor, such as size of issue, date of issue, interest rate and maturity, as well as 
investors’ 5-digit postal code, the amount of the investment and date of the investment. A 
description of the issuers and their mini-bond issues is summarised in Table 4.2.   
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: German mini-bond issuers Supplying Transaction Data 
 
(1) At time of bond issuance. 
The mini-bond issuers vary significantly in their turnover, number of employees and the size 
of mini-bond issue they placed with investors. A brief description of each firm follows: 
(i) Firm G1 is a 100-year-old producer of metal castings located in a Bavarian town of 
approximately 20,000 inhabitants. The firm employs approximately 500 people and is, 
therefore, relatively important to the local economy. Ownership of the company 
changed hands several times over the years, and in 2004 it was acquired by a privately 
owned, medium-sized castings manufacturer based in the mid-Western United States. 
The financial stress incurred by the company during the 2008 financial crisis led the 
firm to declare insolvency in 2009, as it could no longer service the debt it had taken 
on to finance the acquisition by the American owner. A group of private individuals from 
the local community where the company is located supported the management team 
to acquire ownership of the company in 2009 and, subsequently, issued a mini-bond 
as part of the debt refinancing of the firm. 
(ii) Firm G2 is the utility company supplying gas and water to the inhabitants of a town of 
approximately 60,000 people in North Rhine-Westphalia in Northern Germany. In 2012, 
it was seeking a 10-year loan of € 10 million to refurbish its distribution network 
infrastructure. The firm decided to raise the required funding by issuing a mini-bond to 
local residents as an alternative to a higher-cost loan offered by the local Sparkassen 
savings bank; 
(iii) Firm G3 is a small, 20-year-old machine tool manufacturer in a town of approximately 
25,000 people in North Rhine-Westphalia in Northern Germany. The firm issued the 	58 The G5 mini-bond issuer provided transaction data for 22,482 investments made by 9,311 individual investors 
in 35 mini-bond issues that occurred between 2002 and 2013. Summary statistics for the G5 mini-bond issues are 
provided in Appendix 7. 
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bonds to help finance an expansion of its facility because it was unable to borrow all of 
the required funds from a bank lender; 
(iv) Firm G4 is a 20-year-old developer and operator of renewable energy projects. It 
issued a € 30 million mini-bond alongside borrowing approximately € 100 million from 
a syndicate of German banks to finance additional projects; 
(v) Firm G5 is a producer of industrial chemicals founded in the early 1990s with 
headquarters in a small city located in the Rhine-Ruhr area of Germany. The firm’s 
entrepreneurial founder has funded the expansion of his business over the past 20 
years by issuing more than 40 mini-bonds as an alternative to borrowing from banks. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show investors attending the annual summer garden party in 2013 
hosted by G5 for its mini-bond investors, and a kiosk manned by employees of G5 
selling bonds to the party attendees. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The G5 Mini-Bond Investors’ Summer Garden Party in 2013 
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Figure 4.2: Kiosk Selling G5 Mini-Bonds at Investors’ Summer Garden Party 
The G4 and G5 firms that provided mini-bond transaction data also agreed to distribute a 
questionnaire containing approximately 50 questions by mail to a random sample of their mini-
bond investors. The structure and format of the questions followed questions previously used 
in the European Values Study, Eurobarometer surveys and other social attitudes surveys. 
Appendix 8 contains the English translation of the questions used in the survey. The 
questionnaire was designed to gather information on socio-demographic status, word-of-
mouth interactions before and after purchasing the bond, investment considerations for 
purchasing the bond, the consumer relationship with the bond, and trust in institutions.   
The survey was distributed in two waves. Surveys were first distributed in person to investors 
and potential investors attending a series of five investor information events held by the G5 
mini-bond issuer in cities across Germany59 during November and December 201360. The first 
wave was used to test the survey questions, and two additional questions were added to the 
survey during the first wave. In the second wave, the questionnaire was distributed by mail by 
the company, rather than via the internet, to the investors to reduce the risk of sampling bias 
following discussions with the mini-bond issuers about their investor base, which revealed that 
a large number of the investors were elderly people who may not be regular users of the 	59 Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich and Duisburg. 60 The dissertation author attended each investor event, and distributed and collected survey questionnaires 
assisted by a German-speaking employee of A-F. 
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internet. The questionnaire was mailed by the mini-bond issuers to the selected investors in 
January and February 2014. Each survey mail package included instructions for returning the 
completed questionnaire to a post office box in Cambridge, UK, using a pre-paid return 
envelope also included in the package. A total of 630 questionnaires were collected during the 
two waves. The completion response levels for the mailed survey were considered to be very 
high, at 49% for G4 and 35% for G5, respectively61. Summary socio-demographic statistics for 
G4 and G5 mini-bond investor survey respondents are provided in Appendix 962.   
Structured interviews were conducted by telephone in mid-2014 with 20 German investors, 
who were randomly selected from among the G5 investors who had completed the 
questionnaire and volunteered to be interviewed. The length of each interview ranged from 30 
minutes to 45 minutes. The interviews with the German investors were conducted in German 
by a German-speaking researcher using a set of semi-structured questions63. The interviews 
were audio recorded with the agreement of the interviewees, and the interviews were 
transcribed and translated to English using a specialised commercial supplier based in the UK. 
Robustness checks confirmed that there were no statistically significant differences in the 
characteristics of the interviewee and the survey respondent samples.  
Socio-demographic data for all German households within 5-digit postcode areas (average 
5,000 households) and 8-digit household areas (average 500 households) were acquired from 
a commercial data supplier in Germany. The socio-demographic data sets were merged with 
the investor survey data sets. The socio-demographic data includes information about 
household purchasing power, population density, foreign population, and affinity to purchase 
speculative financial investments. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the distribution of socio-
demographic characteristics of survey respondents (at the postcode level) relative to all 
German households. 
	61	The dissertation author set up the PO Box return address using Mailboxes Unlimited in Cambridge, printed and 
prepared the packages of questionnaire as well as return pre-addressed envelope. The packages were then 
shipped to the G4 and G5 mini-bond issuers.  Stamps were purchased in Germany by A-F and sent to G4 and G5 
and an employee of each company attached an address label and stamp and mailed the packages to the sample 
of investors from their premises.	62 The date entry, coding and statistical analysis of the German and UK mini-bond transaction data sets, mini-bond 
survey data sets and investor interview data sets was performed by the dissertation author. 63	The interviews were conducted in German by the same German-speaking employee of A-F who participated in 
the distribution of survey questionnaires at the G5 investor information events.  The interviews followed a script of 
question areas prepared by the dissertation author.	
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Table 4.3: Socio-Demographic Statistics in 5-digit Postcode Areas in Germany 
 
4.1.2.2 UK Mini-Bond Data Sets 
A mini-bond has four characteristics that distinguish it from other types of corporate bonds: (i) 
the issue size is small, always less than £150m and typically less than £50m; (ii) the nominal 
amount is small, typically £1,000 versus £100,000 for corporate bonds; (iii) the regulatory 
requirements for issuance are lower;64 and (iv) the distribution of the bonds to investors has 
less involvement from financial intermediaries. In the UK market, the closest equivalent to a 
mini-bond listed segment is the Order Book for Retail Bonds (OBR) segment of the London 
Stock Exchange, which lists corporate bonds with small nominal bond amounts. As a result, 
bonds listed on the OBR segment are referred to as retail bonds because the nominal bond 
amounts have been structured to appeal to individual rather than institutional investors. Almost 
all retail bonds issues are large companies issuing bonds with very few issues below £100 
million that are small enough to be considered mini-bonds65. Even the smaller retail bond 
issues, however, cannot be considered as equivalent to mini-bonds because the exchange 
and regulatory requirements for listing are the same as for a corporate bond, and the 
placement of corporate bonds with institutional investors involves more intermediation by 
advisors and investment banks. As a result, retail bonds have been excluded from the analysis 
of mini-bond financing in the UK market. 
	64 For financial instruments intending to be placed with retail investors. 65 Some small companies that have tried to issue small bonds on the OBR have failed. An example is Stobart 
Group, which announced a £25 million OBR bond in November 2014 but quickly pulled the offering after failing to 
attract sufficient investor interest. 
% 
Foreigners
% Urban 
HHs
Number of 
HHs
Purchasing 
Power per HH Low Average High
 All Germany 
Postcodes 8,256         8,256         8,256           8,266               8,266                8,266                8,266                
Missing 10              10              35                -                   -                   -                   -                   
Mean 18              19              4,894           41,000             60                     12                     27                     
Median 10              - 2,947           42,824             64                     11                     19                     
N 372            372            372              372                  372                   372                   372                   
19              19              19                19                    19                     19                     19                     
Mean 2,242         49              9,977           44,370             42                     10                     47                     
Median 2,075         9,770           43,776             42                     10                     43                     
N 159            194            159              179                  179                   179                   179                   
35              -             35                15                    15                     15                     15                     
Mean 2,142         35              8,885           45,221             42                     12                     46                     
Median 1,690         8,975           44,576             39                     11                     43                     
Postcodes 521            521            521              521                  521                   521                   521                   
Valid 590            593            590              630                  591                   591                   591                   
Mean 23              49              9,722           41,889             47                     42                     11                     
Median 21              - 9,619           43,400             43                     41                     11                     
Affinity for Speculative Investments (% of HHs)
Survey Respondents N=630
		 80	
There is no equivalent to Anleihen-Finder operating in the UK market, and therefore data for 
mini-bond lending in the UK was hand-collected via internet searches for online press 
announcements of mini-bond fundraisings66. These announcements were issued by PR firms 
retained by mini-bond issuers to make as many individual investors as possible aware of the 
mini-bond offering and, thereby, increase the likelihood of receiving the target amount for the 
mini-bond fundraising. The press announcements typically contain a link to the documentation 
detailing the terms of the offering, which can be downloaded by interested investors. An 
overview of the UK unlisted mini-bond issues is contained in Appendix 10. 
Primary source data was collected during 2014 from three UK firms that issued mini-bonds67. 
The data sets contain mini-bond transaction data at the individual investor level, with mini-bond 
investments made by 4,695 individual investors in 3 mini-bond issues. The set of descriptive 
variables for each bond investment is the same as the German mini-bond transaction data 
sets. Each individual investment includes descriptive variables for the bond instrument 
purchased by the investor, such as size of issue, date of issue, interest rate and maturity, as 
well as the investors’ 5-digit postal code, the amount of the investment and date of the 
investment. The issuers and their mini-bond issues are summarised in Table 4.4. The firms 
vary significantly in turnover, number of employees and the size of mini-bond issue they placed 
with investors. 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics: UK Mini-Bond Issuers Supplying Transaction Data 
 
(1) At time of bond issuance 
(i) Firm UK1 is an e-commerce retailer of wine which was founded in 2008 by a veteran 
of the UK wine industry. The firm’s business model is to finance the harvest of emerging 
wine producers in order to acquire the produced wines at lower cost and, thereby, offer 
wines at lower prices than competitors. It issued a mini-bond to finance the additional 
harvest inventory needed to expand its business;  
(ii) Firm UK2 is a developer and operator of small-scale renewable energy projects 
founded in the 1990s in Australia. It issued a mini-bond in 2011 to finance wind farm 
projects in the UK; 
	66 This data was collected and analysed by the dissertation author. 67 The dissertation author cold-called every firm in the UK that had issued a mini-bond prior to June 2014 and only 
three of these mini-bond issuers agreed to contribute data. 
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(iii) Firm UK3 is the owner and operator of 200-year-old enterprise of horse racing courses 
across the UK. It issued a bond in 2012 to finance the refurbishment of the grandstand 
and grounds at its flagship facility after discovering that the cost of a loan from its 
traditional bank lender could only be obtained on terms that were significantly more 
onerous than the terms for similar loans entered into before the financial crisis. 
One of the UK firms (UK3) that provided mini-bond transaction data also agreed to mail a 
questionnaire containing approximately 50 questions to a random sample of its mini-bond 
investors. The questionnaire was distributed by mail to reduce the likelihood of sampling bias 
affecting the analysis when comparing UK and German mini-bond investors, since the 
questionnaire had been distributed by mail to the German mini-bond investors. The mailing 
was completed in April 2014, using the same collection method as the German survey mailing. 
A total of 276 completed questionnaires were received at the Cambridge post office box 
address. The completion response level was high for the survey mailing, at 37%. 
Structured interviews were conducted by telephone during 2014 with 30 of the investors in the 
UK3 mini-bonds who had completed the questionnaire and volunteered to be interviewed68. 
Interviews lasted from 40 minutes to one hour using a set of semi-structured questions. All 
interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees, and the audio recordings were 
transcribed by the same commercial provider of transaction services used for the German 
interview transcriptions.  
Summary socio-demographic statistics for the UK3 mini-bond investor respondents completing 
the survey are provided in Appendix 9. Robustness checks confirmed that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the characteristics of the interviewee and the survey 
respondent samples. 
4.1.3 Other Data Sets  
The following additional data sets obtained from secondary sources have been used in the 
analysis. 
(i) Eurobarometer cross-country trust survey data: Survey data about individuals’ beliefs in 
the trustworthiness of known entities from a question in the 2010 Eurobarometer Survey 
Secondary was obtained from a public internet data source; 
(ii) Business lending by banks in the UK and Germany: Data for lending volume by the 
traditional bank channel in the UK and Germany was collected from the Bank of England, 
the British Business Bank, and British Bankers Association for the UK market, and the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and European Central Bank for the German market; 
	68 The dissertation author conducted all of these interviews. 
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(iii) Regulation and policy data for the UK and Germany: Information about regulation and 
policy developments was collected via internet searches of the websites for the 
government entities in the UK and Germany. In the UK, this included the HM Treasury, the 
two regulatory bodies for financial services (the Financial Services Authority and its 
successor the Financial Conduct Authority), and the state-owned business development 
bank (British Business Bank). In Germany, information was collected from the German 
Ministry of Finance, the financial services regulator (the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority, or ‘BaFin’), and the state-owned business development bank (KfW). 
4.2 Research Methodology  
This section of the chapter sets out the research methodology used to investigate the 
development of alternative lending channels in the UK and Germany since the 2008 financial 
crisis, and analyse how trust has influenced the development of these channels. It discusses 
three research questions and associated hypotheses, and the methodological approach used 
for testing each hypothesis.   
4.2.1 Research Question 1: Alternative Lending and VoC Predictions 
Question 1: How have the P2B and mini-bond channels developed in each country since the 
crisis, and do their development trajectories fit with the propositions of the Varieties of 
Capitalism framework?  
Hypothesis 1: The development trajectories of the channels differ between countries, and 
these trajectories are congruent with propositions of the VoC model.  
The analysis for testing the first hypothesis uses a three-step approach. In the first step, the 
development trajectories of the lending channels are identified along four dimensions: (i) 
lending characteristics; (ii) supply of patient capital; (iii) policy enactments; and (iv) response 
of incumbent lenders. The following characteristics are associated with each of these 
dimensions: 
(i) Lending characteristics: Six characteristics for each lending channel are analysed using 
data contained in the aggregated lending data from the survey of P2B platforms: The 
A-F data set for aggregated mini-bond lending in Germany, the P2B loan transaction 
data provided by UK platforms, and the hand-collected data set of mini-bonds issued 
in the UK market. Cumulative lending volume provides an estimate of the market size 
of each channel in each country. Average size of loan/bond provides information about 
the type of firm using each form of funding, and the number of loans/bonds issued 
indicates how prevalent the channels were as a form of funding for firms. Average 
investors per loan and average investment amount characteristics providing 
information about the investment style of the funders in each channel, and the number 
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of investments characteristic, indicates the level of adoption by individual investors of 
P2B loans and mini-bonds as an ‘investable’ asset class. 
(ii) Supply of patient capital: The supply of patient capital in each lending channel is 
indicated by the cumulative proportion of funding provided by repeat investors versus 
one-time investors in the loans/bonds issued by repeat borrowers over time. The 
longitudinal mini-bond data supplied by German mini-bond issuer ‘G5’ contains data for 
the repeat investments made by investors in 35 bonds issued by the company over an 
11-year period (‘repeat G5 mini-bond investment’). Qualitative data for repeat 
investment of UK mini-bond issues is contained in press releases and other secondary 
sources. The transaction data supplied by UK P2B platforms provides data 
representing the investments of both repeat and one-time investors investing in loans 
of repeat P2B borrowers (‘repeat UK P2B investment’). 
(iii) Policy enactments: Secondary sources are used to analyse the effect of policy 
enactments introduced in the UK and Germany during the 2009 to 2015 period on the 
development of mini-bond and P2B lending in each country. Enactments are 
categorised as enabling, constraining or neutral in their impact on the development of 
the channels. The analysis examines economic stimulus policies designed to increase 
lending to SMEs, and regulatory changes targeting mini-bond and P2B lending 
activities. The analysis also uses data collected in the survey of P2B lending platforms 
in the UK and Germany to assess the platforms’ perception of the regulatory 
environment in which they are operating. These variables reflect the level of state 
support for alternative finance channels serving SMEs and mid-sized firms within each 
economy.  
(iv) Response of incumbent lenders: This analysis uses secondary data sources to 
examine the response of the incumbent bank lenders to mini-bond and P2B lending 
activities, and the influence of this response on the business models and growth of the 
channels in each country.  
The second step of the analysis is to use the propositions of the VoC thesis to develop a set 
of predictions for the development of the channels, and to assess the congruence of the 
observed versus the predicted trajectories of development. The VoC framework contends that 
the different institutional arrangements of CMEs and LMEs provide different levels of 
institutional support for how firms carry out their activities, with the result that firms’ operations 
align with this support, thereby producing differing comparative advantages between firms 
located in CMEs and LMEs. Two areas of differing comparative advantage within the corporate 
governance sphere (which includes financing practices) are used as dependent variables to 
derive the VoC prediction: ‘transactional (market) versus relational (bank) finance’, and ‘inter-
firm relations. The analysis investigates the extent to which the regulatory changes and policy 
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initiatives in each country have produced outcomes consistent with these characterisations. 
The analysis also attempts to define the form(s) of change unfolding in each channel using 
Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) framework for categorising institutional change, and examines 
the role of mini-bond issuers and P2B platforms as institutional entrepreneurs in bringing about 
institutional change.   
4.2.2 Research question 2: Role of Trust in Alternative Lending 
Question 2: What has been the role of trust in the development paths of P2B and mini-bond 
lending in the two countries? 
Hypothesis 2: Investors rely on different forms of trust for different types of lending, and the 
presence and strength of these forms varies across the two economies. 
This research question introduces a broader perspective on the important role played by trust 
in the financing practices of firms in CMEs and LMEs than was discussed in the VoC literature. 
The starting point for the analysis is the assumption that trust is a necessary condition for 
economic exchange for a firm, regardless of whether it is located in a CME or LME. VoC 
literature highlights the importance of a trustworthy reputation for CME firms reliant on 
relationship-based banking relationships, but is silent on the role of trust for firms in LMEs that 
are assumed to be more reliant on market-based sources of financing. The hypothesis 
complements the VoC dichotomy by proposing that trustworthiness impacts both CME and 
LME firms’ access to finance; however, these ideal type economies are differentiated by the 
forms of trust relied on by the providers of financing to firms.  
In the case of mini-bond and P2B lending, individual investors have provided most of the 
funding, and so the object of analysis for testing the hypothesis is individual investors as an 
investor group. The adoption of new alternative lending practices by these investors (the 
trustors) is conceptualised as a matter of trust, with the perceived trustworthiness of borrowers 
(the trustees) determining the willingness of investors to provide funding for loans requested 
by borrowers. More specifically, the underlying assumption is that the level of perceived 
trustworthiness influences the investors’ expectations regarding the future behaviour of the 
borrower regarding the repayment of the loan. For an investor, a sufficiently high level of 
trustworthiness in the borrower mitigates any adverse selection risk resulting from the 
information asymmetry problem in lending.  
The analysis of the second research question proceeds in two steps. The first step identifies 
the presence and strength of forms of trust influencing the lending decisions of investors within 
each channel in each economy. In the second step, the analysis compares the relative 
dominance of trust forms between channels in the two economies. Variation in the presence 
and/or strength of trust forms between the channels is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for validating the hypothesis. Inter-channel variation indicates that there may be channel-
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specific factors, but not necessarily country-specific factors, influencing lenders’ perceptions 
of borrower trustworthiness. Channel-specific factors can include the level of intermediation 
between lenders and borrowers,69 differences in the collateral security of P2B loans and mini-
bonds which are preferential to lenders in one of the channels, or differences in the 
creditworthiness between firms using P2B lending versus mini-bonds as a form of financing.   
A frequently used approach for measuring trust is to ask individuals about their beliefs in the 
trustworthiness of other people, in the case of generalised trust, or of a known entity in the 
case of focussed trust (e.g. Guiso et al., 2007; Sapienza et al., 2010; Tabellini, 2010). The 
methodology of this dissertation also incorporates a belief-based measure of trust similar to 
that used in prior trust research, by analysing investors’ beliefs in the relative trustworthiness 
of different organisation categories within the financial system of each country. The strength 
of these beliefs is measured by an ordinal score related to the Lickert scale used in the 
questions, and compares these scores with similar questions answered by participants in the 
Eurobarometer cross-country trust survey. 
Scholars have identified a number of problems in trying to directly measure trust. Determining 
causality is a significant measurement challenge: was the decline in the perceived 
trustworthiness of banks a result of their financial deterioration during the crisis, or did the 
deterioration result from a reduction in trustworthiness produced by other factors? It is difficult 
to observe properties like internalised norms, rules, or moral codes, which are implicit and 
seldom articulated directly. In addition to measuring beliefs, the methodology incorporates a 
second approach for measuring trust in an effort to address some of the measurement issues. 
In her study of trust production in the US economy, Zucker measures trust indirectly by 
observing indicators that signal the presence of different forms of trust (Zucker, 1986). The 
analysis that was used to investigate the second research question about the role of trust 
applies Zucker’s ‘three forms of trust’ taxonomy to a set of characteristics indicating the 
presence of these trust forms in the lending practices of P2B and mini-bond investors. The 
methodology also incorporates a measure of strength for these trust forms, by using the 
framework of space, time and intensity dimensions, as used by Stolowy et al. in their study of 
the Madoff investment fraud to assess the strength of the trust relied on by Madoff’s investors 
(Stolowy et al., 2014:358).  
4.2.2.1 Description of Trust Indicators  
The indicators of presence for the three trust forms used in the analysis, along with their 
measures of strength, are discussed below.  
	69 For example, whether the P2B platform or the individual investors select the individual loan investments in 
investors’ portfolios. 
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Usage of Product/Service and Reputation of Borrower as Indicators of Process-Based 
Trust 
Zucker identifies direct experience and reputation produced by indirect experience as sources 
of process-based trust in individuals and firms (Zucker, 1986). The data collected from the 
surveys and interviews with mini-bond and P2B investors are analysed to identify the presence 
of process-based trust arising through usage of product or services by investors. 
Characteristics reflecting the strength of process-based trust on the lenders include: (i) the 
frequency with which the product or service has been used by the investor; and (ii) the duration, 
or length of time, the investor has been using the product or service.  
The data sets also contain information about the reputation of borrower as a second indicator 
of process-based trust. Investors were asked about sources of second-hand information about 
the borrower that they obtained from third parties prior to investing, and the distance that the 
third party lives from the investor. Close geographic proximity to the issuer can provide the 
investor with ‘soft information’, or tacit knowledge about the issuer that is separate from the 
financial and operating information about the firm that is available to all potential investors. 
Granovetter highlights the reliance on social relationship by buyers and sellers, depending on 
how easy it is to assess quality of goods through brand names or other impersonal standards 
(Granovetter, 2005:39). He discusses the role of distance and norms in the context of network 
density as one of his core principles of social structure and economic outcomes: 
 Norms - shared ideas about the proper way to behave - are clearer, more firmly 
held and easier to enforce the more dense a social network. Thus, greater density 
makes ideas about proper behavior more likely to be encountered repeatedly, 
discussed and fixed; it also renders deviance from resulting norms harder to hide 
and, thus, more likely to be punished. 
(Granovetter, 2005:34) 
 The strength of this indicator is indicated by the social proximity defined by the nature of the 
relationship of the third party supplying information to the investor.  
Investor-Borrower Social Relations and Investor-Borrower Proximity as Indicators of 
Characteristic-Based Trust 
In Zucker’s modes of trust production, characteristic-based trust is produced by social similarity 
with shared social values and norms informing a trustor’s expectations of how a trustee will act 
in the future in relation to the trustor. The greater the number of social similarities exist, the 
more the parties in the transaction assume that common background expectations do exist, 
hence trust can be relied on (Zucker, 1986:63)  In the case of P2B and mini-bond investors, 
shared norms and values may increase a trustee’s confidence in predicting how the issuer will 
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behave in honouring the future repayment obligation. On this basis, evidence of a social 
relationship between the investor and the borrower which pre-dates the lending relationship 
indicates the presence of characteristic-based trust. The strength of the characteristic-based 
trust present is indicated by several characteristics contained in the investor survey and 
interview data sets: (i) the number of pre-existing social relationships between a firm and its 
investors/lenders; and (ii) the ‘social distance’ of the pre-existing relationships, with immediate 
family relationships between a borrower and lender, indicating stronger characteristic-based 
trust rather than a casual acquaintance. 
Investor-borrower proximity is the second indicator of characteristic-based trust. This indicator 
reflects Zucker’s observation that the social similarities embodied in characteristic-based trust 
are ‘intra-local’, which limited its substitution for locally produced process-based trust as the 
distance between transacting parties increased during the expansion of the US economy 
(Zucker, 1986:63:83) . The analysis in this dissertation assumes that the geographic distance 
between a firm and its investors is a proxy for social similarity, with an inverse relationship 
between distance and similarity. There is a substantial body of sociology literature supporting 
this assumption. The social networks literature studies homophily as a social mechanism, and 
finds evidence of an increased likelihood of individuals with similar characteristics establishing 
a social connection (Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010:94). Several studies of proximity 
mechanisms have found evidence of a positive relationship between the proximity of 
individuals and their social attachment, and that being geographically proximate increases the 
likelihood of new relationship being formed and of existing relationships being maintained 
(Rivera et al., 2010:105).  
Investor-lender proximity in the analysis is the measure of the geographic distance between 
the home of the investor and the main operating location of the borrower. The postal code of 
each borrower-lender pair was geo-coded into longitude and latitude coordinates, and straight-
line distance was calculated using a formula derived from the Pythagorean theorem. Pair-wise 
distances have been calculated for all investors in both loan transaction and investor survey 
data sets. The indicator of the strength of this characteristic-based trust indicator is the distance 
between lender and borrower, with strength inversely proportional to distance. 
Regulation and Category Reputation as Indicators of Institutional-Based Trust 
Zucker argues that the structural changes in the late-nineteenth century economy disrupted 
the production of process and characteristic-based trust because they became less reliable in 
predicting the behaviour of the actors engaged in economic exchange. Institutional trust 
mechanism emerged to fill a void of reliable predictors needed for economic exchange in 
larger, more complex, modern economies. Regulation is a particularly important trust 
mechanism in financial services because it provides a formal system of societal guarantees 
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that can be enforced with formal sanctions in the event of malfeasance by actors in the financial 
system.  
There are two types of institutional-based trust in Zucker’s conceptualisation, namely firm-
specific and intermediary mechanisms, and the dissertation investigates indicators for each 
type. In the case of firm-specific institutional trust, the regulatory authorisations obtained by 
the firms issuing mini-bonds or borrowing via P2B platforms are analysed as indicators. The 
strength of firm-specific institutional trust is measured via the interviews with investors and their 
self-reported influence of regulatory authorisations on investors’ perceived trustworthiness of 
the channel. Zucker also highlights the important role played by intermediaries in producing 
institutional trust by guaranteeing the performance of counter-parties. In this context, the 
analysis considers screening approval of the P2B platforms and financial exchanges as 
intermediary mechanisms to be an indicator of institutional-based trust. 
The analysis also examines category reputation as an indicator of firm-specific institutional-
based trust. Zucker argues that there were formidable obstacles and few mechanisms for the 
production of process-based and characteristic-based trust at a societal scale in the US 
economy during the late 1800s (Zucker, 1986:83). Zucker identifies credentialisation as a 
mechanism for embodying the constitutive properties of the localised forms of trust in firm-
specific institutional-based trust. The analysis in this dissertation views credentialisation in a 
broad context, recognising that the value of a credential is socially constructed and can be 
applied in either a formal or informal context. The analysis uses data collected from the mini-
bond and P2B investors’ surveys and interviews about the investors’ perception of 
trustworthiness of the SME/Mittelstand category of firm relative to other types of firms in the 
economy. 
4.2.3 Research question 3: Micro-foundations of trust production 
Question 3: How do the social and institutional arrangements in the UK and Germany produce 
the forms of trust influencing the development of alternative lending channels? 
Hypothesis 3: Different social and institutional arrangements in each country provide the basis 
for producing different forms of trust relied on by alternative finance investors. 
The third research question investigates the social and institutional arrangements in each 
country that give rise to the micro-foundations of the trust forms identified in the second 
research question. The hypothesis for the third question proposes a social embeddedness 
model of trust production, in which forms of trust have micro-foundations within the social and 
institutional arrangements of an economy and which differ across economies. In this context, 
the social forces produced by an increase in immigration and urban migration in the US during 
the late 1800s, as described by Zucker, are an example of how social arrangements enable 
and inhibit the production of trust. She argues that cultural homogeneity is an antecedent for 
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characteristic-based trust, which was disrupted as social forces undermined the ‘taken-for-
granted’ expectations of behaviour in interpersonal and inter-firm relations (Zucker, 1986:68). 
This dissertation follows Zucker’s approach to identify variation in the social relationship 
between individuals and firms in the UK and Germany that influence the production of trust.  
The analysis examines one of the five institutional spheres which firms in an economy must 
engage with in order to solve their coordination problems. The analysis compares the social 
relations of individuals and firms within the vocational training and education system of each 
country as a micro-foundation for the production of trust.  
This chapter provided an overview of the nested mixed methods research design used to 
analyse the lending practices in the mini-bond and P2B lending channels in the UK and 
Germany. It also summarised the primary and secondary data used in the analysis of each of 
the three research questions and the testing of the associated hypotheses. The following 
chapter outlines the findings of the analysis of the first research question by examining the 
development trajectories of the channels in each country, and the fit of these development 
paths with the propositions of the VoC model. 
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Chapter 5: Development Trajectories of Alternative Lending and Varieties of 
Capitalism  
 
This chapter addresses the first research question investigated in this dissertation: How have 
the P2B and mini-bond channels developed in the UK and Germany since the crisis, and do 
their development trajectories fit with the propositions of the Varieties of Capitalism 
framework? The chapter has three main sections. The first section discusses the development 
of the channels following the onset of the crisis by analysing the lending characteristics and 
the policy actions relevant to each channel. It discusses how their trajectory of development 
has been a catalyst for changing the lending practices of incumbent bank lenders in each 
country. The second section builds a prediction for the development of the channels through 
the lens of the Coordinated Market Economy (CME) and Liberal Market Economy (LMEs) 
dichotomy in the VoC framework, by estimating the level of institutional support for each type 
of lending in the two countries. The concluding section discusses the validity of the research 
question hypothesis: the development trajectories of the channels differ between the countries, 
and these trajectories are congruent with the propositions of the VoC model. The concluding 
section also discusses some limitations of the VoC framework as an explanatory model in the 
context of alternative lending developments. 
5.1 Development of Mini-Bond and P2B Lending Following the Financial Crisis 
5.1.1 Comparison of Lending Characteristics by Channel 
The financial crisis was the catalyst that increased both the supply and the demand for 
alternative forms of financing as banks reduced their lending to small and medium-sized 
businesses. On the supply side, investors in all developed economies suddenly faced a 
dramatic reduction in investment yields as governments reduced interest rates near zero or 
into negative territory, as they tried to stimulate economic growth following the crisis. This 
motivated many investors to start ‘chasing yield’ by investing in alternative asset classes 
capable of generating higher returns than traditional asset classes. In principle at least, there 
was new capacity available from investors to invest in P2B loans and mini-bonds.  
The development pattern of P2B and mini-bond lending during the 2009 to 2015 period is 
represented by seven characteristics of the lending activity summarised in Table 5.1. Three of 
the characteristics provide insight into how firms engaged with the channels: (i) cumulative 
lending volume characteristic provides an estimate of market size; (ii) average size of 
loan/bond provides information about the type of firm using each form of funding; and the (iii) 
the number of loans/bonds issued indicates how prevalent the channels were as a form of 
funding for firms. The other four characteristics provide insight into how investors engaged with 
the channels: mean # of investors per loan and mean investment amount characteristics 
providing information about the investment style of the funders in each channel; the mean 
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portfolio value and number of investments characteristic indicates level of adoption of P2B 
loans and mini-bonds by individual investors as an investable asset class. These 
characteristics were analysed from several of the data sets: (i) the P2B transaction data 
collected from UK platforms; (ii) the transaction data collected in the online questionnaire 
completed by German and UK P2B platforms; (iii) the German mini-bond dataset supplied by 
Anleihen-Finder (A-F); and (iv) the hand-collected data set of UK mini-bond issues. Not all of 
the characteristics for both channels in both countries were contained in the data used in the 
analysis70.   
Table 5.1: Lending Characteristics of the Channels (2009 – 2015) 
 
 
The lending volume in both channels combined, totalling approximately €10.5 billion over the 
period, is relatively insignificant when compared to the volume of lending by banks during the 
period. Based on the bank lending data for Germany and the UK presented in Chapter 2, the 
combined channel volume represents well under 1% of lending to SMEs and mid-sized 
businesses. In relative lending volume, there was significantly more lending volume through 
the mini-bond channel by a factor of almost 4:1, despite fewer than 300 mini-bonds being 
issued versus more than 18,000 P2B loans71. The greater mini-bond lending volume is a result 
of much larger mini-bond issue size, averaging €28.4 million, which is approximately 200 times 	70 For example, the survey of P2B platforms in Germany and the UK included a question about the number of 
investors per loan, however not all platforms provided this data. Therefore, the ‘mean # of investors per loan’ 
characteristic could be calculated for P2B lending in the UK using the transaction data supplied by UK P2B 
platforms, but not for Germany since there was no transaction data collected from the German P2B platforms. Also, 
the ‘mean investment amount’ for mini-bond investing in Germany was calculated using the transaction data 
collected for unlisted minibond issues as there was no individual investment data available for listed mini-bonds. 71	The data collected from the survey of P2B platforms in the UK contains fewer loans and investments than the 
transaction data supplied by UK P2B platforms because the latter includes some platforms that were excluded from 
the survey data because these platforms were not classified as P2B lenders when the survey data was collected 
on the basis that only a part of their lending activity involves P2B borrowers. 
 Characteristics  P2B  Mini-bond  P2B  Mini-bond  P2B  Mini-bond 
 Cumulative lending 
volume (€ millions)        2,294.0           275.0             55.0        7,942.0        2,349.0        8,217.0 
 Mean size of 
loan/bond (€) 
      138,500    9,808,000         53,700  30,430,000       129,679  28,432,526 
 Total # of 
loans/bonds issued         17,092                28           1,022              261         18,114              289 
 Mean # investors 
per loan/bond 
             523           1,600                 -                   -                   -                   -   
 Mean investment 
amount 
265                       7,857 
-              
        16,000                 -                   -   
 Mean portfolio 
value 
          8,115                 -             6,471                 -                   -                   -   
 Number of 
investors       282,700         35,000           8,500                 -         291,200                 -   
 UK  Germany  Total 
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larger than the €129,679 average size of a P2B loan. This difference in size of loan suggests 
that the vast majority of P2B borrowers are ‘micro’ companies with less than €2 million in 
annual revenues, while a firm issuing the average size mini-bond of €28 million would need to 
have annual revenues of at least €30 million euros. This size range places mini-bond financing 
solidly in the large SME segment, which includes firms with annual revenues of €25 million to 
€50 million. 
From the perspective of investors, there are some striking similarities and differences in the 
investment amounts in the channels across the two countries. The size of individual investors’ 
P2B loan portfolios, at approximately €6,500 after stripping out investments by institutional 
investors72, is quite similar in the UK and Germany. This indicates the average P2B loan 
portfolio of these investors is well diversified with approximately 25 investments of €200 to 
€300 per investment73. These characteristics are very different for the mini-bond lending. 
Although data is not available in the AF dataset for the average investment amount, the 
average investment amount for the five datasets provided by German firms that issued mini-
bonds suggests that the average investment amount per individual German mini-bond is 
approximately €16,000, which is more than twice the average amount invested in a portfolio of 
P2B loans. This difference in individual loan amount suggests different investment strategies 
by P2B and mini-bond investors. Mini-bond investors are more exposed to substantial financial 
loss in the event of a default relative to P2B investors with diversified loan portfolios. The 
analysis suggests that a similar number of investors participated in each channel during the 
sample period. Assuming the average investment amount of €16,000 for German mini-bonds, 
and adjusting for the investments made by institutional investors in the AF dataset, then the 
number of mini-bond investments exceeds 300,000, which similar to the 282,700individuals 
investing in P2B loans in the period.  
In summary, the analysis of lending characteristics provides insight into the development 
patterns of the channel following the crisis. At an aggregated level of analysis, the large 
difference in lending volume between the two channels indicates that mini-bonds were the 
more established form of financing for firms during the period. The analysis also indicates that 
the channels are not substitutes for each other. The disparity in the average amount raised by 
P2B versus mini-bond fundraisings suggests each channel is serving a different segment of 
the market based on size of firm. The analysis of average investment amount and investor 
portfolios suggests that the channels appeal to investors with different investing styles, with 	72 The mean portfolio size for UK P2B loans is overstated because the data provided by platforms included 
investments made by institutional investors in addition to individual investors.  Institutional investment during the 
period is estimated at €600 million in approximately 4,500 loans.  The mean size of P2B loan portfolios in the UK is 
reduced to approximately €6,500 after stripping out the loans funded by institutions, which is similar to the mean 
portfolio size of P2B loan portfolios in Germany. 73 This calculation assumes the mean investment amount in Germany is the same as the UK , which is a reasonable 
assumption given the similar portfolio sizes. 
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P2B lending offering greater portfolio diversification. While there is some variation in 
development of the channels at an aggregated level of analysis, the more significant variation 
is revealed at the country level of analysis, and this is addressed in the next section. 
5.1.2 Channel Development by Country 
Examining the development of the two channels on a country level reveals a reverse pattern 
of development for the channels in each country, with mini-bonds the more dominant form of 
financing in Germany and P2B lending the more dominant in the UK. Mini-bond issuance 
volume in Germany during the period was approximately €8.2 billion, which was about 30 times 
greater than mini-bond issuance of €275 million in the UK. P2B lending was the mirror opposite 
of the mini-bond pattern, with €2.4 billion of lending in the UK about 40 times larger than the 
€53.7 million of P2B lending in Germany. In both cases the large differences are a product of 
both the number of issuances and the average size of each loan or bond issued. There were 
261 mini-bonds issued in Germany versus 28 in the UK with an average issue size of €30.4 
million in the former and €9.8 million in the latter. More that 17,000 P2B loans were issued in 
the UK versus approximately 1,000 in Germany, with an average loan size of €129,679 versus 
€53,700 respectively. By some estimates, by 2015 P2B lending volume in the UK had grown 
to represent approximately 12% of lending by banks for loans of less than £1 million (Zhang et 
al, 2016) 
Analysing the lending volume of the two channels over time reveals divergence in the 
trajectories of development that are not apparent in the analysis of aggregated data for the 6-
year period. Figure 5.1 plots the annual issuance volume for the channels in the 2009 to 2015 
period. Mini-bonds re-emerged in Germany as a preferred alternative to bank lending soon 
after the peak of the financial crisis had passed in late 2008 and early 2009, and issuance 
volume grew quickly to exceed €1.5 billion per year in the 2010 to 2013 period. P2B lending in 
Europe started in the UK in 2010, and growth in lending volume began to soon accelerate, with 
the result that UK P2B lending had overtaken German mini-bond lending by 2014.  In contrast 
to the accelerating growth of UK P2B lending, mini-bond issuance volume in Germany started 
falling precipitously in 2013 as investors’ interest in listed mini-bonds began to wane.  This 
decline is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
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Figure 5.1: Estimated Annual Issuance Volume by Channel in Germany & UK (2009 – 2015) 
The first mini-bond was issued in the UK in 2009, and P2B lending did not begin in Germany 
until 201374. Neither UK mini-bonds nor German P2B lending had a ‘breakout’ in lending 
volume trend change over the period, and remained insignificant as financing channels in these 
markets relative to the dominant channels. These divergent patterns of channel development 
in each country are discussed in the following sections.   
5.2.2.1 Channel Development in Germany 
Figure 5.2 shows the percentage distribution of mini-bonds issued in German for number of 
mini-bonds issued and issuance volume by size range. The range of issue size is very broad, 
ranging from less than €5 million to €150 million, indicating that a wide range of firms from 
medium-sized SMEs to relatively large firms issued mini-bonds. However, over 60% of the 
bonds issued were in the €5 million to €50 million range. The discussion in Chapter 2 
highlighted the variation in access to bank financing for firms following the financial crisis. This 
divergence in bank financing access by firm size is a factor explaining the dominance of mini-
bond financing relative to P2B lending in the German market.  It was the larger SMEs with 
revenues between €25 million and €50 million and mid-sized firms with revenues between €50 
million and €500 million that faced the contraction in bank lending and were too small to access 
funding via capital markets. 	74 Chapter 2 discussed Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending to consumers in Germany, which began in 2008 with the launch 
of the Auxmoney platform.   
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Figure 5.2: Size Distribution of German Mini-bond Issues75 (% of Total) 
Chapter 2 discussed the role of the German banks as intermediaries in the issuance of more 
than €5 billion of mezzanine loans76 for approximately 700 large SMEs in the 2004 to 2007 
period. These loans were bundled into securitisation vehicles77, and then the securities were 
sold on to institutional investors. The repayment of these loans became due in 2011 – 2014 
when the securitised mezzanine loan market was shut, so mini-bond issue was one of the few 
alternative sources of financing available to the many firms that were unable to increase their 
borrowings from a bank lender.  One of the mid-sized first firms to issue a mini-bond following 
the crisis was Klett, a family-owned company founded in 1897 and well known for producing 
the stationary used in the German public school system. In mid-2009, it borrowed €50,000,000 
from individual investors, many of whom were teachers, and placed the bond directly with 
investors in a matter of weeks.  The success of Klett motivated similar firms to issue mini-
bonds, and the bonds became known as Mittlestand bonds given many of the issuers were 
family-owned businesses well-known in the communities in which they operated. The 
Mittelstand issuers were a mix of industrial products producers and consumer-facing 
businesses.  such as Textilkontor Walter Seidensticker GmbH, a 93-year-old family-owned 
shirt manufacturer in Bielefeld with sales of €105 million. In 2011, Wiener Feinbäcker Heberer 
GmbH, a 120-year-old family-owned bakery chain, sold much of its €8.5 million bond to 
customers of the bakery and used part of the proceeds to repay bank debt. The Seidensticker 	75 There were 10 mini-bond issues great than €150 million during the period that have been excluded.  76 Loans with repayment rights ranking below senior loans secured by a first charge on the assets of the borrower. 
Senior secured loans are the common form of loan made by banks. 77 The process of securitisation consists of pooling assets in a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a form of corporate 
entity owning only financial assets; then vertically dividing the pool of assets into different tranches reflecting 
different levels of repayment risk; then selling financial securities associated with each tranche of risk to investors 
with different risk/return preferences.  These were a common form of financing for US home mortgages prior to the 
financial crisis but their opaque characteristics made them unappealing to investors during the post crisis period. 
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CEO explained the rationale for his borrowing program: ‘We wanted to be independent from 
big banks after we realized that restrictions have clearly increased...we don't know when the 
next crisis will come’ (Lawton, 2012). 
By 2011, the growth in privately-placed mini-bond issuance volume attracted the attention of 
the five regional financial exchanges in Germany. The exchange operators believed the 
relatively high interest rates offered by bonds issued by companies based in the region of the 
exchange, combined with the greater liquidity78 offered by a listed versus unlisted bond, would 
appeal to the individuals and small institutional investors that form the core investor base for 
these small exchanges. The exchanges targeted larger mini-bond issuers with a set of listing 
requirements much less onerous than the main corporate bond segment, consisting principally 
of a €25 million minimum issue size and stipulating a requirement to retain a corporate finance 
advisor for the issuance and obtain a bond rating provided by one of the German rating 
agencies. Two exchanges quickly launched specialised listed Mittelstand bonds segments: 
The Entry Standard segment on the Frankfurt exchange and the Bond-M segment on the 
Stuttgart exchange. The other three exchanges quickly followed with their own Mittelstand 
bond segments, with Dusseldorf launching its Mittelstandsmarkt, Hamburg launching its 
Mittelstandsboerse, and Munich launching m:access. Table 5.2 describes the number of listed 
mini-bonds and issuance volume listed on the German regional exchanges between 2010 and 
2015. A summary of the industry classifications for the listed issuances is provided in Table 
5.3. 
Table 5.2: Overview of A-F Listed and Unlisted German Mini-Bond Data Set  
 
 
 
 
 	78 In reality, listed mini-bonds issues are still too small to provide investors with the liquidity needed to re-sell the 
bonds.		
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Table 5.3: Industry Composition of Listed German Issuers 
 
Source: Anleihen-Finder and Mietzner et al, (2017) 
Listed mini-bond issuance exceeded €1 billion between 2011 and 2013, before dropping 
sharply in 2014 and effectively disappearing by 2015. The decline of issuance volume was due 
to a wave of defaults by mini-bond issuers; by mid 2014, 18 of 104 listed mini bonds issued 
had declared insolvency, which represented a default rate in excess of 20% of the value of the 
issued bonds (Mietzner et al., 2017). Many of the issuers had obtained credit ratings from 
regional ratings issuers as a condition of being listed, and the assigned ratings significantly 
underestimated the default risk of the rated issues. Most of the defaulting issuers were 
renewable energy companies rather than industrial Mittelstand firms, but the increase in 
defaults frightened investors and effectively dried up funding for issuers of all industry types. 
All of the exchanges, with the exception of Frankfurt, closed down their mini-bond segments 
during 2014. 
5.1.2.2 Channel Development in the UK 
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of mini-bonds issued in the UK by issue size for number of 
issues and issue volume, based on the hand collected data set of 28 mini-bonds issued in the 
UK between 2009 and 2015 (see Appendix 10). The range of issue size is much narrower than 
the German issues, with no UK issue larger than £50 million, and heavily skewed towards 
small issues of less than £6 million in issue size.  
 
Figure 5.3: Size Distribution of UK Mini-Bond Issues (% of Total) 
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Early UK mini-bond issuers were inspired by the use of mini-bonds in Germany to finance 
locally-known brands or renewable energy projects.  The first UK bond was placed in by a 
small brand of men’s shaving products called ‘King of Shaves’, raising only £627,000 from 400 
investors during the first six months of 2009.  Two larger bond issues followed in 2010. Hotel 
Chocolat raised £4 million with its ‘Chocolate Bond’ to fund an expansion of the company’s 
network of retail stores and its chocolate manufacturing operations. The 1,800 Chocolat Bond 
investors were solicited from its mailing list of 100,000 customers in its Chocolat Club customer 
loyalty programme. The annual interest payment of 7% over the 3-year term of the bond was 
paid entirely in chocolate rather than in cash, at the rate of six chocolate boxes per year for 
each £2,000 invested, and with the value of the chocolate fully taxed as interest income. 
Ecotricity, an electricity distributor producing ‘green’ energy placed its ‘Ecobond’ of €10 million 
to help finance an expansion of wind farm projects for its renewable energy business. The 
offering was over-subscribed, with Ecotricity’s residential customers for its supply of electricity 
taking up more than 80% of the bond placement, partly motivated by receiving an additional 
0.5% interest credit in the form of a discount on their annual electricity bill. Ecotricity issued 
another mini-bond in 2011 for £10 million with similar financial terms, which was again over-
subscribed with strong demand coming from its residential electricity customers. 
These early UK mini-bond issuances attracted the attention of the mainstream UK press 
looking for stories that played to the popular resentment against the big banks in the post crisis 
era. Headlines along the lines of ‘Entrepreneurs turn to customers to finance growth’ began to 
appear alongside ‘UK lending to small business collapsed last year’ in the mainstream press 
(Telegraph, 2010). The founders of the early bond issues gave frequent interviews that 
reinforced this sentiment. Ecotricity’s founder and CEO, Dale Vince, talked about his 
motivations in launching the bond, stating: "We wanted to cut out the middle man…when we 
started, we wanted to cut out the middle man who wouldn't give us a good price for our 
electricity, and now we're doing the same with the financial sector" (Arnott, 2011). These UK 
bonds combining financial return with customer loyalty incentives were being sometimes 
referred to as ‘loyalty bonds’ (SyndicateRoom, 2017). Hotel Chocolat’s chief executive, Angus 
Thirlwell, endorsed the view that mini-bonds were as much about customer engagement as 
financing: “This was prompted by our customers asking how they could get more involved with 
the company. We found a way of inviting them to invest in our development plans in exchange 
for a return paid in chocolate” (Hurley, 2010). Mini-bonds received a legitimising endorsement 
in early 2011 when John Lewis, one of the most trusted companies in the UK, issued a £50 
million mini-bond available only to its employees and store credit card holders. The bond 
offered an annual interest rate of 4.5% plus an additional 2% which could be used as credit for 
purchases made at John Lewis stores.  The issue was fully-placed in 8 days, despite a cap of 
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£10,000 on the amount that could be invested by a single investor. 
While UK firms were intrigued with the idea of using mini-bonds as a form of financing, most 
saw its application limited to firms that were customer-facing and able to offer investors a 
blended return of financial and consumer loyalty premium. These differed from German 
issuances in several respects. This was a much narrower application than shown in the 
German market, where the return earned by investors excluded any consumer loyalty 
premium. This was reflected in the types of firms that have issued mini-bonds in the UK versus 
Germany. Unlike the UK, many of the German issuers were producers of industrial products 
having no connection to consumers.  
The mini-bonds in the UK were not adopted by financial exchanges that provided the 
opportunity to expand the distribution of bonds to a larger base of investors.  In Germany, the 
regional financial exchanges were quick to detect the broad appeal of mini-bonds to German 
investors and launch specialised mini-bond segments. However, the conditions exempting UK 
mini-bonds issues from the UK prospectus requirement included non-transferability79, meaning 
they could not be listed and traded on a regulated exchange. Despite the limitations imposed 
by the restriction on transferability, the largest UK equity crowdfunding platform, Crowdcube, 
attempted to develop a mini-bond fundraising platform alongside its equity platform, and 
offered mini-bonds issues on its platform in 2014 and 2015. Crowdcube managed to raise a 
total of less than £15 million80 in mini-bond investment and some issues failed to attract 
sufficient investor interest, while during the same two year period it raised more than ten times 
that amount in the form of equity investment for firms listed on its platform (Crowdfund Insider, 
2018). Crowdcube effectively abandoned its effort to build a mini-bond financing business after 
concluding that mini-bonds were not attractive enough for the platform’s investor base relative 
to the equity investment opportunities (Williams, 2017). 
5.1.3 Alternative Lending as a Source of Patient Capital 
Two of the transaction datasets collected, one mini-bond and one P2B, were analysed to 
investigate the potential for each channel to be a source of patient capital for the borrowing 
firms. For the German mini-bond channel, the longitudinal dataset of G5 investments between 
2002 and 2013 reveals a high incidence of repeat lending by investors over time, suggesting 
that mini-bonds are a potential source of patient capital for firms. Approximately 9,300 investors 
made 22,482 investments in the 35 bonds issued during the 11-year period for a total value of 
€343 million. A summary of the investment transaction data is provided in Appendix 7. The 
summary statistics for the investments of one-time versus repeat investors in the G5 mini-
bonds is provided in Table 5.4.  The repeat investors accounted for 84% of the total investment 	79 The bonds could not be transferred, exchanged, or redeemed prior to maturity. 80 This amount included one issuer raising £10 million. 
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volume of €342.6 million during the period. Repeat investors made an average of 3.7 
investments in bonds with an average duration of 3.3 years, meaning that these repeat 
investors, on average, supplied 12.2 years of funding to G5.  
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics for One-Time vs Repeat Investments in G5 Bonds 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the percentage of repeat investors and first-time investors investing in 
each of the 35 bonds issued by G5 during the 11-year period. The chart illustrates a general 
increase in the proportion of repeat investors over time. However, there are two additional 
observations that are relevant to the supply of patient capital. First, the proportion of first 
investments is highest (except for the first issue in the time period) in December 2005 when 
the firm listed its bonds for the first time. This suggests that a listing and the potential to sell 
the bond in the secondary listed market was attractive to some investors who would not have 
otherwise invested. The pattern of repeat investor increasing participation soon resumes in 
2006. More importantly, the firm issued two bonds in the midst of the financial crisis, in 
December 2008 and October 2009. More than 90% of the investors participating in those bond 
issues were repeat investors, suggesting that a loyal base of investors was willing to continue 
funding G5 during a period of economic uncertainty when wholesale capital markets were shut 
to most borrowers. 
 
Figure 5.4: Participation of Repeat versus One-Time Investors in G5 Bond issues  
Minimum Maximum Sum Mean
 Multiple investments by investor N=18,024 
Macauly duration of the bond issue (yrs) 1                   5                   57,370            3.3                  
Number of investments 2                   20                 18,024            3.7                  
Amount invested in bond  (€) 1,000            700,000        287,097,000   15,926.8         
 One investment by investor N=4,459 
Macauly duration of the bond issue (yrs) 1                   5                   14,355            3.3                  
Number of investments by investor 1                   1                   4,459              1.0                  
Amount invested in bond by investor (€) 1,000            300,000        55,532,000     12,462.3         
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The data collected in the UK did not include transaction or survey data from any repeat mini-
bond issuers. Interviews with UK3 investors included a question about their willingness to 
reinvest in the event that UK3 issued another mini-bond and almost all of the investors 
interviewed stated they would reinvest and do so with a larger investment. Public and privately-
reported information was collected about three of the twenty-eight UK mini-bond issuers that 
either issued a second mini-bond (Ecotricity and Hotel Chocolat) or offered their investors the 
opportunity to extend the maturity of a mini-bond as an alternative to repayment (Hotel 
Chocolat and Jockey Club). These issuers all reported high levels of repeat investment and 
maturity extensions which provides further evidence that mini-bonds are a potential source of 
patient capital. In the case of Ecotricity, senior management privately stated that more than 
80% of the investors in EcoBond II were also investors in EcoBond I. The Jockey Club publicly 
reported that individual investors funding 96% of its 5-year £25 million ‘Racing Bond’ elected 
to extend the repayment date of the bond rather than being repaid their original investment.  
The experience of Hotel Chocolat illustrates how mini-bonds can be used as a source of patient 
capital in the financing strategy of firms. In 2010, Hotel Chocolat raised £4 million via a mini-
bond with a three-year maturity, and subsequently offered its 1,800 investors the opportunity 
to extend the maturity for another three years. It reported that 96% of the 1,800 investors 
elected to extend the maturity, which is notable because investors received interest payments 
in the form of (taxable) chocolate boxes rather than cash. In 2014, firm issued a second mini-
bond which increased the total amount of mini-bond issuance outstanding to £7.3 million. The 
proceeds of the bonds were used to fund capital investment in manufacturing facilities and 
expanding its retail store network in the UK and internationally (Hotel Chocolat, 2014). The 
company’s earnings (before interest, depreciation and amortisation) increased from £1.5 
million in 2011 to £8.1million in 2015, and this growth enabled Hotel Chocolat to go public in 
2016, raising £55 million on the London Stock Exchange.  It repaid all outstanding bonds in 
2018 from excess cash flow being generated by the company’s operations, preferring to use 
its retained earnings for investment (Jackson & Ram, 2016). 
In contrast to the findings of the mini-bond analysis, the analysis of P2B transaction data in the 
UK market reveals a relatively high level of repeat lending by the platforms but a much lower 
level repeat investing by P2B investors in the loans of repeat borrowers on the platform. The 
transaction data set contains 26,217 P2B loans made by the UK P2B platforms between 2010 
and 2015 and 12,218 loans of these loans were selected for the analysis81. Summary statistics 
for the P2B loans made by the platforms are provided in Table 5.5.  Loans made to repeat 
	81 There were three reasons for eliminating loans from the analysis. First, some of the loans made by the platforms 
could not be matched to the individual investors on the platform. Second, some reported loans were actually sub-
parts of larger loans. Third, loans of less than 24 months were eliminated to more closely match the duration of the 
P2B loan maturities with mini-bonds. 
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borrowers accounted for 46% of all the loans made during the period82. There was little 
difference in the mean duration of the term of the loan, interest rate, and amount of the loan 
for the loans made to one-time and repeat borrowers. The mean interest rate of 9.5% is 
approximately 30% higher than the mean interest rate of the UK mini-bonds issued during the 
same period.  
Table 5.5: Repeat versus One-time loans Made by P2B Platforms (2010 – 2015) 
 
 
The dataset containing the investments of individual P2B investors was analysed to identify 
the repeat investments of the investors in the loans of repeat borrowers. Table 5.6 presents 
the summary statistics of the analysis, which indicates that only 12% of loans representing 8% 
of loan value was made by investors in two or more loans to a repeat borrower. The analysis 
also shows significant skew in the distribution of individual investment amounts, which reflects 
the larger amounts funded by a relatively small number of institutional investors.  
Table 5.6: Repeat versus One-time Investments Made by Investors in Loans of Same Repeat 
Borrower83  
 
 
The smaller proportion of repeat investors funding repeat loans relative to the number of repeat 
loans funded by the platform can be attributed to the automated allocation system used by the 
platform operators to randomly allocate portions of loan investments to the investment 
portfolios on their platforms. The randomising nature of the allocation system creates 
incentives for platform operators to focus on short term returns in order to attract flows of 
investment funding, particularly from institutional investors which are a growing proportion of 
the investment volumes of the P2B platforms. The relevance of automated loan investment 	82 It’s possible that some borrowers categorised as ‘one-time’ may be repeat borrowers beyond 2015 since the 
analysis defines ‘repeat borrowers’ as borrowers borrowing more than once in the 2010 to 2015 period. 83 The second column of the table labelled ‘# of Loans’ refers to the number of investments made by investors in 
the loans made by P2B platforms. In total, 5,213,409 investments funded the 12,218 P2B loans made to borrowers. 
Repeat versus One-time Loan
# of Loans % of Total N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean
Loan to One-Time Borrower
Term of loan (months) 6,585            54% 24                60                    -                49                   
Interest rate (%) 6,585            54% -               18.30               -                9.64                
Loan Amount (£) 6,585            54% 5,000           3,400,000        406,465,862  61,726            
Loan to Repeat Borrower
Term of loan (months) 5,633            46% 24                60                    -                46                   
Interest rate (%) 5,633            46% -               18.37               -                9.52                
Loan Amount (£) 5,633            46% 5,000           1,000,000        333,427,080  59,192            
# of Loans % of Total N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean
One-time investor in repeat borrower loans
Total amount invested (£) 4,583,024     88% -               -                   623,563,419  -                 
Mean of amounts Invested  (£) 4,583,024     88% 81                2,453               -                524                 
Median of amounts invested (£) 4,583,024     88% 20                160                  -                60                   
Repeat investor in repeat borrower loans
Total amount invested (£) 630,385        12% 288,615       24,167,676      58,793,770    
Mean of amounts Invested  (£) 630,385        12% 75                1,006               -                303                 
Median of amounts invested (£) 630,385        12% 20                312                  -                86                   
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allocation functionality to the business models in the UK is discussed further in section 5.1.5 
of this chapter.  
The analysis of the mini-bond and P2B transaction data sets, along with the publicly-reported 
accounts of re-investment by UK mini-bond investors, suggests that mini-bonds are much 
more likely to be a potential source of patient capital for SMEs than P2B loans. Intermediation 
by P2B platforms appears to be a significant factor in de-coupling the relationship between the 
individual funders of P2B loans and the borrowers, which leaves firms’ access to P2B funding 
vulnerable to shifting market conditions that patient capital flows are unaffected by. 
5.1.4 Policy Enactments 
Anger expressed by voters towards banks and other financial intermediaries for causing the 
crisis and then needing massive state support led to a demand for more bank regulation 
(Zingales, 2011) and, in some countries, shifted policy-making sentiment away from protecting 
incumbents and towards changing financial services through increased competition.  At the 
same time, the policy and regulatory landscape in both countries following the financial crisis 
recognised the urgent need to stimulate growth in their respective economies.  How this focus 
manifested itself in the implementation of policy and regulation regarding alternative lending 
channels was very different in Germany as compared with the UK.  These differences had 
significant repercussions for the development of P2B and mini-bond lending, and how these 
alternative channels impacted the lending practices of incumbent banks. 
5.1.4.1 Policy Enactment in the U.K. 
The UK has been in the forefront of countries that view innovation within the banking system 
as a positive catalyst for stimulating economic growth, a perspective which may be influenced 
by the UK’s historical reliance on financial services as a significant contributor of economic 
output. It enacted a number of material changes to policy and regulation following the crisis to 
bring this about through structural change in the banking system. In 2012, it adopted the model 
of Germany’s KfW development bank in creating the British Business Bank (BBB), a new state-
owned development bank with a mandate to serve the financing needs of small and mid-sized 
UK businesses. KfW has a programme of providing guarantees to banks lenders for loans 
made to firms deemed credit-worthy but lacking sufficient collateral to obtain a bank loan 
without the support provided by the guarantee84. The KfW guarantee provides banks with a 
higher recovery of the amount loaned to a borrower in the event of a default by the borrower, 
and so both increases the amount of lending and lowers the cost of loans made by banks.  
Unlike the KfW bank guarantee model, however, the BBB’s aim was to be an additional system 
for funding firms by lending directly rather than via the banks. In April 2013, the BBB launched 	
84 Seventeen regional guarantee banks in Germany also provide credit guarantees supporting small business by 
granting loan guarantees to the firms’ main banks backed by counter guarantees from the state. The guarantee 
banks and the state cover up to 80% of the risk and the borrowers’ main banks (respectively investment firms) bear 
at least 20% of the risk (Hennecke, Neugerger, & Ulbricht, 2017). 
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its Investment Programme to invest £400 million alongside ‘private sector investors’ which 
included non-bank P2B lending channels. The initial P2B platforms receiving BBB co-
investment funding were Funding Circle and MarketInvoice. 
The launch of the BBB was followed by the creation of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
in 2013 as the UK’s new financial services regulator. The FCA succeeded the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) as the regulator. ‘Promoting competition’ was added to the FCA’s 
operational objectives.  The FCA has modified the regulatory framework to encourage new 
entrants providing services in competition with banks, for example, by authorising several new 
‘challenger banks’ using digital platforms to accept deposits and provide loans.  It has also 
created programmes to facilitate the innovation in the development of services using 
alternative channels not currently covered by existing regulation, such as alternative payment 
service providers and alternative lenders, and introduced access obligations85 for incumbents 
aimed at levelling the playing field for these new entrants.  In 2014, the FCA introduced 
bespoke regulation for several forms of crowdfunding, which imposed a relatively light 
regulatory burden on P2B lending platforms in recognition that this activity differs materially 
from traditional banking.86 Policy support for financial services was explicitly stated in a report 
published by the UK Government Office for Science titled FinTech Futures:  
‘The Government’s stated ambition is for the UK to cement its world-leading 
position in developing FinTech, and to become a global hub for financial innovation. 
To succeed, it will be necessary to foster the best investment environment, the right 
tax system, the appropriate regulatory framework and the best infrastructure for 
FinTech companies to flourish within the UK.’ 
FinTech Futures, March 2015 
5.1.4.2 Policy Enactment in Germany 
Policy actions in Germany designed to stimulate economic growth avoided tinkering with any 
innovation in the banking system that changed the status quo of how it functioned in providing 
loans to small businesses. Policy initiatives were aimed at making more funding available to 
Mittelstand firms, which was consistent with the long-held view of German policy makers that 
the Mittelstand was the engine of the German economy and its source of innovation (Bank, 
2013). In 2009, the federal government announced a €50 billion stimulus programme that 
channeled funding to the Mittelstand via the loan guarantee programme provided by KfW to 
the country’s banks. In effect, the stimulus programme pumped new funding through the 
	85 Sharing of account info, access to BACS API payment rails. 86	P2B lending platforms neither accept deposits, nor do they engage in ‘liquidity transformation’, which involves 
making a loan for a longer maturity than the maturity of the funding used to make the loan. 
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existing distribution system of KfW and the banks, and maintained the status quo of lending to 
firms within the banking system. 
The status quo regarding the banking system was also maintained from a regulatory 
perspective. Regulation regarding the prospectus requirements for mini-bond lending pre-
dated the financial crisis, and there was no change in relevant legislation post the crisis. The 
changes to regulation, or lack thereof, had much more impact on the development of P2B 
lending. No new regulation was introduced to cover crowdfunding until 2015, and this 
legislation was primarily designed to cover equity crowdfunding rather than lending activities.  
The stance of the BaFin was that entities soliciting, arranging and granting loans must have a 
banking licence and be regulated as credit institutions, including lending platforms arranging 
loans funded by groups of investors. Statements by the Bundesbank, the German central bank, 
about FinTech were the opposite in tone to those of UK policy makers, and have been 
consistent in expressing resistance to introducing regulatory changes designed to 
accommodate change within the banking system: 
 ‘There is no regulatory justification for systematically giving preference to new 
technologies.  On the contrary, I am of the firm belief that we require a system of 
regulation that treats technologies neutrally.  A special regulatory treatment of fintech 
companies is therefore neither desirable nor legally compliant.’ 
               Andreas Dombret, Member of the Executive Board of Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016 
 
The differences in the level of policy support for P2B lending are reflected in the perceptions 
of the platform operators in the two countries regarding the adequacy of their respective 
regulatory environment. The questionnaire distributed to German and UK P2B platform 
operators by the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance in 2015 survey included the 
following question:  
Based on the type of alternative finance your platform operates, what are your perceptions of 
the existing national regulation? 
Two-thirds of the German platforms perceived the existing regulatory environment for their 
activity to be excessive and too strict, and the remaining one-third perceived it to be adequate 
and appropriate.  These perceptions of the German regulatory environment are in sharp 
contrast to the sentiment of the UK platforms, 100% of which perceived the UK regulatory 
environment to be adequate and appropriate. 
5.1.5 Response of Incumbent Actors in the Financial System 
The variation in the development trajectories of the two channels has produced different 
responses from the incumbent actors in the banking system of each country. Mini-bonds are a 
benign development from the banks’ perspective and, if anything, benefited lenders by 
increasing the assets their borrowers could offer as loan collateral and thereby increase the 
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recovery of loan principle in the event of default. The other actors benefiting from mini-bond 
development are small advisory firms which are retained to engage in the development of the 
information and marketing activities associated with mini-bond issuance. P2B lending is a 
much more disruptive threat to traditional lending practices and therefore has elicited a 
stronger response from the incumbent banks. P2B lending is a direct substitute for bank 
lending, and leverages rapidly-advancing technological developments to reduce the barriers 
to entry produced by the operating scale and information advantages that have historically 
protected the market position of banks. P2B platforms operators are more agile than banks 
hampered by outdated and inefficient legacy IT systems, and better able to respond to the 
changing preferences of borrowers as social and commercial engagement migrates online. 
In the face of these forces the regulatory environment is a critically important variable in 
determining the level of threat that P2B lending poses to incumbent bank lending practices. 
There are stark differences in the regulatory frameworks for P2B lending in the UK and 
Germany, beginning with the definition of what this activity entails and what type of party 
qualifies as a lender in the view of each regulator. In the UK, the FCA refers to P2B lending as 
a ‘loan-based crowdfunding’ activity ‘covering a number of different models involving the 
platforms facilitating loans from individual investors to businesses (citation). Section 32 (1) of 
the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG) refers to P2B lending as ‘crowdlending’, 
and defines it as: ‘the brokering of a loan over an Internet services platform between a 
customer (the borrower) and a credit institution (the lender)…’ (BaFin, 2017). In Germany, the 
P2B platforms have been relatively more constrained than UK platforms in lending activities, 
with a less competitive offering because the loans they originate must be funded by an 
incumbent bank. The fee charged by the German bank lender increases the cost of making a 
loan and the lending bank gains knowledge about the borrower which it may not have 
otherwise obtained. In principle, the German platforms could seek to be licenced as credit 
institutions, but as a practical matter this was not viable for start-up firms with limited resources 
to manage the same regulatory compliance obligations the country’s banks are subject to. The 
UK platforms are able to operate with complete autonomy from the incumbent banks, because 
any entity can make a loan without being regulated providing they are lending their own money. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates entrenched position of the banks in the business model of the German 
platforms relative to the UK platforms. 
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Step 1: Would-be borrowers place their loan requests on a platform for selection by investors. 
Step 2: If there are enough investors, the platform brokers a loan agreement between an investor 
(which must be a credit institution in Germany) and the borrower. 
Step 3: In Germany (only), the credit institution then resells the repayment claim arising from the loan 
agreement in the form of partial claims to individual investors through agreements on the purchase of 
receivables, and transfers the receivables. 
Figure 5.5: Business Models of German versus UK Platforms 
For the German banks, the disruptive threat of P2B lending has been mitigated by the business 
model that German P2B lenders have had to adopt.  The banks willing to act as lenders have 
charged German P2B investors ¼% to ½% of the loan value as a fee, which was a profitable 
activity given a bank only owns a loan for a few minutes before reselling it to the P2B investors 
(step 3 in Table 5.5). The fee has also pushed up the cost of a P2B loan for the borrowers, 
making these loans less competitive with traditional bank loans. In effect, the threat posed by 
the German platforms was limited to being more efficient originators of loans, with the severity 
of the threat dependant on their ability to originate loans more efficiently than the banks. This 
is a tall order in Germany, given the strong relationship between Mittelstand firms and 
Hausbank lenders. In the UK, the broader business model meant that P2B lenders were in 
direct competition with banks and were motivated to innovate not only in loan origination, but 
also in credit analytics and loan monitoring. The UK platforms have also been able to play an 
intermediation role that is more akin to an asset manager, offering their investors the option of 
having the platform assemble their loan investment portfolio with loans selected by the 
platform.  This ‘auto-select’ tool has become an increasingly important feature of UK platform 
business models, and by 2015 the majority of new P2B investors on the largest UK P2B 
platform were electing to delegate the selection of their loan portfolio rather than selecting their 
own loans (Hurst, 2017). 
The response of incumbent bank lenders in each country reflects these differences in the level 
of business model innovation. In both markets, banks have explored originating loans via P2B 
platforms in customer segments that are underserved by banks because high origination costs 
make these segments unprofitable, such as making small loans to very small businesses 
(Atkinson, 2013). Commerzbank, second largest of the four commercial banks in Germany, 
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launched its own P2B platform called Main Funders ostensibly to compete with 3rd party P2B 
platforms. The platform matches Commerzbank clients seeking loans with institutional 
investors that are also Commerzbank clients (Commerzbank, 2016). On closer examination, 
the Main Funders platform differs from ‘mainstream’ P2B lending in two important respects. 
First, it makes loans of €200,000 to €10,000,000, a size range which is larger than the loan 
amounts typically funded on P2B platforms. Second, the loans are unsecured, which means 
they are subordinated to the borrower’s secured bank loan provided by Commerzbank. In 
many ways, the Main Funders platform is reconstituting the mezzanine loans of the 2003 – 
2007 period, but matching borrowers directly with institutional investors via an online platform 
rather than via an intermediated securitisation sold in capital markets. 
In the UK, the banks have gone beyond tactical collaborations serving unprofitable segments 
to more strategic collaborations targeting profitable segments which are more central to the 
banks’ core business (Dunkley & Evans, 2015). UK banks have also been aggressively 
investing in and partnering with early-stage FinTech firms providing alternative approaches to 
credit analytics and monitoring systems for loans, in an effort to pro-actively become more 
efficient and prevent P2B lenders from gaining market share in profitable market segments. 
For example, Santander UK entered into an agreement with Kabbage, a US-based alternative 
lender to small businesses, to provide small SMEs with working capital funding between £500 
and £100,000 using Kabbage’s automated credit scoring and near real-time monitoring system 
(Santander Ventures, 2016). Providing working capital loans of this size using Santander’s 
credit approval process takes between two and twelve weeks. Kabbage uses multiple external 
sources of data, including social media and data captured from online marketplaces. The 
collaboration with Kabbage was projected by Santander to reduce loan approval times from 
more than two weeks to a few minutes (Santander Ventures, 2016). Other UK banks, such as 
Metro Bank, have been collaborating with P2B platforms by investing their customer deposits 
in P2B loans (Dunkley & Evans, 2015). 
5.2 The VoC Prediction for the Development of Mini-bond and P2B Lending 
This section of the chapter presents a prediction for the development of P2B and mini-bond 
lending derived from the propositions of the VoC framework, and discusses the fit of this 
prediction with the actual development of the channels in each country. The VoC framework 
identifies five institutional spheres in the economy that firms must engage with in order to 
advance their interests: industrial relations; the education and training system for workers; 
corporate governance (which includes the financial system); inter-firm relations; and employee 
relations. Two of these spheres, corporate governance and inter-firm relations, are of central 
importance to the financing of firms. The predicted response of firms to the post crisis 
contraction in bank lending is derived from the likely level of institutional support provided to 
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alternatives as posited by the VoC framework. The response of firms then uses these to derive 
a prediction for the development of the channels in each country.  
The VoC framework was developed to understand how variation in institutions between 
economies can explain differences in economic outcomes, such as differences in economic 
performance or different capacities for adapting to institutional change. Firms are assumed to 
be the ‘crucial actors’ in an economy and are therefore at the centre of the VoC framework 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001:6). Firms engage with institutions by necessity to address the 
coordination problems they encounter in carrying on business, and are therefore seen to be 
key ‘agents of adjustment’ in the economy as they respond to shifts in the global competitive 
environment and changes brought about by technology. In the VoC literature the institutional 
environment influences how firms go about adjusting to change because firms are naturally 
inclined to engage in practices that have institutional support within their economies. Since the 
VoC literature posits that there are distinctly different institutional arrangements in CMEs 
versus LMEs, then the level of institutional support for P2B and mini-bond lending should differ 
in the two economies given the different characteristics of the two lending channels. These 
differences should produce different trajectories of development as firms seeking alternative 
sources to bank financing gravitate towards either P2B lending or mini-bonds financing. 
Evidence of this institutional support should also be reflected in the regulatory and state policy 
regime that the institutions relevant to the financing of firms are subject to. 
The approach used in the analysis for building the prediction follows a similar analysis used by 
Hall and Soskice, the authors of the VoC framework, to predict variation in the response of 
CME-based and LME-based firms in their seminal introductory chapter of Varieties of 
Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage	(Hall & Soskice, 2001:16).  
Hall & Soskice cite a study comparing the response of UK and German exporters to a sudden 
change in exchange rates which increased the cost of their goods in foreign markets (Knetter, 
1989). The UK firms tended to pass the cost along to maintain profitability, while German firms 
tended to maintain price in order to maintain market share.  Hall and Soskice argue that this 
outcome fits with the predicted responses based on the variation in the corporate governance 
and industrial relations spheres in the two economies. In LMEs (the UK), access to capital is 
directly linked to profitability and firms can more easily dismiss workers to help offset the cost 
of a decline in volume.  In CMEs (Germany), firms can sustain a decline because they can 
continue to access capital independent of periods of reduced profitability, and long-term 
employment strategies make lay-offs difficult. Knetter’s findings suggest that firms facing 
challenges react differently, depending on the type of economy they are located in (Knetter, 
1989). In VoC terms, the financial crisis was a shock that changed the availability of bank 
financing, and so firms had to respond by turning to alternative sources of funding. Which 
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alternative source they gravitated to is influenced by the amount of institutional support for a 
given source in that economy.   
The case presented by Hall and Soskice is relatively simple, since firms faced a binary choice 
in how they could respond to the increase in the cost of their goods resulting from exchange 
rate movement, by either increasing or by maintaining the price. The VoC prediction of their 
behaviour is based on an analysis of the level of institutional support for each alternative action 
in their respective economies. The decision set available to firms deciding how to respond to 
a contraction in bank lending is more complex. In the first instance, firms must decide whether 
or not they should seek financing through any alternative lending channel. The institutional 
environment in an economy could be broadly hostile to any form of non-bank lending, which 
would suggest that firms in that economy are unlikely to pursue non-bank financing 
alternatives. In the event they deem there is sufficient institutional support for non-bank 
alternatives, they then need to decide which type of non-bank lending to pursue. The choices 
faced by firms are summarised in Table 5.7. There are four possible outcomes in each country, 
from a total of 8 possible outcomes. If there is weak institutional support for any form of non-
bank lending then we would expect negligible development of either P2B or mini-bonds, and 
the incumbent bank lending channel would remain dominant and unchanged.  
Table 5.7: Alternative Lending Choices for Firms 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, strong institutional support for all forms of non-bank 
lending will likely result in similarly strong trajectories of development for both P2B lending and 
mini-bonds, and be a catalyst for change within the incumbent banking system.  If there is 
strong institutional support for only one of the alternative lending channels then we would 
expect to see divergence in the trajectory of development as firms adopt that form. 
The predicted development of the lending channels, therefore, is based on a determination of 
the strength of institutional support for the channels in each country by applying the 
characteristics of CMEs and LMEs in the VoC framework.  It considers four institutional 
variables influencing the level of support: (i) how firms in the economy engage with institutional 
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spheres; (ii) the comparative institutional advantage of the economy; (iii) the approach to 
economic policy-making; and (iv) the capacity for adapting to change. 
5.2.1 Engagement with Institutions 
In the VoC corporate governance sphere, the financing of firms is characterised by a ‘relational 
lending’ versus ‘market lending’ dichotomy in CMEs and LMEs respectively. CME firms have 
access to ‘patient capital’ finance from bank lenders that is not tied to factors influenced by 
short term profitability, and thus their lending relationships should remain more stable than the 
lending relationships of firms in LMEs through an economic downturn. In the context of 
relational lending, there should be relatively little need for German firms to pursue non-bank 
sources of financing either during or following a financial crisis. In the event that CME firms are 
not supported by their bank lender, then it is plausible that their choice of non-bank sources 
will be consistent with ‘pecking-order’ theory and inter-firm relations would play a role in their 
preference of non-bank funding sources. Pecking order theory is well-developed in the finance 
literature to describe the capital structure of firms.  It assumes a direct relationship between 
the cost of funding and the level of information asymmetry between the funder and the firm, 
such that the firm will prefer sources of funding facing the lowest level of information asymmetry 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). In the VoC framework, CME firms are highly reliant on inter-firm 
collaborations in their business activities, and this collaborative behaviour should have a 
positive bearing on CME firms’ access to finance relative to LME-based firms. Collaborators in 
a network are sources of reliable information about other firms in the network, and this private 
information can be used by both bank and non-bank actors to assess the financial strength of 
potential borrowers. Financially strong firms should be motivated to provide bi-lateral forms of 
non-bank financing to others in the network because collaborations including a high level of 
inter-dependence create vulnerabilities if a collaborator weakens financially, particularly if it is 
a supplier. This suggests firms in collaboration networks both the potential lenders and 
borrowers, are likely to prefer more private non-bank alternatives to either P2B or mini-bond 
lending. 
In the event that a CME-based firm cannot access financing via a collaboration relationship, 
then German firms are more likely to raise funds via mini-bonds than P2B because the former 
is a complimentary form of finance which allows the borrower to maintain its relationship with 
its hausbank. Firms located in LMEs like the UK are more vulnerable to interruptions in the 
supply of credit, because of the strong link between current financial performance and access 
to finance. LME firms rely on market relations to solve coordination and there is less 
institutional support for non-market forms of coordination. In the case of financing for firms, this 
includes the use of public rather than private sources of information about firms by lenders. 
The intermediation services provided by P2B lending included screening loan applicants for 
creditworthiness which relies on information provided by 3rd party data sources, such as of 
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credit bureaus. The UK has a more developed ecosystem of commercial information providers 
than Germany, suggesting relatively strong institutional support within the financial system for 
P2B lending in UK. 
5.2.2 Comparative Institutional Advantage 
In the VoC literature, the concept of comparative institutional advantage proposes that the 
institutional structure of an economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific 
types of activities because of institutional support for those activities, and the institutions 
relevant to the activities are not distributed evenly across countries. The VoC thesis highlights 
the impact of comparative advantage on firms’ capacity for innovation. CMEs have 
comparative advantage in incremental innovation, supported by extensive collaboration and a 
more deliberative process which results in high quality production outputs. By contrast, LMEs’ 
comparative advantage in radical innovation involves the development of major changes to 
processes or entirely new products that entail significant risk. The capacity for radical 
innovation is especially valuable in rapidly-changing and complex system-based products. In 
the context of alternative lending channels, mini-bonds are not innovative from a technological 
perspective, whereas the development of P2B lending is part of a broader, rapidly-changing 
‘FinTech’ phenomenon which is a product of radical innovation. Advanced data analytics 
technologies are being applied by P2B platform operators to enhance the analysis of P2B 
borrower creditworthiness and the enhance the provision of advice and processes for P2B 
investors. An analysis of FinTech ecosystems found the UK had a FinTech talent pool almost 
five times larger than Germany, received almost 50% more investment in FinTech firms, and 
had more supportive regulation, government policies and taxation supporting FinTech firms 
(E&Y, 2016). This suggests that the UK’s comparative advantage in radical innovation, 
particularly in technology-enabled financial services, provides greater institutional support for 
P2B lending.  
5.2.3 Economic Policy-Making 
Economic policies in LMEs are aimed at increasing market competition, while policy-making in 
CMEs focuses more on increasing the capacities of actors for non-market coordination (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001:46). Therefore, economic policies will be effective only if they are incentive 
compatible with the existing coordinating capacities (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 2018). Given P2B 
lending is a substitute for bank lending, its development requires policy initiatives that 
challenge the incumbent system. Mini-bonds are a complement to bank lending and do not 
require initiatives to stimulate market competition. This suggests that there is likely to be higher 
institutional support for P2B lending in the UK than in Germany. 
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5.3 Institutional Change  
The analysis indicates that the institutional change taking place in the practices of lending to 
SMEs is at an early stage of development in both Germany and the UK. VoC envisions 
institutional change in an economy occurring as a result of external shocks, which force firms 
to modify their practices as they seek to retain their comparative advantages, which can lead 
to changes to the institutions with which they interact. In that context, the financial crisis was a 
shock that affected the bank lending practices in both countries. However, it is unclear whether 
the alternatives that emerged following the crisis would be catalysts for processes producing 
permanent change preventing institutional practices reverting to the status quo that existed 
before the crisis. Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) categorisation of change processes assumes a 
more gradual process of change and thereby provides a useful template for analysing 
institutional change produced by mini-bond and P2B lending.  
In Germany, it does not appear that either mini-bond nor P2B lending has yet been a catalyst 
for changing the behaviour of banks lenders. In the case of P2B lending, the launch of the Main 
Funders lending platform by Commerzbank is indicative of a layering process which could 
ultimately crowd out the legacy lending practices over time. The likelihood of change actually 
occurring is highly questionable given the low level of P2B lending volume and the institutional 
support. Commerzbank appears to be approaching the Main Funders initiative as a 
complement to its existing activities, suggesting that as the host institution it is not playing the 
role of an institutional entrepreneur seeking to ‘implement changes that diverge from existing 
institutions’ (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009:70). The financial exchanges were another 
candidate for the role of institutional entrepreneur with the introduction of a listed mini-bond 
segment on the regional financial exchanges in Germany.  This was a potentially more potent 
catalyst for institutional change through displacement of bank lending via another financial 
institution. However, the high default rate of listed mini-bonds and the subsequent closure of 
these specialised segments has made it highly unlikely that incumbent bank lending practices 
will be displaced by financial exchanges in Germany. Notwithstanding the high level of defaults, 
it is difficult to envision a scenario in which the regional exchange operators seriously challenge 
the incumbent lending practices of the banks given both the exchanges and the local and 
regional banks are owned by the same regional governments.  In the case of Germany, both 
the incumbent banks and the regional exchanges embody the paradox of embeddedness, 
which reflects the constraining influence of the structure in which an institutional entrepreneur 
is embedded in trying to bring about change from within incumbent institutions (Battilana, 
2006). 
In the UK, the limited growth of the mini-bond issuance volume has been inconsequential to 
incumbent institutional practices and has not instigated any institutional change. In contrast to 
Germany, the collaboration by incumbent bank lenders with P2B lending platforms for serving 
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distinct segments of SME borrowers suggests that institutional change through layering is a 
possibility. There are two other possibilities for P2B lending instigating institutional change over 
time through a process of displacement. First, institutional change in lending practices could 
come about as a result of P2B platforms obtain banking licences and thereby competing 
directly with banks on their own terms with their ‘platform’ lending model87. Second, P2B 
lenders with more ‘asset management’ business models could produce a similar effect in asset 
management if they were to become more sophisticated in their intermediation services for 
investors and become fully regulated as asset managers88. In any case, given the early stage 
of development of P2B lending it is likely there will be more than one form of institutional 
change process underway in the UK at different points in time. There is a strong case for the 
UK P2B platform operators playing the role of institutional entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs 
have emerged from outside of the institutional practices they seek to disrupt and thus are 
unaffected by the influences constraining actors embedded in the incumbent system seeking 
to bring about change.  
In the VoC approach, the capacity for change in the financial system is related to the level of 
institutional complementarity in the economy. A high level of complementarity will cause 
change to ‘either ripple throughout the system, or will be rather marginal because the 
competitive advantages of being rooted in the existing system lead actors to resist more radical 
change’ (Deeg, 2010:324). Actors in CME financial systems are presumed to be resistant to 
adopting change increasing non-bank funding because non-market coordination supports their 
competitive advantage, although this resistance has been starting to erode as it applies to 
large firms ((Deeg, 2010:324; Thomson, 2018). VoC scholars argue that Germany has been 
reluctant to accept deregulation of financial services proposed by the European Union because 
of its desire to retain the profitability of incumbent actors and  preserve the ‘capacities for 
network monitoring that sustain the terms on which domestic capital is available to firms’ (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001:53).  
Despite being in a nascent stage of development, the relative level of institutional change 
observed in Germany and the UK appear to be consistent with predictions of change based 
on the propositions of the VoC framework, despite these propositions not specifying the type 
of change likely to take place nor addressing the role played by institutional entrepreneurs in 
enacting change. The VoC approach indicates there will be stronger institutional support for 
P2B lending in the UK compared with Germany, and this should produce a more rapid pace of 
adoption and development of P2B lending in the former. It should also produce more change 	87 In 2017, the largest P2P consumer lending platform in the UK, Zopa, announced that it intended to apply for a 
full banking licence. 88 In 2015, the largest P2B platfrom in the UK, Funding Circle, launched a fund for investment in P2B loans 
originated on its platform. In early 2018, Funding Circle also announced its intention to undertake an Initial Public 
Offering of its shares (IPO) expected to value the company at more than £1.5 billion. 
		 116	
to legacy lending practices within the incumbent UK banking system because P2B lending is 
a direct substitute for bank lending. The VoC analysis indicates there will be more institutional 
support for mini-bond lending in Germany than the UK, which should result in greater adoption 
in the former than the latter. In contrast to the substitutive nature of P2B lending, the 
complementarity of mini-bond lending to bank lending means its adoption is less likely to lead 
to change in the incumbent bank lending practices in Germany.  
5.4 Conclusion 
5.4.1 Comparison of Predicted versus Observed Development  
The development of P2B and mini-bond lending since the financial crisis generally fits the 
trajectories predicted by the VoC framework. While both types of lending are present in both 
economies, the significant differences in the observed lending volume for each channel are 
consistent with the predicted dominance of P2B lending in the UK and mini-bond lending in 
Germany. The direct lender-borrower relationship in mini-bond lending is more characteristic 
of relational bank lending in CMEs, while the intermediation of online platforms in the P2B 
channel is more characteristic of the market-based lending associated with LMEs. Market-
based P2B lending characteristics are also stronger in the UK than in Germany, influenced by 
the impact of the regulatory environment on the business models for P2B lending in each 
country. 
Comparative advantage of LMEs versus CMEs is reflected in the divergent development of the 
two channels. In the UK, P2B lending platforms gain comparative advantage by being 
concentrated in London, where they can easily access risk capital and large pools of workers 
with finance and technology expertise. Banking and finance activity is less geographically 
concentrated in Germany, and most of the P2B platform operators are based outside of 
Frankfurt, the country’s main financial centre. In Germany, this regional distribution of financial 
institutions has been a positive factor supporting the development of the mini-bond market, as 
the six regional financial exchanges were quick to introduce listing segments for mini-bonds 
issued by firms within their respective regions that broadened the base of potential investors.  
The analysis of the data for repeat borrowing confirms the VoC prediction that mini-bonds 
lending is a source of patient capital.  The analysis indicates that P2B lending is unlikely to be 
a source of patient capital because the intermediation strengthens the link between a firm’s 
current financial performance and access to P2B funding. The power of P2B platforms to 
determine whether a prospective P2B borrower obtains a loan has increased as P2B investors 
have increasingly elected to have the platform select loan investments on their behalf. This 
increases the relational distance between investors and borrowers, and increases the link 
between borrowers’ financial performance and access to finance because the platforms’ 
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lending decisions are influenced by the need to compete for investors on the basis of the 
financial return they can produce versus other investment alternatives.  
The approach to policy and regulation also fits the VoC prediction. Policy initiatives and 
regulatory change in the UK have been strongly supportive of P2B lending, underpinned by a 
desire to increase market-based competition in financial services.  At the same time, the 
regulatory framework for mini-bonds in the UK is much more restrictive than the comparable 
mini-bond legislation in Germany, where platforms have had to adopt business models which 
have reinforced the incumbent position of banks within the financial system. 
5.4.2 Limitations of the VoC Framework as an Explanatory Model 
The trajectories of mini-bond and P2B lending development generally fit the VoC prediction, 
but the analysis also reveals limitations of VoC as an explanatory model. The framework was 
originally conceived to explain institutional similarities and differences among the developed 
economies and predict how these institutional arrangements influence policy decisions, firm 
behaviour, economic performance and institutional change (Hall & Soskice, 2001:1). The 
propositions regarding institutional arrangements of CMEs and LMEs provided the basis for 
predicting an outcome, in this case the development of the two lending channels.  However, 
the VoC framework does not provide an explanation about why the institutions in each 
economy came to be in the first place.  As a result, the VoC model does not provide the 
explanatory insight needed to intervene in order to change outcomes. Applying the VoC thesis 
to explaining the development of mini-bond and P2B lending falls short in three areas.  
First, the observed development of alternative financing channels indicates that the ‘bank 
versus market’ dichotomy used to describe the financing of firms in CMEs and LMEs may be 
too superficial to capture the variation of lending practices within each economy.  The 
explanatory power of the model is weakened by failing to account for the presence of mini-
bond and P2P lending in both the UK and Germany, despite these two countries being 
frequently cited by VoC analysts as the ideal type representations of LME and CME financial 
systems. The macro-level analysis at the level of institutional arrangements implies that firms 
have less latitude than they are predicted to have in pursuing alternatives to those prescribed 
by the institutional arrangements in which they are embedded.  
Second, VoC provides little insight into how bank lending practices will change as a result of 
the development of alternative lending channels. VoC assumes institutional change is a result 
of firms adjusting to an exogenous shock, and seeking to re-establish equilibria that sustain 
the comparative advantage existing prior to the shock.  This is an overly-functionalist 
perspective on the sources and process of institutional change, and underestimates the 
complex interaction among multiple contemporaneous factors.  While the financial crisis was 
an exogenous shock, there were other forces of change to the banking system that were 
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endogenous and unfolded more gradually following the financial crisis. In the UK, for example, 
banks were engaged in series of dubious business practices, from rigging Libor rates and front-
running foreign exchange trades to mercenary business lending practices, which produced a 
constant drip feeding of negative news stories until well after the peak of the crisis had passed.  
This produced very negative public sentiment against banks and fuelled a broader social 
movement advocating greater economic equality which, in turn, influenced the sentiment 
among policy makers enacting changes in financial services regulation that began forcing 
change on banks. In parallel, the FinTech movement emerged in Germany, the UK and many 
other countries with a mission to ‘democratise finance’ by exploiting advancements in data 
analytics to disintermediate banks in areas of their business where they were popularly 
perceived to be ‘ripping people off’ (Hinrikus, 2017). The complexity of the variables producing 
change in incumbent lending practices may be better conceptualised as nested change, with 
banks being forced to respond to developments in multiple, layered fields (N. Fligstein, 2001), 
only one of which is occupied by alternative lenders. 
Finally, the VoC framework falls short in explaining the behaviour of the investors in alternative 
lending. The firm-centric perspective of the VoC approach predicts the motivation of firms to 
solve ‘coordination problems’ by seeking mini-bonds or P2B loans as an alternative to bank 
loans, and which form of lending should be dominant in each country. Firms adopting new 
finance practices are the institutional entrepreneurs in this conceptualisation, playing the role 
of the adopters of new finance practices and catalysing change by abandoning incumbent 
practices. However, the willingness of the firms to seek non-bank financing is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for change, because their ability to obtain alternative funding is 
dependent on the willingness of investors to supply the funding. The willingness of UK 
investors to supply P2B loans via intermediated online platforms is consistent with the VoC 
perspective regarding the role of public information sources and market-based relations in the 
financing of LME-based firms. VoC offers less insight in explaining why individuals should be 
motivated to invest in mini-bonds. If bank lending in Germany is dependent on private sources 
of information and network monitoring mechanisms, then why did individual investors lend if 
they cannot access equivalent sources of information and monitoring? This is an intriguing 
question, particularly given the extraordinarily high default rate for mini-bonds listed on the 
regional financial exchanges in Germany, which suggests that investors did not accurately 
assess the default risk of the bonds they were buying. VoC may be more useful as a predictive 
model rather than an explanatory model, at least in the case of comparing cross-national 
finance practices, given other mechanisms influencing the behaviour of economic actors. The 
next chapter explores a complementary explanation for the development of alternative lending, 
by investigating trust as a determinant in the willingness of investors to supply the capital 
needed to fund mini-bond and P2B loans.   
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Chapter 6: The Role of Trust in Alternative Lending Practices 
The previous chapter discussed the development of P2B and mini-bond lending channels in 
Germany and the UK in the period from 2009 to 2015 following the global financial crisis.  The 
empirical analysis revealed inverse patterns of growth for the two lending channels, with P2B 
lending volume more than 8 times greater than mini-bond lending in the UK and mini-bond 
lending volume approximately 144 times greater than P2B lending in Germany.  More than 
97% of the combined mini-bond lending volume took place in Germany while more than 98% 
of the combined P2B lending volume took place in the UK. These findings are consistent with 
the Coordinated Market Economy (CME) and Liberal Market Economy (LME) proposition in 
the Varieties of Capitalism framework, and the evidence of institutional arrangements 
supporting the development of the dominant lending channel in each country is also consistent 
with VOC theoretical propositions. This chapter extends the empirical analysis of collected data 
to investigate the trust relationships of borrowers and investors as a factor influencing the 
development of the two lending channels and discusses the social arrangements particular to 
each economy that influence the formation of this trust. 
This chapter considers the influence of trust as a supply-side variable, by investigating the 
willingness of investors to supply funding to prospective borrowers in each channel. This does 
not imply that the variation in the growth of the P2B channel discussed in Chapter 5 has been 
influenced solely by supply-side factors.  Chapter 2 described how the contraction in lending 
by the incumbent banks during the financial crisis impacted SMEs and their access to funding 
differently. Many small SMEs in Germany, with borrowing requirements of less than €5 million, 
were largely unaffected by the contraction in bank lending, whereas most SME in the UK and 
many larger SMEs in Germany were more severely impacted and therefore had greater 
demand for alternative sources of lending. Therefore, the supply side analysis in this chapter 
only focuses on P2B lending in the UK market on a stand-alone basis and comparatively 
analyses mini-bond lending in Germany versus the UK. 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first two sections address the second research 
question posed in this dissertation: What has been the role of trust in the development paths 
of P2B and mini-bond lending in the two countries? The hypothesis asserts that P2B and mini-
bond investors rely on different forms of trust for each type of lending, and the presence and 
strength of these forms varies between the two economies. The first section of the chapter 
discusses the trust forms, and the strength of these forms, that are present in the investor-
borrower relationships within each lending channel.  The second section discusses how the 
trust forms observed in the mini-bond channel vary in presence and strength between the two 
countries. The third section extends the analysis of cross-national variation in trust forms to 
address the third research question: How do the social and institutional arrangements in the 
UK and Germany produce the forms of trust influencing the development of alternative lending 
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channels? Again, the analysis is comparative and focuses on the development of the mini-
bond lending channel. The hypothesis is that different social arrangements in each country are 
micro-foundations for the production of trust forms, and differences in these arrangements 
produces variation in the dominant forms of trust relied on by investors in the two countries. 
This dissertation argues that differences in the education and training systems has contributed 
to differences between Germany and the UK in the social distance between firms and the 
communities in which they are embedded. The third section of the chapter also discusses 
categorisation as a micro-foundation for the production of trust. 
6.1 Forms of Trust Present in P2B and Mini-bond Lending 
What role has trust played in the development paths of P2B and mini-bond lending in the two 
countries? The hypothesis proposes that the individuals investing in the loans provided to the 
borrowers in each lending channel rely on different forms of trust to overcome the information 
asymmetry problem which exposes these lenders to adverse selection risk. The analysis uses 
the typology of three trust forms proposed by Zucker to test the hypothesis: process-based, 
characteristic-based, and institutional-based trust. Given the methodological challenges of 
directly observing trust discussed in Chapter 4, the analysis also follows Zucker’s approach for 
indirectly identifying the presence of these forms of trust by measuring indicators that signal 
their presence (Zucker, 1986). The relative strength of each form of trust is measured using 
dimensions proposed by Stolowy et al. (Stolowy et al., 2014:358).  
The analysis of trust presented in this chapter focuses on the trust forms relevant to individual 
investors. Individuals rather than institutions were the dominant source of funding for both 
lending channels in the 2010 to 2015 period, with individuals accounting for more than 70% of 
P2B lending volume and more than 90% of mini-bond lending respectively. The proportion of 
institutional investor participation increased over the period as lending volumes in each 
channel grew large enough to satisfy the size requirements of these investors89. However, there 
is a strong argument that the investment opportunity would not have been created for 
institutions had it not been for the earlier participation of individual investors. Therefore, the 
trust forms relied on by individual investors were of critical importance in the development of 
the channels because individual investors had to contend with a higher level of adverse 
selection risk in the early years of P2B and mini-bond lending when there was little 
accumulated repayment experience with the borrowers in either channel. In the analysis which 
follows, therefore, the borrower is the object of trust and referred to as the trustee in the lender-
borrower trust relationship, and the individual lenders are referred to as the trustors. 
	
89 This increasing institutional investor participation over time is important to note, as it suggests that institutional 
funding is likely to become the dominant form of funding in both lending channels at some point.  	
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6.1.1 Forms of Trust Present in Mini-bond Lending 
Summary socio-demographic statistics for the mini-bond investors that completed the 
questionnaire distributed by the three German and UK mini-bond issuers is provided in 
Appendix 9. The investors in all three mini-bond offerings are broadly similar in average age 
(55 to 64) and gender (80% to 86% male). However, other characteristics in the profile of the 
three investor groups vary significantly.  The investors in Germany have lived at their current 
address for an average of 28.3 years, which is more than 8 years longer the UK investors. 
More than half of the G5 and UK3 investors are retired compared with less than one-third of 
the G4 investors, which indicates that the G4 investors are the youngest on average amongst 
the three investor groups. The most significant difference between the investor groups is their 
level of educational attainment, with 87% of UK investors having attended university versus 
57% and 43% of the G4 and G5 investors. The average level of educational attainment of the 
investors in both countries is higher than their respective national averages for tertiary 
education, which is approximately 38% and 26% for the 55 to 64 year old cohort in the UK and 
Germany respectively (OECD, 2017). 
6.1.1.1 Presence of Process-based Trust  
Process-based trust is a form of trust produced by experience of prior exchange, with 
information about a ‘record of prior exchange’ obtained by a trustee through either direct 
experience or through the second-hand experience of others (Zucker, 1986:60). Two variables 
indicating the presence of process-based trust are considered in the analysis.  The first variable 
is product usage, and reflects an investor’s direct experience with the borrower, specifically 
her use of a product or service produced by the borrower prior to investing in the loan. The 
second variable indicating the presence of process-based trust is reputation, which reflects 
second-hand information an investor has acquired from a 3rd party having direct experience 
with the borrower.   
Product Usage as a Trust Indicator 
The validity of product usage as an indicator of process-based trust is supported by literature 
studying the influence of affect heuristics90 on investment decisions discussed in the review of 
trust literature in Chapter 3. Characteristics reflecting the strength of process-based trust 
include: (i) the frequency with which the product or service has been used by the investor; and 
(ii) the duration, or length of time, the investor has been using the product or service. 
The questionnaire distributed to mini-bond investors and interviews with mini-bond investors 
included questions about the investors’ use of products or services produced by the borrowing 
	90 Also referred to as affect impressions. 
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firm91. Figures on product usage by the mini-bond investors are provided in Table 6.1. Only 
nine of the 621 German investors answering this question indicated they used the product of 
the mini-bond issuer versus 84% of the individuals investing in the UK3 mini-bond.  These 
response levels reflect the different business activities of the issuers, with G5 producing 
industrial chemicals products, G4 producing renewable energy and UK3 providing consumer 
leisure services and entertainment. The strength of the product usage indicator measured by 
the frequency and use is only relevant to the UK3 investors. The mean ‘frequency of use’ is in 
the ‘once or twice per year’ range, which could be considered relatively infrequent.  However, 
the UK3 investors have, on average, been consuming the UK3 services for more than 5 years, 
suggesting this experience is likely a relatively strong source of process-based trust. While 
UK1 did not participate in the survey of mini-bond investors, the transaction data it provided 
included information indicating that only 9% of its investors were registered as customers prior 
to the mini-bond issue. UK1 saw its issuance of its mini-bond as part of its overall marketing 
efforts aimed to attract new customers as well as obtain the funding it needed. 
Table 6.1: Use of borrower’s Product or Service  
 
The positive influence of investors’ affinity for the product produced by a mini-bond issuer is 
supported by the analysis of mini-bond investor survey data. The questionnaire asked how 
important different factors were in the decision to purchase the bond92, including ‘high coupon’, 
‘I like the company’s products’ and ‘company’s values are similar to my own’. Table 6.2 
provides the response levels for the latter as a factor influencing the investment, and shows a 
significant difference between the investor groups, with 77.7% of UK3 investors versus only 	
91 Refer to Questions 24, 25 and 26 in Appendix 8: Questionnaire distributed by mail to mini-bond investors. 
 92  See Q22 in Appendix 8  
Frequency
Valid.
Percent
Cumulative.
Percent Frequency
.Valid.
Percent.
Cumulative.
Percent Frequency
Valid.
Percent
Cumulative.
Percent
Use.issuer's.products
Yes 9%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 2.1%%%%%%%%%%%% 2.1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% )%%%%%%%%%% )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 230%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 84.2%%%%%%% 84.2%%%%%%%%%%%%%
No 418%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 97.9%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%%% 43%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 15.8%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%
Total 427%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%% 273%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%
Missing 9%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 3%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Total 436%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 276%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Frequency.of.use.
Every%day 4%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.9%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.9%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.4%%%%%%%%% 0.4%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Once%or%twice%per%week 1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.2%%%%%%%%%%%% 1.1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 9%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 3.3%%%%%%%%% 3.6%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Once%or%twice%per%month 2%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.5%%%%%%%%%%%% 1.6%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 85%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 31.0%%%%%%% 34.7%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Once%or%twice%per%year 6%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 1.4%%%%%%%%%%%% 3.0%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 137%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 50.0%%%%%%% 84.7%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Not%applicable 423%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 97.0%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%% 42%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 15.3%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%
Total 436%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) 274%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%
Missing )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 2%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Total 436%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 276%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Duration.of.useage
Less%than%1%year 3%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.7%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.7%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 15%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 5.5%%%%%%%%% 5.5%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Between%1%and%2%years 3%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.7%%%%%%%%%%%% 1.4%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 19%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 6.9%%%%%%%%% 12.4%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Between%2%and%5%years 2%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0.5%%%%%%%%%%%% 1.8%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 21%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 7.6%%%%%%%%% 20.0%%%%%%%%%%%%%
More%than%5%years 7%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 1.6%%%%%%%%%%%% 3.4%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) ) 178%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 64.7%%%%%%% 84.7%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Not%applicable 421%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 96.6%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%% 42%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 15.3%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%%%%%
Total 436%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ) ) 275%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 100.0%%%%
Missing )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% )%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Total 436%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 194%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 276%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
G5>Germany G4>Germany UK3>UK
Mini>bond.Issuer
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32.9% of G5 investors agreeing or strongly agreeing that their liking the issuer’s product was 
a factor in their investment decision. As pointed out earlier, neither G5 nor G4 investors actually 
use the issuer’s products because these firms do not produce products used by consumers, 
and therefore the relatively high level of importance of product affinity stated by G4 investors 
may be related to investors’ affinity with the issuer’s values, which is discussed in more detail 
in section 6.1.1.2. 
Table 6.2: Product Affinity as a Factor in Investment Decision 
 
Secondary sources also provide evidence the influence of product affinity as a source of 
process-based trust in the mini-bond channel in the UK. UK mini-bond issuers and their 
advisors were explicit about the role of mini-bond issuers’ dual relationship with individuals 
purchasing mini-bonds. Capita, a UK provider of an administration services of mini-bond 
issues, marketed the value of mini-bond to potential issues by stating: ‘ 
Finance teams often look to either restructure debt or raise new funds, whilst the 
Marketing department want to encourage customer loyalty and connect with 
investors. Mini-bonds enable companies to achieve both objectives, providing them 
with an alternative means of raising debt while also engaging with customers… 
  
         (Capita, 2013) 
   
Reputation as a Trust Indicator 
The second variable indicating the presence of process-based trust is reputation, which 
reflects second-hand information an investor has acquired about a borrower from a third party 
having direct experience with the borrower.  Branding and reputation are important sources of 
second-hand information because they signal information about the trustworthiness of a 
trustee to trustors (Zucker, 1986).  
The questionnaires distributed to mini-bond investors asked how the mini-bond investors first 
became aware of the bond offering and the extent to which they communicated with other 
individuals before purchasing the bond93. The most-cited source of awareness by investors in 	
93 Refer to Q10 in Appendix 8: Questionnaire distributed by mail to mini-bond investors. 	
Frequency
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency
 Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
‘I like the Company’s 
products’
Strongly disagree or disagree 67                 17.4          17.4            13                6.7            6.7               5                  1.9            1.9               
Neutral 192              49.7          67.1            35                18.1          24.9             55               20.4          22.3            
Strongly agree or agree 127              32.9          100.0          145              75.1          100.0           209             77.7          100.0          
Total 386              100.0        193              436.0        269             436.0        
Missing 50                 1                   7                  
Total 436              194              276             
Mini-bond Issuer
G5-Germany G4-Germany UK3-UK
		 124	
all of the three mini-bond groups was a newspaper article or advertisement, with awareness 
levels ranging from 38% to 51%. The second-most cited source for G5 investors was ‘a friend, 
relative, or colleague’ (25%), and either the website of the issuer or another website was 
second-most cited by G4 investors (42%) and UK3 investors (34%). The G4 and UK3 investors 
cited ‘friend, relative or colleague’ at 15% and 8% respectively. the G4 investors (15%) and 
the UK3 investors (8%). reported communicating about the borrower with 3rd parties prior to 
investing, as summarised in Figure 6.3.  
Table 6.3: Source of Initial Awareness   
 
The higher share of personal relationships as the initial source of awareness for G5 investors 
may be related to the much larger number of bonds issued by G5 in comparison to the single 
bonds issued by G4 and UK3, and additional analysis was undertaken to better understand 
the variation in awareness sources between investor groups. The survey questionnaire asked 
investors if they referred the bond to someone else after they invested, and the responses are 
summarised in Table 6.4. The proportion of G5 investors who discussed the bond (63%) after 
investing is significantly higher than for both the G4 investors (47%) and the UK3 investors 
(38%), so it’s plausible that the larger base of G5 investors more actively discussing the bond 
is a significant factor in the larger proportion of G5 investors first learning about the bond 
through an acquaintance.   
Table 6.4: Discussed Mini-Bond After Investing 
 
Given the large number of G5 mini-bonds issued since 2002, the G5 data was also analysed 
in order to gain more insight into the relationship between the length of time an investor had 
!Frequency! !Valid!Percent!
!Cumulative!
Percent! !Frequency!
!!Valid!
Percent!!
!Cumulative!
Percent! !Frequency!
!Valid!
Percent!
!Cumulative!
Percent!
Q.10%Source%of%initial%
awareness%of%the%mini6bond
Newspaper(article 166(((((((((((((((( 39.1(((((((((( 39.1(((((((((((((( 70(((((((((((((((( 37.6((((((((((((( 37.6(((((((((((((( 122((((((((((((( 44.7(((((((((( 44.7((((((((((((((((
Television(or(newpaper(
advertising 49(((((((((((((((((( 11.5(((((((((( 50.6(((((((((((((( =((((((((((((((( =((((((((((((((( 37.6(((((((((((((( 21((((((((((((((( 7.7(((((((((((( 52.4((((((((((((((((
Website(of(issuer 50(((((((((((((((((( 11.8(((((((((( 62.4(((((((((((((( 57(((((((((((((((( 30.6((((((((((((( 68.3(((((((((((((( 77((((((((((((((( 28.2(((((((((( 80.6((((((((((((((((
Another(website 31(((((((((((((((((( 7.3(((((((((((( 69.6(((((((((((((( 22(((((((((((((((( 11.8((((((((((((( 69.6(((((((((((((( 17((((((((((((((( 6.2(((((((((((( 69.6((((((((((((((((
A(friend,(relative(or(colleague 104(((((((((((((((( 24.5(((((((((( 94.1(((((((((((((( 27(((((((((((((((( 14.5((((((((((((( 94.1(((((((((((((( 23((((((((((((((( 8.4(((((((((((( 94.1((((((((((((((((
A(financial(advisor 25(((((((((((((((((( 5.9(((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((( 10(((((((((((((((( 5.4((((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((( 3(((((((((((((((((( 1.1(((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((((
Other =((((((((((((((((( =(((((((((((( =(((((((((((((((( =((((((((((((((( =((((((((((((((( 10((((((((((((((( 3.7((((((((((((
Total 425(((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((( 186(((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((( 273((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((
Missing(or(/n/a 8((((((((((((((((((( 3((((((((((((((((((
436(((((((((((((((( 194(((((((((((((( 276(((((((((((((
UK37UK
Mini7bond!Issuer
G57Germany G47Germany
!Frequency! !Valid!Percent!
!Cumulative!
Percent! !Frequency!
!!Valid!
Percent!!
!Cumulative!
Percent! !Frequency!
!Valid!
Percent!
!Cumulative!
Percent!
Q20.%Discussed%bond%with%
someone%after%investing
No 138&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 36.7&&&&&&&&&& 36.7&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 102&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 53.4&&&&&&&&&&&&& 53.4&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 170&&&&&&&&&&&&& 61.6&&&&&&&&&& 61.6&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Yes 238&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 63.3&&&&&&&&&& 100.0&&&&&&&&&&& 89&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 46.6&&&&&&&&&&&&& 100.0&&&&&&&&&&& 106&&&&&&&&&&&&& 38.4&&&&&&&&&& 100.0&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Total 376&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 100.0 0 191&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 100.0 276&&&&&&&&&&&&& 100.0
Missing&or&n/a 60&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 3&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
376&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 194&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 194&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Mini5bond!Issuer
G55Germany G45Germany UK35UK
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owned a G5 bond and their referral of the bonds to a 3rd party. The result of a correlation test 
are presented in Table 6.5, and indicate there is a statistically significant positive correlation 
between the duration of the G5 investment and the investor referring the bond investment. 
Also, G5 investors who first heard about the mini-bond from another person were the most 
likely to tell another person about the bonds while investors hearing about the mini-bond from 
advertising were least likely to tell another person about the bonds. This observation may be 
a result of advertising being introduced relatively recently by G5, meaning investors buying the 
bonds after seeing the advertisement have been G5 investors for a relatively short period of 
time. 
Table 6.5: Relationship Between Length of Ownership and Referral 
 
Additional insight into the word-of-mouth behaviour of G5 investors regarding recommending 
the bond investment to 3rd parties was provided by the interviews with G5 investors, and a 
summary of extracts from the investor interviews is provided in Appendix 11. Most investors 
interviewed recommended the bond investment to either other adult family members or to small 
groups of friends with whom they informally exchanged information about potential investment 
opportunities. Interviewees stated that identifying relatively safe investments with higher 
interest income in a low interest rate environment was important to friends and family given 
most were retired. However, recommending an investment opportunity that turned out badly 
could endanger the investors’ relationship with these individuals, so investors were cautious 
about their referral of the G5 investment to 3rd parties. Most of the investors waited until they 
had received interest payments or had a bond repaid before recommending the investment. 
The following excerpt from one interview illustrates the investors’ rationale for this approach to 
recommending the bond to third parties: 
Investor: ‘[Company G5] has very good returns in terms of investment, on the other 
hand that awakens mistrust in many people's eyes. For example, why do they 
return such high yields. Will they soon disappear or have problems? With me 
it was the same, I observed for a year how it developed. My first contact was 
I believe with [ Company X ] from Wirtschaftwoche (Germany economy 
magazine)  I think at some point which was an investment 12 years ago I 
believe or 14 years ago, I must check when, but I started small with an 
investment costing 5,000DM and then I invested more as it developed.’ 
 
Investor referred bond to 
someone after investing
Pearson Correlation .228**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0
N 373
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Length of time investor owned 
bonds issued by G5
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Interviewer: ‘So as you made money over the years and for the reason that you wanted 
to let others know about the trust you'd built up with them?’ 
 
Investor:  ‘Yes, yes.’ 
 
The findings from the analysis suggest that reputation is present as an indicator of process-
based trust, and appears as a relatively stronger indicator in the G5 investor group versus the 
other groups as a result of the experience gained by a large number of individuals investing in 
G5 bond issuances in the 11 years preceding the survey. 
6.1.1.2 Presence of Characteristic-Based Trust 
Characteristic-based trust is a form of trust produced by affinity, or attributes of the borrower 
familiar to the lender, as a result of being connected by shared values within the same 
community (Zucker, 1986:60). Two variables indicating the presence of characteristic-based 
trust are considered in the analysis of mini-bond lending.  The first variable is social relations, 
which reflects an investor’s connection to a borrower prior to investing in the loan, reflected in 
either a lender’s direct social relationship as a stakeholder (as an employee, supplier or 
customer) with the borrower, or in a lender’s indirect social relationship via a third party 
connected to the borrower. The strength of this indicator of social connection is measured by 
the number of these relationships, the directness of the relationships (ie degrees of separation 
between issuer and investor) and the social distance indicated by the type of relationship (e.g. 
employee versus investor). The second variable is proximity, which assumes that the 
geographic distance between borrowers and their lenders is a proxy for shared community 
values.  The degree to which these values are shared is assumed to be inversely related to 
the geographic distance between a lender and the borrower.  
Social Relations as a Trust Indicator 
Data from the responses to three questions94 in the questionnaire distributed to mini-bond 
investors was analysed to reveal the social relationships between investors and the firms 
issuing mini-bonds prior to the investment. The results of the data analysis are contained in 
Table 6.6. Less than 2% of the investors in any of the mini-bonds had either a direct relationship 
or a relationship via a family member with any of the mini-bond issuers prior to making the 
investment. Outside of the investors’ households, 16% of the G5 investors knew an individual 
who was a G5 investor, a finding which is consistent with the high level of word-of-mouth 
communication already identified in the analysis. Uniquely, almost 10% of G4 investors knew 
an individual who worked for the company.  In summary, the low level of pre-existing social 
relationships suggests it is a relatively weak indicator of characteristic-based trust. 	
 94 Refer to Questions 15, 16 and 17 in Appendix 8: Questionnaire distributed by mail to mini-bond investors. 	
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Table 6.6: Pre-existing Investor-Issuer Relationship  
 
Proximity as a Trust Indicator 
The proximity of investors to mini-bond issuers was calculated by measuring the straight-line 
distance between the centre-points of the postcodes of a borrower and its investors using the 
methodology described in Chapter 4. The mean distance between each of the five German 
and three UK mini-bond borrowers and their respective investors is summarised in Tables 6.7 
and 6.8.  The distance between the postcode of each mini-bond issuer and all German 
postcodes has been weighted for household density and purchasing power to normalise the 
proximity by controlling for the effect of population distribution and wealth95. 
Table 6.7: Mean Distance Between German Mini-bond Investors and Issuers (kms) 
 	95 The UK data is weighted for household distribution only. 
Frequency Valid.Percent
Cumulative.
Percent Frequency
.Valid.
Percent.
Cumulative.
Percent Frequency
Valid.
Percent
Cumulative.
Percent
Q15..Investor.relation.to.issuer
Employed)by)the)issuer 8))))))))))))))))))))) 2.1)))))))))))) 2.1))))))))))))))))))) 2))))))))))))))))))) 1.0)))))))))))) 1.0))))))))))))))))) 6))))))))))))))) 6)))))))))))) 6)))))))))))))))
Employed)or)formerly)employed)
by)entity)related)to)issuer 6)))))))))))) 2.1))))))))))))))))))) 2))))))))))))))))))) 1.0)))))))))))) 2.1))))))))))))))))) 6))))))))))))))) 6)))))))))))) 6)))))))))))))))
No)relation 379)))))))))))))))) 97.9)))))))))) 100.0))))))))))))))) 190))))))))))))))) 97.9)))))))))) 100.0)))))))))))) 6))))))))))))))) 6)))))))))))) 6)))))))))))))))
Total 387)))))))))))))))) 100))))))))))) 194))))))))))))))) 100))))))))))) 6))))))))))))))) 6))))))))))))
Missing)or)n/a 49)))))))))))))))))) 6)))))))))))))))) 276))))))))))))))
Total 436)))))))))))))))) 194))))))))))))))) 276))))))))))))))
Q16..Investor's.hhld.relation.to.
issuer
Employed)by)the)issuer 6))))))))))))))))))))) 1.6)))))))))))) 1.6))))))))))))))))))) 1))))))))))))))))))) 0.5)))))))))))) 0.5))))))))))))))))) 4))))))))))))))))))) 1.5)))))))))))) 1.5))))))))))))))))
Formerly)employed)by)the)
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Employed)or)formerly)employed)
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MiniEbond.Issuer
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Investor)Postcode
Issuer Actual)Distance)(km) Un8weighted)Distance)(km)
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Distance)(km)
Actual)as)%)of)Un8
Weighted
Actual)as)%)of)
Weighted
Firm%G1 36 285 268 13% 13%
Firm%G2 2 292 282 1% 1%
Firm%G3 39 261 259 15% 15%
Firm%G4 153 298 286 51% 54%
Firm%G5 234 297 285 79% 82%
All)German)Postcodes)(58digit)
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Local bias is present in all of the bond issues analysed, however the amount of bias varies 
significantly by firm.  Firm size is negatively correlated with local bias, a finding consistent with 
the finance literature examining the effect of firm size on the distance between a firm and its 
bank lender (Bellucci, Borisov, & Zazzaro, 2013; Ivković & Weisbenner, 2005). Firm G5, the 
largest issuer in terms of both number of active investors and number of bonds issued, exhibits 
much less local bias in the geographic proximity of its investors relative to the other mini-bond 
issuers. This could also be a result of having completed 35 mini-bond offerings over the 
preceding 11-year period, whereas the other issuers are smaller firms and have issued only 
one or two bonds.  
Significantly less local bias is present in the distance between investors and the UK mini-bond 
issuers compared with the German issuers. Interestingly, the actual average distance between 
UK3 and its investors is slightly greater than the weighted average distance.  
Table 6.8: Mean Distance Between UK Mini-bond Investors and Issuers (kms) 
 
Proximity as an indicator of characteristic-based trust is intended to be a proxy for cultural 
values shared between the investors and the issuer. UK3 operates 10 venues across the UK 
which could be frequented by potential investors rather than the London-based headquarters 
of the firm96. The analysis of distance between each of these venues and UK3 investors shows 
much greater local bias versus the UK3 headquarters location. Section 6.1.1.1. discussed the 
relatively strong influence of product affinity in the investment decision of UK3 investors, and 
therefore the proximity of UK3 investors to these venues UK suggests this is more indicative 
of the presence of process-based trust rather than characteristic-based trust.  
The analysis of investor survey data also indicates that the product affinity was a relatively 
important factor for G4 investors even though they were not users of the renewable energy 
produced by G4. Table 6.9 provides the response levels for the alignment of investors’ values 
with values of the mini-bond issuer. This factor was particularly important for the G4 investors, 
with 81.4% of G4 investors stating it was either an important or very important factor. In 
contrast, only 27.3% of G5 investors and 48.7% of UK3 investors felt it was either an important 
or very important factor in their decision to purchase the bond. In the case of G4, investors’ 
relatively strong identification with the issuer’s values is a form of characteristic-based trust 	96 Neither UK1 nor UK2 operate facilities that can be visited by a potential mini-bond investor. 
Investor)Postcode
Issuer Actual)Distance)(km) Un8weighted)Distance)(km)
Weighted)
Distance)(km)
Actual)as)%)of)Un8
Weighted
Actual)as)%)of)
Weighted
Firm%UK1 256 269 259 95% 99%
Firm%UK2 192 231 226 83% 85%
Firm%UK3 223 200 194 112% 115%
All)UK)Postcodes)(48digit)
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which is independent of the investors and issuer being located in close proximity. The source 
of this variation of characteristic-based trust could be social movements, such as 
environmental activism in the case of G4, propagated by social media technology that did not 
exist in the 1840 to 1920 time period studied by Zucker. 
Table 6.9: Importance of Alignment of Values as a Factor in Mini-Bond Investments 
 
The significant variation in local bias across the German and UK mini-bond issuers is illustrated 
in Figures 6.1 through 6.8 which plot the longitude-latitude centre-point coordinates for the 
investors in each of the 8 mini-bond issues for which transaction and geo-location data was 
collected. The red dots indicate the postcode centre-point location of issuers’ headquarters97, 
and the black dots indicate the location of postcode centre points of the investors. 
 
 
       Figure 6.1: G1 Investors Plot     Figure 6.2: G2 Investors Plot 
	97 The locations of UK3 operating facilities are indicated instead of its headquarters location. 
Frequency
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency
 Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent Frequency
Valid 
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Company’s values similar to 
my values'
Strongly disagree or disagree 45                 12.0          12.0            11                5.7            5.7               32               11.6          11.6            
Neutral 210              56.1          68.2            24                12.4          18.1             109             39.6          51.3            
Strongly agree or agree 119              31.8          100.0          158              81.9          100.0           134             48.7          100.0          
Total 374              100.0        193              100.0        275             100.0        
Missing -            1                   1                  
Total 100.0        194              276             
Mini-bond Issuer
G5-Germany G4-Germany UK3-UK
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       Figure 6.3: G3 Investors Plot       Figure 6.4: G4 Investors Plot 
 
 
Figure 6.5: G5 Investors Plot      Figure 6.6: UK1 Investors Plot 
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      Figure 6.7: UK2 Investors Plot   Figure 6.8: UK3 Investors Plot 
Analysis of proximity data for word-of mouth communication with 3rd parties obtained in the 
mini-bond investor survey also supports the use of investor-issuer proximity as an indicator of 
characteristic-based trust. Table 6.4 earlier in this chapter summarised word-of-mouth 
communication as an indicator of process-based trust. The analysis of the proximity of the 
individuals with whom the investors spoke is presented in Table 6.10 below. More than three-
quarters of these individuals live within an hour of travel time from the investors in all three 
investor groups, suggesting that the communities in which investors are sharing information 
are highly localised. 
Table 6.10: Mini-bond Investors Word-of-Mouth Proximity 
 
Additional analysis of the G5 data set was performed to gain further insight into investor-issuer 
distance as an indicator of trust.  Figure 6.9 illustrates the relationship between the number of 
investments made by an investor in the 35 mini-bonds issued by G5 between 2002 and 2013 
and the distance between the investor and the issuer. The chart illustrates an inverse 
relationship, suggesting that investors living closer to the issuer perceive less risk associated 
with the investment on average and are therefore willing to invest more frequently in the G5 
mini-bonds. This relationship between distance between investors and G5 has also been 
consistent over time. The data analysis illustrated in Figure 6.10 indicates each of the mini-
bond issues has consistently had a group of repeat investors living on average closer to the 
user than investors only investing once during the 11-year period.  
!Frequency! !Valid!Percent!
!Cumulative!
Percent! !Frequency!
!!Valid!
Percent!!
!Cumulative!
Percent! !Frequency!
!Valid!
Percent!
!Cumulative!
Percent!
Q21$Proximity$of$person$with$whom$
investor$discussed$bond
In#immediate#neighborhood 33################# 14.2######### 14.2############# 9################# 9.9############## 9.9############### 12############## 11.4######### 11.4###############
In#same#town#or#city 84################# 36.1######### 50.2############# 31############### 34.1############ 44.0############# 31############## 29.5######### 41.0###############
In#a#place#about#an#hour#away 85################# 36.5######### 86.7############# 30############### 33.0############ 76.9############# 38############## 36.2######### 77.1###############
Further#away#in#the#country 26################# 11.2######### 97.9############# 21############### 23.1############ 100.0########### 24############## 22.9######### 100.0#############
Outside#of#the#country 5################### 2.1########### 100.0########### D############## D############## 100.0########### D############# D########### 100.0#############
Total 233############### 100.0 91############### 100.0 105############ 100.0
Missing#or#not#applicable 203############### 103############# 171############
436############### 194############# 276############
Mini5bond!Issuer
G55Germany G45Germany UK35UK
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Figure 6.9 Number of Investments versus Distance from G5 Issuer 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Multiple versus One-time Investor Participation by Issue 
In summary, the analysis of investor proximity to mini-bond issuers suggests that there is a 
relatively high level of characteristic-based trust in the five German investor groups, and the 
proximity is directly related to the size of the firm issuing the bonds.  The only UK mini-bond 
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issuer with local bias in proximity is UK3, however this is only apparent in the proximity of 
investors to the UK entertainment venues distributed around the UK, suggesting this is more 
an indication of process-based trust produced by visitations to the venues by investors. 
6.1.1.3 Presence of Institutional-based Trust  
Zucker argues that large developed economies must produce forms of trust that are not 
contingent on trustors and trustees having prior exchange experience or shared characteristics 
in order to function at scale (Zucker, 1986:63). She identifies a more generalised form of trust, 
institutional-based trust, which embodies the ‘constitutive expectations’ of the localised forms 
of trust without the contingency of close geographic or social distance.  Institutional-based trust 
can be either firm-specific or associated with intermediary mechanisms. In the case of the 
former, it is produced by formal mechanisms such as ‘credentialisation’, that provide 
information about the trustworthiness of parties in exchange such as membership in industry 
associations, or standards accreditation 98  bodies. The strength of these bodies, and the 
credentials provided by associations, is derived from their perceived legitimacy in the context 
of the social system in which they are embedded.  Trust in intermediary mechanisms is 
produced by guarantee mechanisms mitigating the risk of non-completion for the parties in an 
exchange (Zucker, 1986:64).   
Firm-specific Indicators of Trust 
The questionnaire distributed to mini-bond investors and interviews with mini-bond investors 
included questions about investors’ perceptions of relative trustworthiness of small firms, 
referred to respectively as ‘SMEs’ and ‘the Mittelstand’ in the UK and Germany 99 , in 
comparison to large firms and banks as other organizational classifications in the economy 
common to both Germany and the UK. The perceived trustworthiness of each organizational 
type in Germany and the UK, measured using a Lickert scale ranging from 1 (‘Absolutely no 
trust’) to 5 (‘A great deal of trust’) is presented in Figure 6.11.  
 
 
	98 An example is the International Standards Organisation (ISO) which publishes international standards for quality 
management of products, management systems and industrial processes. It then certifies companies that meet 
these standards Many companies will not commercially engage with organisations that are not ‘ISO certified’. 
Standard-setting bodies in Germany typically establish national standards that are higher than the ISO standards.  99 In Germany, the term ‘Mittelstand’ is used to describe SMEs.  Not all Mittelstand firms are SMEs, however almost 
all SMEs fit the criteria of Mittelstand firms.  See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of the German Mittelstand.	
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Figure 6.11: Perceived Trustworthiness of Organization Types  
The analysis indicates that both German investor groups perceive the SME/Mittelstand 
classification of firms to be more trusted that the three other organization types. UK investors 
are more neutral in their views of SMEs and on average do not perceived SMEs to be more 
trustworthy than any other category at the 95% confidence interval. German investors have a 
higher level of trust in the Mittelstand than UK investors have in SMEs. These findings are 
statistically significant. The high level of trust that the German investors appear to have in 
Mittelstand firms is particularly noteworthy because they are perceived as being more 
trustworthy on average than the local Sparkassen savings banks100 and cooperative banks 
that are popularly considered to be amongst the most trusted institutions in the German 
economy (Sorge, 2018). 
The high level of perceived trust in the German Mittelstand appears to be robust, even when 
accounting for differences in motivations for investing in mini-bonds issued by different 
companies.  The German mean trust scores for each institution were calculated separately for 
each of the two mini-bond investor groups surveyed because there was a significant variation 
in the relative importance of the considerations that each group took into account in making 
their investment decision.  The survey questionnaire contained questions101 about investment 
considerations including maximising financial return, maximising return relative to risk, 	100 The data analysis included both regional state-owned Landesbanken and the Sparkassen savings banks but 
this has been excluded from the chart as there are no comparable classifications of banks in the UK economy. 101 Refer to Question 22 in Appendix 8: Questionnaire distributed by mail to mini-bond investors.	
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alignment with the values of the issuer, and affinity for the issuer’s products. Compared with 
the bond investors of the German industrial chemicals company, the investors in the bonds 
issued by the German renewable energy company were less influenced by financial return 
(‘best return/risk’ and ‘high coupon’) and more influenced by their alignment with the issuer’s 
values and their affinity towards the issuer’s product when they purchased the bonds.  
The analysis of German mini-bond investor survey data also found relatively low levels of trust 
for some banking institutions, and the variation in trust levels for different types of German 
banks is consistent with other surveys conducted since the onset of the financial crisis.  An 
annual survey of trust in German Banks (Forsa, 2014) has consistently found that the highest 
level of trust is in local Sparkassen savings banks, although this trust level declined from 54% 
to 46% between 2009 and 2014.   
The analysis of the investment and survey data reveals that German mini-bond investors have 
relatively high levels of process-based trust in Mittelstand firms relative to other categories of 
firms in the financial system and the economy.  Furthermore, this high level of trust is consistent 
across groups of investors with varying socio-demographic attributes and with different 
investment considerations.  Survey respondents were also asked to indicate how the current 
perceived trustworthiness in each institution compared with the level of trustworthiness prior 
to the financial crisis (‘less’, ‘about the same’ or ‘more’ trust). The mean scores for the change 
in the level of trust of each institution since the beginning of the financial crisis is illustrated in 
Figure 6.12.  In Germany, the trust scores are consistent for both groups of investors across 
all of the institutions. Mittelstand firms are the only group that did not suffer a drop in the level 
of trust during the financial crisis. These results are consistent with other surveys of 
institutional-based trust that find Germans have high levels of trust in SMEs relative to the 
populations of other countries (Eurobarometer, 2010).  
	
Figure 6.12: Change in Perceived Trustworthiness Since the Financial Crisis 
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There is anecdotal evidence providing support for the high level of trust retained by Mittelstand 
firms following the financial crisis, as Mittelstand firms made decisions and took actions during 
the crisis that signalled trustworthiness to individuals within their communities. For example, a 
representative of the machine tool industry association in Baden-Württemberg contacted as 
part of this research project stated that local machine tool manufacturers saw orders decline 
by 29% from 2007 to 2008, and yet these firms laid off less than 5% of their employees102.  He 
stated that the decision of one family owner to invest €75 million in the firm to fund losses and 
retain the workforce during the initial period of the financial crisis was well known in the region. 
He also explained that this behaviour by Mittelstand owners was not interpreted by most 
Germans as benevolence, but rather as a willingness to ‘do what it takes’ to retain skilled 
workers and ensure the long-term viability of the owner’s business.   
The analysis of the change in the level of trust in the banks in both Germany and the UK is 
consistent with the findings of other surveys of trust in financial institutions before and after the 
financial crisis. An annual survey of trust across 25 nations asked individuals how much they 
trusted banks to ‘do what is right’ on a scale of 0% to 100%.  In the UK in 2008 the average 
response was 47% and by 2011 it had fallen to 16%, and in Germany trust in banks fell from 
42% to 22% during the same period.  In both countries the banking was the least trusted 
industry of the eleven industries included in the survey (Edelman, 2012).  
Secondary data obtained from two pan-European surveys containing questions about trust 
was analysed so the level of perceived trustworthiness of organisation types among the 
general populations of Germany and the UK could be compared with the results of the mini-
bond investor surveys in the two countries. First, a comparison of means test was conducted 
for UK and German responses to the trust question in the European Values Study conducted 
in 2008 and found no statistically significant difference in the levels of generalised trust for UK 
and German respondents. The same test was conducted for the responses to questions about 
trust contained in the 2010 Eurobarometer survey, which asked participants whether they 
‘tended to trust’ or ‘tended to distrust’ various institutions and organisation types including large 
companies and small companies (Eurobarometer, 2010).  Eighty-five per cent of German 
respondents tended to trust SMEs versus 75% of Britons (statistically significant at the .05 
level).  By contrast, there was no statistically significant difference between Germans and 
Britons in their trust of large companies, which was only 24% and 28% respectively.   
An alternative explanation for the different levels of trustworthiness of small and medium-sized 
companies across countries is variation in the level of trust in companies, regardless of size, 
across countries.  Additional analysis of the Eurobarometer data was performed to try to control 
	102 This anecdote was cited by an employee of the VDMA in Stuttgart during a meeting with the dissertation author 
in February 2013. 
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for this by comparing the difference in the levels of trust between small and large companies 
across Western European countries.  The results of the analysis are contained in Figure 6.13. 
The analysis indicates that the level of trust in small companies varies significantly across 
countries even when controlling for differences in the trust levels of companies of all sizes.  
Respondents in all surveyed countries had higher levels of trust in small versus large 
companies by 42 points on average, but ranging from a difference of only 20 points in Italy to 
more than 60 points in Germany. 
 
Figure 6.13: Difference in Trust for Small versus Large Companies (Eurobarometer, 2010) 
The analysis of both the primary and secondary source survey data indicates that SMEs in 
Germany, the Mittelstand firms, are perceived by both individual investors and the general 
population to be a more trusted type of organisation than SMEs in other countries. In contrast, 
the mini-bond data analysis indicates that UK3 investors are relatively neutral about SMEs and 
do not have a statistically significant higher level of trust on average in SMEs versus either 
large multi-national corporations or commercial banks. The UK investors’ perception of SME 
trustworthiness since the onset of the crisis declined less than that of the other types of 
organisations, which suggests that both UK and German investors considered 
SME/Mittelstand firms to have been more victims that perpetrators of the crisis. 
Indicators of Trust in Intermediary Mechanisms 
Financial services are heavily regulated activities in most developed economies, and therefore 
the presence of institutional-based trust in mini-bond lending is indicated by the regulatory 
authorisations obtained by mini-bond issuers.  A regulatory authorisation is an institutional 
credential that implies a vetting process of the issuer and its investment proposition, and 
thereby signals information about of trustworthiness about the borrower to investors. The 
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strength of the institutional-trust production is measured by the number and type of regulatory 
authorisations obtained by the issuer.  
Chapter 5 discussed the policy actions initiated by UK and German legislators and financial 
regulators in response to the introduction of P2B lending following the financial crisis. By 
contrast, the issuance of mini-bonds was an activity already covered by existing regulation in 
both countries, and hence there was no need to introduce or modify legislation. In Germany, 
mini-bonds as financial securities were not considered as ‘loans’ in the context of the 
regulation, and therefore there was no requirement for mini-bond investors to be licensed as 
credit institutions. Companies intending to make mini-bonds available for sale to the public 
need to comply with the German Securities Prospectus Act, which requires them to make a 
prospectus available to investors after having it approved by the regulator (the BaFin). The 
specifications for the prospectus content is quite prescriptive and relatively limited 103  in 
comparison to the disclosures and representations typically contained in fundraising 
prospectuses in liberal market economy countries like the US and the UK. The BaFin checks 
whether the minimum information is contained and is comprehensible to investors, however it 
does not examine whether the information contained in the prospectus is accurate (Winheller, 
2018). While approved prospectus is a form of regulatory authorisation obtained by the issuer, 
the lack of vetting for content veracity in the BaFin approval process suggests it is a relatively 
weak form of institutional-based trust.  
Regulatory authorisations obtained by issuers of listed mini-bonds in Germany represent a 
stronger form of institutional-based trust than a BaFin approved prospectus. Chapter 5 
reviewed the development and growth of the listed mini-bonds in Germany from 2010, with the 
five regional financial exchanges creating listing segments for bonds issued by Mittelstand 
firms with financing needs too large for the local banks to satisfy and too small to interest 
investors in traditional capital markets.  Each exchange operator created a set of listing criteria 
which issuers had to satisfy in addition to obtaining prospectus approval from the BaFin. The 
most active exchange in listing mini-bonds, Stuttgart, described its listed bond segment for 
Mittelstand bonds, Bondm, as follows:  
‘Bondm is a trading segment for bonds from medium-sized enterprises. The 
issuers of the bonds are committed to ongoing compliance with stricter 
standards of transparency and publicity than those applying to the normal open 
market (also referred to as regulated unofficial market).’ (Boerse Stuttgart, 2018)		
103 The issuer must present and explain the risk factors that are specific to the issuer and its industry and/or that 
are likely to impair its ability to meet its obligations to investors; present the issuer's business situation and financial 
position (operating and financial review); make pro forma disclosures based on historical data concerning the issuer; 
make forecasts about the future business development; comment on the adequacy of working capital for the current 
needs and need to raise more capital in the future; provide information about the identity of the persons involved in 
the management; describe the rights and obligations attaching to the securities. 	
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A Bondm listing required issuers to meet the several listing requirements, including: a minimum 
issuance size of €25 million; retaining an approved corporate finance advisor ‘coach’; obtaining 
a credit rating for the issuer and/or the bond offering. While the BaFin is responsible for 
supervising the firms issuing mini-bonds, either listed or unlisted, the regulatory supervision of 
exchanges is the responsibility of the stock exchange supervisory office of each of the federal 
state in which the exchange is located. Exchange conduct is supervised in accordance with 
the Stock Exchange Act (Börsengesetz), which contains explicit investor protection provisions 
relating to issuer liability regarding statements made in an offering prospectus. Hence, firms 
issuing listed bonds obtained layered regulatory authorisations consisting of BaFin prospectus 
approval and financial exchange approval which indicate a relatively strong form of 
institutional-based trust relied on by investors.  
Analysis of investor participation data for one German mini-bond finds supporting evidence for 
the influence of institutional-based trust in listed mini-bond lending. PCCSE issued 16 unlisted 
mini-bonds between 1998 and 2004, and then issued its first listed mini-bond on the Open 
Market Segment of the Frankfurt Exchange in July 2005. Table 6.11 illustrates the mean 
amount invested and mean distance between PCCSE and the individuals investing in these 
bonds. Both first time and repeat investors purchasing the listed bond invested approximately 
14% more and lived, on average, 20 kilometres further away from PCCSE than investors 
purchasing the unlisted bonds. This finding suggests that the regulatory authorisation provided 
by the financial exchange as a requirement for the listed bond may have produced incremental 
institutional-based trust which complemented the production of characteristic-based trust and 
extended the proximity range of investor participation.  The increase in amount invested by 
repeat investors in both listed and unlisted bonds suggests that process-based trust generated 
by prior investment experience in the bonds continued to influence mini-bond investors over 
time.  
Table 6.11: Mean Investment Amount and Investor Distance Pre and Post Listing G5 Bonds	
 
The UK regulatory requirements for issuing a mini-bond are even less onerous than the 
German prospectus requirement. While an issuer wishing to sell securities in the UK to the 
public is also required to make an approved prospectus available to prospective investors, 
mini-bond offerings could qualify for an exemption from the prospectus requirement by 
satisfying a few basic conditions. The most material condition was prohibiting the sale, 
exchange or redemption of the mini-bond instrument prior to the repayment date.  Providing 
First&time)investors Repeat)Investors First&time)investors Repeat)Investors
Mean)number)of)investments)per)bond )))))))))))))))))))))))))))266) )))))))))))))))))))))))))117) )))))))))))))))))))))))1,022) ))))))))))))))))))))))))520)
Mean)issuer&investor)distance)(kms) 224.6)))))))))))))))))))))))) 204.7)))))))))))))))))))))) 245.4)))))))))))))))))))))) 216.3)))))))))))))))))))))
Mean)amount)invested)in)bond)(€) 11,578.4))))))))))))))))))) 13,604.3))))))))))))))))) 12,559.7))))))))))))))))) 16,600.0))))))))))))))))
16)Unlisted)Bond)Issues)(1998)&)2004) First)Listed)Bond)Issue)(July)2005)
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the terms of the offering met these conditions, then the marketing documentation for the 
offering was treated as a ‘financial promotion’, with its ‘Invitation Document’ simply reviewed 
and approved by a corporate finance advisor authorized by the UK financial services regulator 
(the FCA) using the same standards regarding misleading claims that are applied for the 
marketing of any financial product to UK consumers.  As a result, the UK mini-bond offering 
documentation provided relatively little information to potential investors versus a typical 
offering prospectus104. In effect, the prospectus exemption meant that UK mini-bond issuers 
did not acquire any regulatory authorisations. The sole financial exchange in the UK, the 
London Stock Exchange, has stringent listing criteria for listed bond issuers that could 
potentially have been a source of institutional-based trust for mini-bond issuers in the UK. 
However, the exchange did not create a dedicated mini-bond trading segment, and so mini-
bonds were never listed in the UK.  The prospectus exemption combined with the absence of 
a listed bond market in the UK indicates that there was little, if any, institutional-based trust 
influencing UK mini-bond investors. 
6.1.2 Forms of Trust Present in P2P Lending  
The analysis of data for P2B lending uses the same indicators for the presence of the three 
trust forms that were used in the analysis of mini-bond lending. Individuals rather than 
institutional investors remain the object of analysis, however, there are two material differences 
in the approach to the analysis of P2B lending. First, only UK data is used in the analysis of 
trust forms because the low volume of P2B lending activity in Germany relative to the UK in 
the 2010- 2015 period made it difficult to access P2B investors or obtain transaction data from 
the P2B platforms operating in Germany.  Second, because P2B lending involves an online 
platform as an intermediary in the lending process, there are two objects of trust (rather than 
one) that need to be analysed since forms of trust produced by either the borrower or the 
intermediary influence an individual’s decision to invest. 
Three sources of data were analysed to identify the forms of trust present in P2B lending in 
the UK: (i) individual investment level transaction data provided by the P2B lending platforms; 
(ii) online questionnaires completed by 405 P2B investors; and (ii) interviews conducted with 
20 P2B investors.  
6.1.2.1 Presence of Process-based Trust  
The presence of process-based trust in P2B lending, based on information about the trustee 
acquired either from direct experience or via the experience of a 3rd party, is indicated by the 
responses provided by P2B investors completing the online questionnaire and investors 
participating in interviews.  The variables indicating the presence of process-based trust for 	104 The Invitation Document for Ecotricity’s first ‘EcoBond’, which raised £10 million in late 2010, consisted of a 
power-point style document of 28 pages. 
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P2B lending are the same as those used for the analysis of mini-bond lending: (i) product 
usage, the investors’ use of the product or service produced by the borrower prior to the 
investment; and (ii) reputation, the second-hand information about the borrower that a 
borrower obtained from a 3rd party with knowledge of the borrower. The analysis of these 
variables is undertaken at both the level of the borrower and the P2B platform intermediary as 
objects of trust. 
Product Usage as a Trust Indicator 
The interview participants were asked if they had any affinities with any of the companies in 
which they have invested, which could include personal relationships with a person connected 
to that company, familiarity with brand, or usage of the product/service105. One of twenty P2B 
investors interviewed had used the product/service of any company they had funded, and 
stated they selected the loan for investment in part because of their knowledge of the borrower. 
However, the investment in the borrower known to the investor represented less than 10% of 
the investor’s portfolio of P2B investments.   
The findings from analysis of the P2B investors survey data provides support for the low level 
of product usage amongst the P2B investors. Forty-eight percent of the 405 survey 
respondents indicated they use an ‘auto-select’ feature106 for selecting at least some of their 
P2B loan investments. This is an automated tool available on many P2B platforms which uses 
an algorithm to select investors’ loan investments based on their expressed preferences 
regarding risk and financial return expectations. As one P2B investor with a time-consuming 
professional career expressed: 
I'm not really an active investor, I'm a passive investor - if I had money in the stock 
market it would be in index trackers. I'm looking for a sort of minimal effort 
investment. My idea is that you should sit there and have an auto-reinvest function 
on it and it should just be checking in once a year or something like that.  
       UK P2B investor  
Several of the interviewees described their approach for trialling the use of a new P2B platform. 
Initially, they invested only small amounts in a new platform and did not increase their 
investment level until they had sufficient time to observe whether their own experience 
matched the claims made by the platform, particularly regarding investment performance and 
customer service. The relatively high importance these investors place on personal experience 
with a platform indicates that process-based trust where the object of trust is the platform 
intermediary is a relatively influential form of trust for P2B lenders. However, it is not produced 
	105 See question 2.5 in Appendix 4: Semi-Structured Interview Question List *UK P2B Investors. 106 Also referred to as an ‘auto-bidding tool’ on some platforms. 
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until after the investor has made the first investment on the platform so is not a consequential 
form of trust at the time of the initial investment. 
The very low level of product usage by investors indicates process-based trust is not present 
in UK P2B lending activity. Furthermore, investors who have started investing more recently 
are more likely to use automated tools for selecting P2B loan investments. For example, more 
than 70% of new investors on the largest lending platform elect to use the automated tool 
which will further reduce the likelihood that investors use the products of the firms they are 
lending to (Hurst, 2017). 
Reputation as a Trust Indicator 
The P2B online survey asked investors about the factors that were important in deciding to 
invest in a P2B lending platform107: ‘When choosing a [P2B] business lending platform, how 
important are the following factors in influencing your decision to use the platform? These 
included reputation-related factors such as the reputation of the firms and management, media 
articles, the opinions of financial advisors, and others they know who have used the platform. 
Respondents indicated the relative importance of each factor using a Lickert 5-level scale 
ranging from 1 for ‘Very Unimportant’ to 5 for ‘Very Important’, with the importance of in ‘word-
of-mouth’ as a factor summarised in Table 6.12. In the analysis, ‘word-of-mouth’ is a proxy for 
reputation as an indicator of process-based trust. Only 2% of the respondents to the survey 
felt word-of-mouth was a ‘very important’ factor along with 20% indicating it was ‘important’ in 
selecting a platform. On a relative basis, however, ‘word-of-mouth’ is an unimportant factor for 
investors, with ‘media/news coverage’ as a factor considered to be slightly more important. 
Figure 6.12: Factors Influencing Investors’ Decision to Use a P2B Platform 
 
Overall, the analysis of survey and interview data associated with the two variables used 
identify the presence of process-based trust suggests it does not have a strong presence in 
P2B lending largely because of the intermediation of the P2B lending platforms. While P2B 
investors place some value on ‘word-of-mouth’ as a proxy for reputation, they do not place 
greater importance on it relative to other channels of information. 	107 See question 16 Appendix 4: Semi-Structured Interview Question List *UK P2B Investors.	
!Frequency! !Valid!Percent! !Cumulative!Percent!
!Rely!on!word7of7mouth!
!Very!Important! 8 2% 2%
!Important! 70 20% 23%
!Neutral! 137 40% 62%
!Unimportant! 66 19% 81%
!Very!Unimportant! 65 19% 100%
!Total! 346 100%
!Missing! 59
!Total! 405
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6.1.2.2 Presence of Characteristic-Based Trust  
The presence of characteristic-based trust in P2B lending is indicated by the same variables 
used in the analysis of mini bond lending to reflect the social distance between borrowers and 
their lenders: (i) an investor’s social relations with a borrower prior to investing in the loan, 
reflected in either a lender’s direct social relationship as a stakeholder (as an employee, 
supplier or customer) with the borrower, or in a lender’s indirect social relationship via a 3rd 
party connected to the borrower; and (ii) the proximity of borrowers and their investors, where 
the geographic distance between borrowers and their lenders is a proxy for shared community 
values reflecting low social distance. 
Social Relations as a Trust Indicator 
Information about P2B investors’ direct and indirect social relationships with either borrowers 
or platforms was gathered from responses to questions about investors’ personal relationships 
during the interviews with P2B investors108. While none of the interviewees had a prior direct or 
indirect social relationship with any of the borrowers, one investor was a retiree who had been 
working in commercial banking and had established a personal relationship with the 
management of a platform prior to investing that reflected their shared familiarity with 
commercial lending:  
…they were like real people when I spoke to [founder] and he told me what they 
were trying to do…We were at a meeting in London and we told him what we 
thought as group of us about 10 or so…it gave me confidence because I knew 
that they'd already worked for [a financial services company] …and they just 
seemed they knew what they were talking about and I knew what they were 
talking about. And it just all made sense. 
        P2B Investor Interviewee 
While this interaction indicates the characteristic-based trust is present in the relationship 
between this investor and the platform operator, the analysis of survey and interview data 
suggests that this type of interaction was highly unusual.   
Analysis of data collected from the online survey of P2B investors does not indicate that 
characteristic-based trust is present in P2B lending.  P2B investors were asked about the 
relative importance of 14 considerations in making the decision to generally invest in P2B loans 
as a category of investment109. Table 6.13 presents the analysis of ‘lending to local businesses 
I know/care about’. This did not appear to be important to P2B investors, with only 5% stating 
it was ‘very important’. While 22% of the investors surveyed described it as an ‘important’ 
	108 See question 2.5 in Appendix 5: Semi-Structured Interview Question List (UK P2B Investors).	109	See question 8 in Appendix 3: UK P2B Investor Survey Questions.	
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factor, these same investors overwhelmingly considered ‘make a financial return’ and 
‘available interest rate’ to be much more important considerations.  
Table 6.13: Relative Importance of Lending to Local Companies (P2B Investors) 
 
This suggests P2B investors consider investing in companies with which they share values is 
more of a ‘nice to have’ rather than a ‘need to have’ in electing to invest in P2B loans. The 
approach to selecting loans described by one P2B investor supports this finding:  
I would say it’s 80 percent financial decision and it’s 20 percent I’m interested in the 
individual companies. If I see a little company, you know, struggling… and it looks 
like it's a good idea or something like that, then I’ll lend the money. But just on a 
whim if I fancied it as a thing, it’s not always a calculated decision. Sometimes it 
can just be, ‘I like the look of that’. 
P2B Investor Interviewee 
In summary, the analysis suggests there is relatively little evidence of characteristic-based trust 
production in P2B lending relationships. 
Proximity as a Trust Indicator 
The second variable indicating the presence of characteristic-based trust is (again) proximity 
using the transaction data provided by the P2B lending platforms.  Given the number of 
individual P2B investments in the data set totalled more than 8 million, the analysis clustered 
the distance pairs for the investments of both one-time and repeat investor in the loans of 
repeat borrowers from 2009 to 2015 into 16 distance brackets. A comparison of means test 
compared the ‘number of investments’ means and the ‘invested amount’ means for the 16 
distance bracket. Figure 6.14 shows the results of the comparison of means analysis for P2B 
investments in the loans of repeat borrowers. The analysis does not indicate that the amount 
invested or number of P2B investments decreases with distance.  The analysis also compared 
the means for the amount invested and number of investments for one-time investments in 
P2B loans of borrowers and also found no evidence of local bias. 
Frequency Valid.Percent Cumulative.Percent
Lend.to.local.industries.I.know/care.about
Very%important 17 5% 5%
Important 77 22% 26%
Neutral 129 36% 63%
Unimportant 79 22% 85%
Very%unimportant 54 15% 100%
Total 356 100%
Missing 49
Total 405
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Figure 6.14: P2B Investments versus Distance to Borrower 
The analysis of both the pre-existing social relations and the proximity of P2B investors to P2B 
borrowers finds little evidence of either, which indicates that characteristic-based trust has a 
weak presence in P2B lending in the UK. This is a result of the intermediating role played by 
the P2B platform which severs the connection between the investors and borrower, and in 
many cases randomly assigns loan investments to investor portfolios using algorithms aimed 
at avoiding bias in allocating investments to portfolios. 
6.1.2.3 Presence of Institutional-based Trust  
Section 6.1.1.3 earlier in this chapter considered the presence of institutional-based trust in 
mini-bond lending with a focus on firm-specific credentialisation in the form of regulatory 
authorisations obtained by mini-bond issuers through prospectus authorisation and, in the case 
of listed mini-bonds, the approval of the regulated exchange listing its bonds. In the case of 
P2B lending, firms as borrowers do not need regulatory approval because the solicitation of 
prospective borrowers is undertaken by P2B platforms which must be authorised as financial 
intermediaries.   
The analysis of institutional-based trust in P2B lending examines whether the following three 
policy actions specific to P2B lending were influential signals of trustworthiness to P2B lenders 
in the UK market: (i) the decision by the British Business Bank, the UK government’s domestic 
development bank created in 2011, to co-invest alongside individual investors in the P2B loans 
offered by selected platforms; (ii) the introduction of bespoke regulation covering the P2B 
lending in 2013; and (iii) the creation of the Innovate Finance tax-fee Individual Savings 
Account (ISA) for investments in P2B loans. The data used in the analysis was collected from 
responses by the P2B investor interviewee responses to the following question: How important 
have the following actions been in establishing the level of trust needed by you to invest in 
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[crowdfunded investments]? (on a scale of 1 -5 with 1 being ‘of no importance’ and 5 being 
‘very important’ for the above-mentioned policy actions). 
The interviewees’ overall awareness of the policy actions was high, with only one or two 
investors unaware of any of the three policy actions. There was significant variation in the 
influence of the policies on the level of interviewees’ trust in P2B investments. The strongest 
source of trust was the bespoke regulation covering P2B lending, with 61% of interviewees 
indicating it increased trust and the remainder indicating it was neutral. Thirty-five percent of 
the interviewees stated the co-investment in P2B loans by the government-owned British 
Business Bank negatively-impacted trust because its investments were competing with funding 
from individual investors and risked creating distortion in the P2B lending market. 
Data collected from the survey of P2B investors was also analysed to assess the relevance of 
factors seen to avoid or reduce investors’ risk in P2B lending.  The responses are summarised 
in Table 6.13 below. The importance of regulatory intervention and access to the Financial 
Ombudsman were perceived to be important or very important for reducing risk by 56% and 
48% of the investors respectively. Only 14% of investors disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
these were factors for avoiding/reducing risk.  
Table 6.14: Importance of Regulation and Statutory Recourse to UK P2B Investors  
 
In summary, the analysis of both interview and survey data suggests that a significant 
proportion of P2B investors consider policy and regulation to be important considerations in 
their willingness to invest in P2B loans. These considerations are perceived to reduce the risks 
associated with P2B lending, particularly the regulated status of the platforms, indicating the 
presence of institutional-based trust produced by the platforms as intermediary mechanisms. 
 
!Frequency! Valid!Percent Cumulative!Percent
!Regulatory!Intervention!(e.g.!by!
FCA!or!government)!
!Strongly!Agree! 79!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 23% 23%
!Agree! 117!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 34% 56%
!Neutral! 108!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 31% 87%
!Disagree! 28!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 8% 95%
!Strongly!disagree! 17!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5% 100%
!Total! 349!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 100%
!Missing! 56!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!Total! 405!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!Access!to!the!Financial!
Ombudsman!
!Strongly!Agree! 70!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 20% 20%
!Agree! 98!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28% 48%
!Neutral! 131!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 38% 86%
!Disagree! 31!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 9% 95%
!Strongly!disagree! 18!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5% 100%
!Total! 348!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 100%
!Missing! 57!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!Total! 405!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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6.2 Variation in Forms of Trust Between Germany and the UK 
The analysis of indicators of trust discussed in section 6.1 revealed variation in the forms of 
trust present in the mini-bond and P2B lending channels, which is summarised in Table 6.14. 
In the mini-bond lending channel, there are different trust forms present in each market. The 
analysis focused on the unlisted segment of the mini-bond market to enable a direct 
comparison of trust forms between the two economies. Characteristic-based trust appeared to 
have a stronger presence in the German market while process-based trust was more dominant 
in the UK market. The development of the listed mini-bond market, unique to Germany, 
appears to have benefited from institutional-based trust which investors relied on.  There was 
little evidence of either process-based or characteristic-based trust forms present in the P2B 
lending channel in the UK. However, institutional-based trust produced by intermediary 
mechanisms such as regulation of the P2B lending platforms was relied on by investors. These 
differences are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
Table 6.15:  Trust Forms Present in P2B and Mini-bond Lending 
 
 
6.2.1 Comparison of Process-Based Trust 
There are distinct differences in the types of firms that had issued mini-bonds in the UK versus 
Germany. A summary of the UK mini-bond issues completed since 2009 is contained in 
Appendix 10, and all of the UK issuers are either a consumer-facing business or in the business 
of producing renewable energy. Twenty of the twenty-eight UK issuers were engaged in 
consumer-facing business activities, and seventeen of them offered a ‘coupon bonus’ 
designed to provide an additional reward to investors that were also customers of the issuers’ 
products and services.  As such, there was a very high proportion of investors that were also 
customers of these issuers as was illustrated by the analysis of the UK3 data. Possibly the 
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most-cited example of this UK trend was the ‘Burrito Bond’ issued by Chilango, a UK chain of 
Mexican restaurants, which gave its 700 mini-bond investors the right to redeem a coupon for 
a ‘free’ burrito every month during the lifetime of the bond.  
In contrast, the vast majority of both listed and unlisted mini-bonds issued in the German 
market were not consumer-facing business. Most were producers of industrial products in 
traditional industry sectors110, followed by renewable energy companies seeking funds for 
projects taking advantage of the generous feed-in tariffs designed to increase the production 
of renewable energy. As a result, few German investors had direct or indirect experience 
consuming the products or services of the mini-bond issuers. However, in the case of the G5 
issuer the analysis revealed that there was a relatively large proportion of investors that relied 
of referrals and recommendations about the bonds provided by prior investors in the bonds. 
This suggests that the reputation effect accumulating over the 35 bonds issued by G5 
produced process-based trust relied on by investors. 
6.2.2 Comparison of Characteristic-Based Trust 
The analysis of pre-existing social relations did not indicate the presence of characteristic-
based trust in the mini-bond or P2B lending channel in either country. There was local bias 
evident in the analysis of investor-borrower proximity in the German mini-bond channel but not 
in either the mini-bond or P2B lending channel in the UK market. Local bias could be an 
indicator of two potential sources of trust111 that could help investors overcome the information 
asymmetry they face in purchasing mini-bonds issued by a particular firm.  As mentioned 
previously, the presence of local bias suggests that investors in close proximity to an issuer 
could rely on the shared values and beliefs producing characteristic-based trust.  An alternative 
explanation is that investors in close proximity to the issuer have access to soft information 
about the firm and the informational advantage over investors living further away that is relied 
on, which is closer in association to process-based trust. The analysis of the geocoded address 
data for the German investors finds that the degree of bias is related to both the size and type 
of firm, with the largest bias for bonds issued by smaller Mittelstand firms that do not produce 
consumer products.  Only a very small proportion of the German investors responding to the 
survey indicated they had a direct or indirect connection to the issuer, which suggests that the 
local bias is more likely to be associated with characteristic-based trust rather than process-
based trust produced by direct or indirect experience transacting with the issuer.  
 
	110 While a higher proportion of German firms are in traditional industry sectors relative to UK firms, the proportion 
of mini-bond issuers was larger than the broader industry composition. 111 This follows Zaheer et al. (1998) in using the term organizational trust to describe the extent to which individuals 
trust an organization, and which depend, in part, on an expectation about the future behaviour of relevant actors 
within the relevant organisation.	
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6.2.3 Comparison of Institutional-Based Trust 
The comparative analysis of P2B lending data indicates the regulatory environment for P2B 
lending in the UK is a relatively strong source of institutional-based trust. It is trust produced 
by the regulation of the P2B platforms as intermediaries, rather than by the borrowers, that the 
investors relied on in making investments. As mentioned previously, the P2B platforms in the 
UK play an important role in selecting the investments on behalf of a growing number of P2B 
investors using automated investment allocation tools which de-couple the relationship 
between investors and borrowers. The analysis of mini-bond data did not identify sources of 
institutional-based trust for mini-bond lending.  
The indicators of institutional-based trust in Germany appear to be present in mini-bond lending 
and not P2B lending and firm-specific rather than intermediary related. The analysis of survey 
data indicates that German investors have greater trust in Mittelstand firms relative to other 
types of organisations.  The UK investors’ relative trust levels for SMEs is quite different, with 
lower trust in SMEs than coop banks and no statistically significant difference in the level of 
trust in SMEs relative to other types of organisations. 
In the context of Zucker’s conceptualisation of institutional-based firm-specific trust, the 
analysis suggests that a firm categorised as a ‘Mittelstand firm’ benefits from a form of trust 
credentialisation produced by shared cognition amongst Germans regarding the trustworthy 
attributes of Mittelstand firms. The following section investigates the foundations of this trust 
production. 
6.3 Micro-Foundations of Trust Production 
Chapter 5 concluded by suggesting that while the trajectories of mini-bond and P2B lending 
are broadly consistent with the Varieties of Capitalism framework, the framework lacks 
explanatory power because it fails to explain variation in the behavior of investors as a factor 
in the growth trajectories of each channel. This limitation does not detract from the predictive 
power of the VoC model, but rather reveals an opportunity to complement institutional analysis 
undertaken at the macro level with analysis of activity occurring at the micro level (Meyer & 
Jepperson, 2011; W. W. Powell & Rerup, 2013). This dissertation investigates the link between 
institutional arrangements at the macro level and individual behaviour at the micro level using 
a two-step process. First, the earlier part of this chapter discussed the dominant forms of trust 
present in each lending channel and how the relative strength of these forms varies between 
the two countries.  This section analyses the social relations that underlie the institutional 
structure in addressing the third research question of this dissertation: How do the social and 
institutional arrangements in the UK and Germany produce the forms of trust influencing the 
development of alternative lending channels? The third hypothesis asserts that particular 
social arrangements underlie the institutional structure of each country, and these are micro-
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foundations for the production of the different trust forms relied on by investors in the two 
countries.  
6.3.1 Social Arrangements as Micro-Foundations for Institutional-Based trust  
According to Zucker, the production of institutional-based trust involves the ‘reconstruction’ of 
locally-produced trust into a form of trust that is exterior to any given exchange and made 
repeatable by common understanding (Zucker, 1986:63). She describes firm-specific 
institutional trust as ‘…[resting] on membership in a sub-culture within which carefully 
delineated specific expectations are expected to hold, at least in some cases based on detailed 
prior socialization ((Parsons, 1951)’. Zucker describes a for-profit private hospital as an 
example of an organization having a societal role with a high level of ‘constitutive expectation’ 
producing institutional trust: in other words, there are commonly understood expectations 
within society about the behaviour and actions associated with ‘for-profit hospitals’ that are 
attributed to any organization with characteristics perceived to be sufficiently similar to the set 
of characteristics associated with a ‘for-profit hospital’. 
This dissertation argues that there are similar high levels of ‘constitutive expectation’ attributed 
to ‘the Mittelstand’ that produce a form of institutional-based trust relied on by German 
investors. The third research question explores the construction of this constitutive expectation 
by analyzing the ‘prior socialisation’ upon which this the commonly-shared expectation of 
Mittelstand firm behaviour is based. Chapter 2 discussed the difficulties associated with solely 
defining the Mittelstand in quantitative terms, and the relevance of defining it as a set of 
common values and operating principles. The reputation of the Mittelstand as a distinct sub-
culture of firms differentiated by Mittelstand values has been propagated globally.  An internet 
search for ‘Mittelstand’ returns more than 4 million results, many from non-German sources.  
British commentators seem particularly obsessed about the Mittelstand, with calls for the 
creation of a ‘British Mittelstand’ regularly appearing during periods of weak economic 
performance in the UK (Hutton, 1996). In 2011, even the Chancellor of the Exchequer called 
on UK businesses ‘to learn the lessons of the successful Mittelstand model’ (Dakers, 2017). 
The Chancellor failed to appreciate, however, that the Mittelstand model is embedded in a 
social context in Germany that is quite different from the UK, and therefore grafting the 
Mittelstand model from Germany onto UK social and institutional arrangements is unlikely to 
produce the economic benefits he expects. German Mittelstand firms are much more 
integrated into the national education and training system than UK firms, and therefore the 
German Mittelstand model is unlikely to take root in the UK without a radical change to the UK 
education and training system.  
A radical change to education and training in the UK, however, is a necessary but not yet 
sufficient condition for enabling a ‘British Mittelstand’ to flourish. There are other structural 
differences between the German and UK economies which impact on how firms behave, and 
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it is the interaction between firm behaviour and the observation of this behaviour that provides 
a micro-foundation for the production of trust in the German Mittelstand.  
6.3.1.1 Inter-firm Collaboration and Reputation 
Business systems scholars have argued that firms located in Germany need to engage in 
cooperative behaviour with other firms and institutions to solve their coordination problems.  
Inter-firm cooperation is high because German firms tend to be more reliant on sub-contracting, 
and therefore need to participate in collaborative technical development (Lane & Bachmann, 
1997). Collaboration is particularly critical to Mittelstand firms as a source of innovation. Prior 
research has found that the higher the family firm intensity in a particular region, the greater 
the innovation activity in that region as measured by patent filings. (Block & Spiegel, 2011). 
German firms support apprenticeships without poaching apprentices in order to ensure that 
the training system can support the future needs of all firms within an industry sector. Hence 
firms are motivated to act trustworthy in these networks of relationships because the cost of 
malfeasance is high: 
Reputation is a key factor: where membership in a network is of continuing value, 
the participants will be deterred from providing false information lest their reputation 
in the network and access to it suffer. CMEs usually have extensive systems for 
what might be termed ‘network reputational monitoring’…  
(Hall & Soskice, 2001:23) 
6.3.1.2 Spatial Distribution and Mobility 
A larger proportion of British workers than German workers move to take another job 
(Dustmann & Pereira, 2008).  The German mini-bond investors surveyed have reported living 
in their current place of residence for 28 years on average, which is consistent with other data 
regarding the relative immobility of Germans, and despite the comparatively lower level of 
home ownership in Germany. By comparison, the UK mini-bond investors surveyed, similar in 
age to the German survey respondents, had lived in their current place of residence for an 
average of 20 years. 
The spatial distribution of economic activity in Germany has reinforced disincentives for both 
workers and firms to relocate. Also, the federal education system is organised and governed 
at the level of the 16 regional states, and there are significant differences between the 
curriculums that can be a disincentive for families with school-age children to move between 
regions.  
The low concentration of economic activity may be partly attributed to the process of new 
business formation in Germany. Prior researchers studying the Mittelstand have found that 
family owners were more likely to grow up in the region in which their firm is located, and 
therefore to have stronger ties to their local communities than other types of owners (Block & 
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Spiegel, 2011). The institutional arrangements in Germany at the political level also reinforce 
the broad distribution of economic activity. Germany has a more decentralised federal system 
of government than the UK, with 16 federal regions having a high level of autonomy in politically 
governing and determining economic policy.  The six regional financial exchanges in Germany 
are as good illustration of this autonomous governance, with each region separately 
responsible for the regulatory oversight of the exchange located in its region. By contrast, the 
UK has struggled for decades with a north-south divide in economic activity levels, which has 
resulted in a steady migration of the population from the north to the south east of England 
where economic activity is concentrated in search of employment opportunities (Gardiner, 
Martin, Sunley, & Tyler, 2013).  
This level of immobility combined with more distributed economic activity influence the strength 
of social sanctions within local communities that punish malfeasance by Mittelstand owners.  
Local investors aware of these social sanctions are more confident that Mittelstand owners are 
likely to act in ways that avoid these sanctions, including defaulting on a repayment obligation 
to local bonds investors. As Portes (1994, p. 430) argues, “Trust in informal exchanges is 
generated by both shared identities and feelings and by the expectation that fraudulent actions 
will be penalized by the exclusion of the violator from key social networks.”  
A conceptual model of the structural process described above is illustrated in Figure 6.15. The 
central tenets of this model are: (i) normative Mittelstand behaviour is trustworthy because 
these firms are highly dependent on accessing inter-firm collaborations to function and not face 
exclusionary sanctions for malfeasance; (ii) social sanctions are strong as a result of labour 
and firm immobility produced by deep divisions of labor and specialization; (iii) the vocational 
education and training (VET) system is a platform which enables ‘prior socialisation’ through 
observation of trustworthy behaviour at close proximity for an extended period of time.  It is 
this combination of elements which forms the ‘constitutive expectation’ of Mittelstand behaviour 
commonly shared by Germans. The VET systems of Germany and the UK were described in 
Section 2.2.2.1 of Chapter 2, and the socialisation role it plays in the German economy is 
discussed in the following section. This is then followed by a discussion of the role that 
categorisation processes have played as a micro-foundation of trust production. 
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Figure 6.15: Structure Supporting Mittelstand Trust Production  
6.3.1.3 Socialisation via Vocational Education and Training  
The much higher level of participation in and length of apprenticeships in Germany produces 
a high level of familiarity with the culture and business practices of Mittelstand firms amongst 
a large proportion of the German population. The German VET system has also been a factor 
in Germany causing lower internal migration levels relative to the UK. German workers have 
not been incentivised to change employers in order to advance their careers and increase 
earning because the most rapid advancement opportunities have historically been with the 
current employer where tenure and experience with the same firm is highly valued (Dustmann 
& Pereira, 2008) 
The analysis of the German mini-bond survey and interview data supports the argument that 
the education and training system has been a socialisation platform reinforcing the constitutive 
expectation for the behaviour of Mittelstand firms. First, the education profile of German versus 
UK investors reflects the broad role played by the apprenticeship system in the German 
economy:  63% of the G5 investors and 87% of UK3 investors had a university qualification, 
suggesting a higher proportion of the former received apprenticeship training in a small firm. 
Second, more than 80% of the German interviewees stated they had been directly engaged 
with Mittelstand firms during their training or working life as either apprenticeship trainees, 
workers, owners of Mittelstand firms, or as suppliers, customers, consultants or bankers.  Of 
those investors having engaged with Mittelstand firms, 4 out of 5 stated that the interaction had 
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left them with a positive impression of Mittelstand firms generally, and felt this was a factor in 
their decision to invest in mini-bonds.  
6.3.2 Categorisation as a Micro-Foundation of Trust Production 
This dissertation argues that the education and training system combined with the structure of 
economic activity in Germany produces a form of institutional-based trust that results in the 
Mittelstand being perceived by German mini-bond investors as a trustworthy category of firms. 
A similar structure for trust production associated with a category is not present in the UK. 
While UK mini-bond investors believed the mini-bonds they invested in were issued by firms 
they perceived to be trustworthy, the analysis indicates the dominant trust form influencing UK 
mini-bond lending is either process-based or characteristic-based trust rather than institutional-
based trust.  
Prior research undertaken by Ezra Zuckerman has highlighted the important role played by 
categorisation as a social factor influencing the behaviour of investors regarding the valuation 
and trading of financial instruments (Zuckerman, 1999, 2004, 2012). Zuckerman argues that 
firms are social objects subject to a classification process that confers legitimacy via a 
classification system. The concept of the categorical imperative in institutional analysis 
describes the tendency of organisations to converge in their behaviour and form to fit within 
categorisations viewed as legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Zuckerman’s contribution was 
to empirically test this conceptualisation in capital markets, where he concluded that the stock 
price of firms that could not be clearly associated within a defined category within an accepted 
taxonomy produced a discount relative to its theoretical value (the illegitimacy discount) 
(Zuckerman, 1999). Zuckerman points out that allocating firms to categories, typically 
undertaken by stock analysts in case of listed stocks, is also a social process because the 
characteristics of all firms classed as belonging to a given category will not match the ideal 
type attribute set of that category (Zuckerman, 2004:413).  Once classified however, the 
attribute set associated with a category are generalised to all firms seen as belonging to that 
category. 
This dissertation builds on the theoretical work of Zuckerman to suggest that mini-bond issuers 
considered to be part of the ‘Mittelstand’ enjoy a legitimacy premium because the trustworthy 
attributes associated with the Mittelstand as a category are attributed to all of its member 
regardless of whether this accurately reflects the actual trustworthiness of each firm. The 
analysis of German mini-bond investors data supports this view. When asked about the criteria 
used to define a Mittelstand company, most of the interviewees cited a broad range of positive 
values-based criteria that including ‘responsibility’, ‘long-term orientation’, ‘innovation’, or 
‘family ownership’ and explicitly excluded quantitative criteria such as ‘turnover’ or ‘number of 
employees’. Despite the varied criteria for defining a Mittelstand firm, 14 of the 17 respondents 
classified PCCSE, the firm issuing the bonds they had invested in, as a Mittelstand firm.  
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The legitimacy premium associated with Mittelstand result is that the price paid for mini-bonds 
issued by a Mittelstand firm is on average greater than the price which accurately reflects risk 
of non-repayment. This is not to say that the legitimacy premium is unwarranted in all cases, 
but rather that the bonds issued by a majority of mini-bond issuer are likely to priced higher 
than they should be because these firms undeservedly benefit from an attribution of 
characteristics that are more positive than the actual attributes of the firms.  This does not 
mean that the firms will not repay their loans, rather that a larger-than-anticipated number of 
these borrowers can be expected to default on repayment. 
6.3.3 Miscategorisation and the Dark Side of Trust 
The legitimacy premium is a plausible explanation for the unexpectedly high default rate of 
bonds listed on the Mittelstand bond segments of the regional financial exchanges discussed 
in Chapter 2. The wave of defaults had exceeded 20% of all listed Mittelstand bonds by mid-
2014, which was two to three times the default rate an investor would reasonably expect given 
the average interest coupon of about 7% on the defaulting bonds. Upon closer examination, 
however, many of the defaulting listed bond issuers were either real estate investment 
companies or alternative energy companies which had few, if any, of the attributes defining a 
Mittelstand firm as stated by the mini-bond investors interviewed for this research project.  The 
regional exchanges were quick to establish mini-bond listing segments with titles evoking a 
connection to Mittelstand companies, such as the Mittelstandsmarkt on the Dusseldorf 
exchange, Bond-M on the Stuttgart exchange and Hamburg launching the Mittlestandboerse. 
The listing criteria developed by the exchange operators, however, consisted entirely of 
quantitative criteria that were completely unrelated to the qualitative criteria cited as attributes 
of a Mittelstand firm by the interviewees for this research project.   
Zuckerman discusses the role played by intermediaries, such as stock analysts, as causal 
agents in placing issuing firms into industry categories and thereby influencing the 
classification of that firm by investors (Zuckerman, 2004:415). The regional exchanges in 
Germany may have played a similar role in legitimising the association of the firms listed in 
their Mittelstand bond segments with the attributes of Mittelstand firms more generally.  The 
lack of coherence between Mittelstand values and listing criteria also introduced a moral 
hazard problem because the advisors, rating agencies and other actors standing to benefit 
from a successful listing were financially incentivised to reinforce the misattribution of 
‘Mittelstand values’.  
The misattribution of trust-producing values to listed mini-bond issuers is an example of the 
detrimental outcomes produced by excessive trust, which Gargiulo and Ertung describe as ‘the 
dark side of trust’ (Gargiulo & Gokhan, 2006). They argue that trust is a double-edged sword; 
while it can bring benefits by reducing the need for information gathering and monitoring, or 
even blind faith in the extreme, a reduction in monitoring also increases the risk of 
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malfeasance. In the case of the listed mini-bonds in Germany, the profile data for mini-bond 
survey respondents indicates that most mini-bond investors are private individuals with a 
relatively limited level of financial sophistication who could have been expected to assume that 
the acceptance of the mini-bond listing into the Mittelstand segment served to substitute for 
much of the due diligence that would have been undertaken by a prudent investor.  
 
This chapter investigated trust as a factor influencing development of mini-bond and P2B 
lending channels in the Germany and the UK following the financial crisis. The analysis 
followed Lynne Zucker’s framework for identifying different sources of trust production using 
variables contained in the primary data set. The analysis revealed different forms of trust relied 
on by investors in each of the two channels, with the forms of trust varying between the two 
countries. The analysis found that mini-bond investors in the UK relied on a form of process-
based trust influenced by their consumption of the issuer’s product or service, while German 
mini-bond investors were more reliant on characteristic-based and institutional forms of trust 
produced by identification with issuers associated with ‘Mittelstand firms’ as a trusted type of 
firm. In the UK P2B lending channel, the analysis indicates that the intermediation of P2B 
platforms de-couples the relationship between investors and borrowers with the result that the 
primary object of trust is the P2B platform rather than borrowers. Therefore, UK P2B investors 
appear to rely on the regulatory framework governing the activities of the platforms as an 
important source of trust. The final section of the chapter concluded with an examination of the 
variation of social and institutional arrangements that are foundations for the different forms of 
trust production observed in the prior analysis. It compared the vocational education and 
training (VET) systems of Germany and the UK, and highlighted how unique aspects of the 
German VET system have contributed to establishing Mittelstand firms as a trusted type of 
organisation that is unique to Germany112. The concluding chapter follows with a summary of 
the research findings and contribution of the research to academic literature, policy-making 
and industry practice. 
  
	112 There are firms similar to German Mittelstand firms in Austria and some pockets of Northern Italy. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to investigate the role of trust in the development of alternative lending 
practices in Germany and the UK following the global financial crisis of 2008. It comparatively 
analyses two non-bank lending channels that small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) in the two 
economies turned to in response to traditional bank lenders reducing their lending activities as 
a result of the crisis. The two forms of lending, mini-bonds and Peer-to-Business (P2B) lending, 
are an intriguing case study of lending practices because the funding for the loans made to the 
firms is provided by individuals rather than institutional investors. The project incorporated a 
nested mixed methods research design to comparatively examine factors influencing the 
development of the channels in each economy at both the macro institutional level and the 
micro level of groups of individual investors providing the funding for the loans. Analysing the 
investments of individuals in non-traditional forms of financing provided a rare opportunity to 
examine the relationship between firms and individuals in the communities in which these firms 
are embedded, and was made possible by the collection of large data sets of primary 
transaction, survey and interview data. 
This concluding chapter summarises the findings answering the three research questions 
aimed at understanding how and why these channels developed in the two economies and 
highlights the contribution and implication of the findings for the academy, policy-makers and 
industry practitioners. It also discusses the limitations of the analysis and proposes directions 
for future research regarding cross-national finance practices and the financing of firms. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
Finding 1: The development of mini-bond and P2B lending has evolved very differently in 
Germany and the UK following the global financial crisis. 
The first research question sought to identify the patterns of development of the two alternative 
lending channels in the UK and Germany following the financial crisis. The analysis tested the 
validity of the hypothesis that the trajectories of development for the two channels varied 
between the two countries. 
The analysis examined the data collected from mini-bond issuers and P2B lending platforms 
to identify the lending volume characteristics of each channel from 2009 to 2015. Overall, mini-
bond lending totalled approximately €8.2 billion, which was 3.5 times greater than P2B lending 
volume of €2.35 billion during the same time period. These volumes are arguably 
inconsequential when compared to lending by banks given the combined volume of mini-bond 
and P2B lending represents less than 1% of lending by banks to SMEs between 2009 and 
2015. However, there was significant variation in their trajectories of development, with each 
channel being the dominant form lending in one of the two economies. Mini-bond lending was 
dominant in Germany with more than 97% of the total mini-bond lending volume, or about 30 
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times greater than the mini-bond lending volume in the UK. P2B lending was the mirror image 
of mini-bond lending, with more than 98% of P2B lending volume taking place in the UK, or 
about 40 times greater than the P2B lending volume in Germany. While mini-bond lending in 
Germany and P2B lending in the UK was used by firms in a wide range of industry sectors to 
obtain funding, mini-bond issuers in the UK were disproportionately issued by firms engaged 
in consumer-facing activities.  Many of the UK mini-bond issuers used the bonds as a form of 
consumer promotion and offered ‘coupon bonuses’ to investors in the form of discounts on the 
issuer’s products and services. 
The analysis also revealed significant variation in the rate of growth for each channel in the 
2009 to 2015 period. Mini-bond lending volume grew much faster than P2B lending volume 
until 2014 when the pattern reversed and P2B lending overtook mini-bond lending as the rate 
of P2B volume growth in the UK accelerated while the German mini-bond market collapsed. 
By 2015, annual P2B lending volume in the UK was estimated to represent approximately 12% 
of bank lending to SMEs for loans of less than £1 million.  
Finding 2: The trajectories of development for the two lending channels are congruent with the 
Varieties of Capitalism thesis. 
The first hypothesis proposed that the variation in the development of the channels between 
the two economies fit the propositions of the Varieties of Capitalism model. The VoC model 
was selected for macro-level comparative analysis because the Germany and UK economies 
are considered by VoC scholars to be highly representative of the ideal type coordinated 
market economy (CME) and liberal market economy (LME) depicting variation in the 
institutional arrangements across national economies. 
The analysis found the development trajectories of the channels was consistent with the 
fundamental propositions of the VoC thesis. First, there was evidence of that the institutional 
arrangements in each economy offered greater institutional support for mini-bond lending in 
Germany and P2B lending in the UK. The policies introduced by Germany to stimulate SME 
growth following the crisis channelled the stimulus funding through the incumbent banking 
system. In contrast, the UK elected to reconfigure the ‘plumbing’ of SME lending flows by 
creating a new national development bank focused on supporting SME via financing schemes 
independent of the incumbent bank lenders.  The addition of ‘promoting competition in financial 
services’ to the UK regulator’s mandate in 2013 provided explicit support for the introduction 
of a regulatory framework for P2B lending with a compliance burden much below that of full-
service bank lenders. In Germany, the insistence that the P2B lending be shoehorned into the 
existing regulatory framework, with the result that P2B platforms were forced to adopt business 
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models that used a ‘regulated credit institution’ to make the loan to a borrower113. As a result, 
UK P2B lending has a single level of intermediation while Germany is a two-level 
intermediation model with both the platform and an incumbent bank performing intermediation 
functions. 
Second, the analysis suggests that mini-bond lending, at least in the German market, is a 
source of patient capital to non-financial firms114. The supply of patient capital to firms located 
in CMEs is a core tenant of VoC proposition that distinguishes the dominance of relationship-
oriented bank lending in CMEs versus more transaction-oriented market-based lending in 
LMEs. Patient capital facilitates long-term investment by firms and therefore the tenor of the 
capital also needs to be long term. In effect, evidence of the long-term supply of funding by a 
lending channel is a litmus test of fit within a CME financial system. While the average duration 
of the loan facility is not significantly different for German SMEs versus UK SMEs versus, the 
duration of the relationship between German SMEs and their Hausbank is longer. This 
facilitates repeat lending by the Hausbank, and thus SME borrowers in Germany make long 
term investments that are reliant on the continual renewal of their loan facilities. The data set 
provided by the G5 mini-bond issuer contained the details of investments made by individuals 
in 35 bonds issues over an eleven-year period.  The analysis found strong evidence of repeat 
lending behaviour with repeat investors funding accounting for 84% % of the €342.6 million 
raised via mini-bond issuance by G5 during the period. A characteristic defining patient capital 
is its continued availability independent of short-term market and firm-specific events that 
typically reduce the availability of capital from market-based funders. In the case of G5, repeat 
investors supplied more than 95% of the funding it obtained from its two mini-bonds issued in 
2008 and 2009.  
In contrast, the analysis revealed a low level of repeat lending by P2B investors in the UK 
market, and finding consistent with the market-based supply of funding to firms in LMEs. The 
intermediating role of P2B lending planforms increases the social distance between investors 
and borrowers, and over time an increasingly large proportion of P2B investors opted to use 
auto-selection tools designed to randomly allocate loan investments to their portfolios. The 
P2B platforms have thus evolved to control the P2B lending to firms. The revenue of the 
platforms is dependent on lending volume, and the analysis revealed that the financial 
performance of the platforms’ loans is a critically important factor in attracting and retaining 
investors. The incentive structure and investor motivations in P2B lending are not conducive 
	113 Similar ‘fronting bank’ structures for P2B lending are required in other markets, including the US.  The impact 
on German platforms has been more significant, however, as they have had greater difficulty than US platforms in 
getting to scale and thereby reducing the additional cost introduced by the intermediation of a fronting bank. 114 As distinguished from financial firms which are typically regulated entities operating in the banking and capital 
markets system of economies.  The types and uses of financing by financial versus non-financial firms is quite 
different.  
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to suppling patient capital, which suggests that P2B is a market-based form of lending and its 
dominance relative to mini-bond lending is consistent with the VoC thesis. 
Finding 3: The prospect of institutional change to SME lending practices is uncertain in both 
economies, but is likely to be more significant in the UK than in Germany. 
The financial crisis that occurred in 2008 was a shock of the type and magnitude that leads to 
institutional change accordingly to the institutional change literature. While there have 
arguably115 been a number of changes to institutions in national financial systems since the 
crisis, this dissertation is only interested in change to the financing practices of SMEs, 
particularly with respect to the lending practices of incumbent bank lenders. This is a more 
gradual process of change that is reflected Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) conceptualization of 
institutional change and their categorisations of the change process were used in the analysis. 
In this context, there has been relatively little change observed in the lending practices of 
German banks and the analysis suggests that the status quo is likely to continue. P2B lending 
volumes in Germany have been inconsequential for the banks, and the decline of the listed 
mini-bond market in Germany effectively eliminated the potential threat of the regional stock 
exchanges becoming a significant source of SME funding. The impact of P2B lending as a 
catalyst for SME lending practices in the UK market has been more substantial.  The 
institutional arrangements in the UK supporting P2B lending have played an important role in 
signaling to the banks that these platforms, despite having relatively insignificant lending 
volumes at the outset, are not going to disappear.  The platforms are institutional entrepreneurs 
playing the role of change agents, unencumbered by the structural impediments to change 
because they emerged from outside the incumbent system. The more fundamental question 
is how the platforms will challenge institutional practices over time if they become large 
businesses and list their shares or seek regulatory authorisation to engage in broader asset 
management or banking services. The findings suggest that this is likely to be a process that 
involves more than one type of institutional change occurring, both contemporaneously and 
sequentially, over the course of time. 
Finding 4: The modes of trust production relied on by investors vary between the economies. 
The second research question considered whether variation in the types of trust relied on by 
investors could explain the observed variation in the development of alternative lending 
channel development in each country. The hypothesis proposed that the investors providing 
the funding for loans rely on their perceptions of trustworthiness to avoid funding loans that will 
not be repaid, and the forms of trust underpinning these perceptions are different for investors 	115 Whether institutional change in financial systems has really occurred is debatable. While policy and regulatory 
changes caused actors in the system to change behaviours, it can be argued that there has been little structural 
change to the financial system as a result of the crisis that has been sustained over time. To the extent that change 
is occurring it a result of other factors such as technological change. 
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in each channel.  Furthermore, the hypothesis states that these forms are produced by different 
sources in Germany and the UK. 
The analysis followed Lynn Zucker’s approach of indirectly identifying the presence of trust 
production using a set of proxy variables contained in the primary data sets collected for the 
project. The production of process-based trust was indicated by investors’ experience 
consuming the borrowers’ product or services, or communication with a third party with 
consumption experience, prior to investing. Process-based trust was present in mini-bond 
lending as a result of direct experience in the UK and indirect experience in Germany, with the 
latter limited to the reputation of the G5 issuer communicated to investors in its previously 
issued bonds. The production of characteristic-based trust was indicated by the presence of 
proxies representing investors’ familiarity with the values of borrowers. Social homophily was 
the theoretical context adopted for selecting the pre-existing social relations between investors 
and borrowers and the geographic proximity of investors to borrowers as proxies for familiarity. 
The analysis of investor-borrower proximity data indicated that characteristic-based trust was 
only present in mini-bond lending in Germany, and there was a relatively strong relationship 
between investor-borrower proximity with closer investor-borrower proximity for smaller firms 
producing industrial products. The analysis of characteristic-based trust also extended the prior 
analysis of repeat lending behaviour by investors to reveal a relationship between investor-
borrower proximity and repeat lending behaviour of the G5 investors, with the G5 investors 
making more repeat investments the closer they live to G5. 
The presence of the third mode of trust production, institutional-based trust, involved analysing 
the credentials in the form of regulatory authorisations for both the borrowers and the 
intermediaries in each lending channel. Regulatory authorisation as a form of credentialisation 
appeared to be a relatively strong form of trust production for the regulated intermediaries in 
the mini-bond channel in Germany (the regional financial exchanges) and the P2B lending 
platforms in the UK. Regulatory credentialisation of the borrowers themselves did not appear 
to produce trust, as P2B lenders required no such authorisation and regulatory authorisation 
obtained by mini-bond lenders in both countries was largely disregarded as a factor in the 
decision to invest in a bond. However, the analysis suggests that the qualification of German 
mini-bond issuers as being a member of the ‘Mittelstand’ category of firms is important to 
investors because this category of firm unique to German-speaking Europe is more trusted 
than other types of firms. 
Finding 5: Variation in social arrangements support different forms of trust production in each 
economy 
The third research question investigated the social and institutional arrangements specific to 
the two economies that are foundations for the production of the trust forms relied on by 
investors in the alternative lending channels. The analysis tested the hypothesis that different 
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sets of arrangements produce different forms of trust, and the variation in these arrangements 
in Germany versus the UK is a factor explaining the variance in the presence of trust form 
between the two countries. The analysis examined the social arrangements associated with 
the Vocational Education and Training System (VET) of each economy. The findings suggest 
that the arrangements in Germany, in combinations with other structural differences between 
the two economies, contributed to the production of institutional-based trust in the Mittelstand 
as a category of firms unique to Germany. The German VET system appears to facilitate a 
socialisation process that embeds Mittelstand firm more deeply in German society than SMEs 
in UK society. However, the analysis also revealed a high level of listed mini-bond defaults in 
Germany, which indicates that the Mittelstand as a category may be over-valued by Germans, 
with the result that listed mini-bond investors over-relied on this form of institutional-based trust 
in assessing listed mini-bond issuers. 
7.2 Contribution of the Research Project  
This dissertations research project makes several methodological, empirical and theoretical 
contributions to the academic literature, and the empirical findings also have implications for 
both policy-making and industry practice. These contributions are discussed in the following 
section. 
7.2.1 Contribution to Academic Literature 
7.2.1.1 Methodological Contribution 
The research design used in this empirical research project makes three inter-related 
methodological contributions to the academic literature. First, the project collected sets of 
primary data that are larger and more comprehensive than the primary data sets used in 
previous empirical studies of cross-national finance practices in the comparative 
institutionalism or sociology of finance literatures. Prior studies of cross-national finance 
practices have undertaken analysis at either the macro or the micro level using either 
secondary source aggregated macro-level data or primary data collected from relatively small-
scale surveys or interviews. The collection of larger, more granular data sets provides a level 
of statistical significance for the findings which allows for generalisation of findings beyond the 
scope of studies using smaller samples of primary data. 
Second, the methodological approach is empirical at both the macro and micro level of analysis 
using a research design that incorporated a nested mixed methods approach for the collection 
and analysis of the data sets. The 70 interviews with investors were nested within 1,311 survey 
respondents which were nested within transaction data sets containing more than 9 million 
investments made by individual investors in almost 30,000 loans to SMEs in the UK and 
Germany. The analysis of multiple data at multiple levels of analysis offers the opportunity for 
deeper insights than can be easily observed otherwise and thereby strengthens the validity of 
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the findings. A tangible example of this insight is the relationship between word-of-mouth 
communication amongst the G5 mini-bond investors and their investing behaviour. Analysis of 
the transaction data revealed a high proportion of repeat investments during the sample period, 
and the surveys revealed a high level of G5 investor recommendations directly related to the 
amount of time they owned the bond. The interviews revealed that investors waited until they 
had gained experience as mini-bond holders before recommending the investment to avoid 
damaging their personal relationships.  Assessing the scale and relative strength of word-of-
mouth recommendations as an indicator of process-based trust would have been more 
speculative with only one of these three levels of data analysis. 
Third, the ‘2 x 2’ research design comparing two finance channels across two economies is 
novel in studying finance practices. First, it recognises that alternative forms of financing for 
firms can emerge in response to dysfunction in the financial systems of developed economies, 
which extends the prior literature focused on investigating alternative finance in the context of 
developing economies116.  Second, it examines individuals as lenders to small firms, versus 
prior research focusing on corporate actors such as banks or other corporate actors as small 
business lenders. Third, it comparatively analyses lending practices between channel types 
(direct versus intermediated) across two national economies (the UK versus Germany). These 
differentiating features of the research design provides a more granular view than prior 
literature comparing the financing practices of firms in the context of the ‘bank-based’ or 
‘market-based’ funding channels for firms in the comparative capitalism literature.  
7.2.1.2 Empirical Contribution 
The more granular analysis enabled by the methodological approach has yielded empirical 
finding that contribute to both the sociology of finance (SoF) and the comparative capitalism 
literatures. Examining the finance practices of groups of individuals acting for their own account 
is novel in the context of the literature. Sociology of finance scholars have studied the practices 
of individuals acting either in a professional capacity engaged in capital markets activities (e.g. 
derivatives trading) or as individual consumer of financial products and services (e.g. credit 
card usage). Examining individuals investing making loans to SMEs is an important 
contribution to the SoF literature because it provides unique insight into how the social 
embeddedness of firms can influence firms’ access to finance. Ultimately, the willingness of 
individuals to provide funding is a litmus test of the perceived trustworthiness of firms within 
their communities. 
	116 A few studies of individual investors in one non-bank channel in one have been previously undertaken for the 
listed mini-bond market in Germany (see Lin & Viswanathan, 2013) and P2P lending in the US market (see Mietzner, 
Proelss, & Schweizer, 2017). 	
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There is a growing body of comparative capitalism literature, including the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature, which investigates the variation in the supply and form of patient 
capital across economies. Patient capital has emerged as a contested topic among scholars 
debating both its definition and its merits (Deeg et al., 2016) This research project informs the 
understanding of patient capital in several respects.  First, it contributes greater understanding 
regarding the forms of patient capital. The finding clearly demonstrated that loan-based patient 
capital is a form of long-term financing for firms, with G5 investors in Germany suppling debt 
to the firm for an average of 12 years. Second, no prior research investigating the supply of 
patient capital has considered individual investors as a source. This is somewhat ironic given 
it is the funds deposited by individuals in bank accounts in the local Sparkassen and 
Volksbanken which are used to supply loan-based patient capital to Mittelstand firms in 
Germany.  
Third, much of the literature referencing patient capital until relatively recently has viewed the 
supply of patient capital through the bank-based versus market-based economy lens, working 
on the assumption that it is present in the former but not in the latter. The findings of this 
research suggest that the supply of patient capital is available to firms in both types of 
economies, with the necessary condition being a direct (non-intermediated) relationship 
between the funders and recipient firms. This finding is consistent with the observation made 
by the editors of a Special Issue of Socio-Economic Review in 2016, who argued that scholars 
engaged in research exploring patient capital need to avoid assuming the simple bank-based 
versus market-based dichotomy regarding the supply of patient capital. However, the findings 
of this research project also highlight the influence of the institutional environment and the role 
played by intermediation influences the relative amount of patient capital supplied in each type 
of economy. While the mini-bond investors in both markets appeared to be sources of patient 
capital, the institutional environment was more conducive to the mini-bond channel in 
Germany. intermediation structures like the P2B lending platforms studied in this project are a 
source of institutional trust relied on by investors, they also have incentive structures that 
encourage transactional lending rather than relational lending.  
The research findings also make an empirical contribution to the understanding of comparative 
advantage of national economies in the comparative capitalism literature. In the context of this 
research project, the findings suggest that trust can be a comparative advantage for firms in 
both types of economies. The obvious case for comparative advantage is the Mittelstand firms 
in Germany, where the higher level of perceived trustworthiness appears to provide these firms 
with greater access to patient capital than is available to UK firms. My findings are congruent 
with the argument of Barney and Hansen that the transaction cost efficiencies gained by strong 
trust relations are as economically valuable to a firm as any other asset that produces a costs 
advantage (Barney and Hansen, 1994). In Barney and Hansen’s conceptualisation of trust 
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forms, strong trust provides sustainable advantage because it is very difficult to duplicate. They 
describe it as ‘exogenous to a particular exchange structure…but rather, reflects the values, 
principles, and standards that…may reflect an exchange partner’s unique history, its culture, 
or the personal beliefs of critical individuals associated with it’ (Barney & Hansen, 1994:179). 
The findings of this thesis lend support to their conclusions. 
While conceptually appealing, Barney and Hansen’s paper is theoretical, and they provide no 
empirical evidence supporting their proposition. The findings of this dissertation research make 
an empirical contribution supporting Barney and Hansen’s claim: the institutional and social 
arrangements contributing to the production of trust in Mittelstand firms are unique to Germany 
and difficult for other economies to duplicate, thereby providing Mittelstand firms with a 
sustainable comparative advantage relative to firms located in other economies. In contrast to 
Germany, SMEs in the UK have greater access to P2B lending which potentially also provides 
these firms with comparative advantage. The research findings reveal that P2B lending is 
growing rapidly partly as a result of institutional arrangements that are particular to the UK. 
The growing proportion of P2B loan funding provided by institutional investors introduces the 
possibility that it could become large enough to become a viable alternative to the incumbent 
bank lending system and be a catalyst for institutional change in the UK banking system for 
the benefit of SME borrowers. 
7.2.1.3 Theoretical Contribution 
In the period immediately following the 2008 financial crisis, many developed economies 
experienced a confluence of developments that tested the strength of their institutions. In 
effect, the crisis stress-tested the relationships between actors in the financial system and 
created a fertile environment supporting the emergence of alternative channels of finance. The 
heightened uncertainty produced by this institutional stress in combination with the emergence 
of digital transformation provides a rich context for the study of both trust and socio-economic 
institutions in the economy. As such, the analysis of investors behaviour and the alternative 
lending channels that emerged during this unique period offers a number of theoretical insights 
relevant to both the Varieties of Capitalism and trust literatures.  
Theoretical Contribution to the Trust Literature 
This dissertation makes three fundamental contributions to the theoretical discussions in the 
trust literature.  First, it informs the conceptualisation of trust by shedding light on the 
relationship between categorisation, legitimacy and trust. Second, it contributes new insight 
regarding the context of trust antecedents, particularly under conditions of uncertainty. Third, 
it highlights the increasing influence of intermediaries in trust relations as the digitalisation of 
the economy enables new business models and organisational forms. 
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Categorisation, Legitimacy and Trust 
Contemporary trust scholars recognise there are a number of issues regarding the 
conceptualisation of trust and related concepts that need further elaboration (Six & Verhoest, 
2017). While there is a relatively large body of literature discussing categorisation, legitimacy, 
and trust as separate and distinct concepts, some scholars have built on this work to clarify 
the distinction between pairs of trust-related concepts like legitimacy and reputation 
(Deephouse & Carter, 2005). However there remains an insufficient understanding regarding 
the relationship of these concepts to the conceptualisation of trust, in particular the relationship 
between legitimacy and trust.  
One outcome of this gap in the literature is the conflation of trust-related concepts like 
legitimacy with trustworthiness, particularly in the sociological literature (e.g. Fedina et al. 
2019). The research findings in this dissertation suggest that these concepts, while inter-
related, are conceptually distinct. The analysis suggests that trustors engage in a classification 
process to determine whether a potential counterparty belongs to a category associated with 
trustworthy attributes and, if so, this association confers legitimacy regarding trustworthy 
attributes onto the counterparty.  
This distinction between classification as a process and the resulting legitimacy as an 
antecedent of trust is clearly illustrated in the case of the behaviour of the German mini-bond 
investors prior to investing. These investors assigned a set of normative attributes to the 
Mittelstand as a category which they believed were shared by all firms deemed to belong to 
that category. At the same time, normative Mittelstand behaviour is perceived as trustworthy, 
and therefore a firm classified by investors as a Mittelstand firm benefits from the legitimacy of 
that association since investors assume it will likely act in the same in the same trustworthy 
manner. In the context of finance, this can be conceptualised as a legitimacy premium given it 
is a tangible benefit to Mittelstand firms in the form of better access of financing than enjoyed 
by non Mittelstand firms. 
Temporal Context of Trust Antecedents 
Within the trust literature there is a limited understanding of how context influences the 
functioning of trust, particularly the antecedents present in specific situations (Searle, 
Nienaber, & Sitkin, 2018). Some developments occurring during the period studied in this 
dissertation were idiosyncratic responses to the severity of the economic shock, including 
policy actions and regulatory reform that provided an opening for alternative channel 
development, particularly in the UK market. At the same time, there was an erosion in the level 
of perceived trustworthiness of the actors in the traditional financial system. These 
developments in combination created a high level of uncertainty in the economy for both 
investors and firms seeking financing. 
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The findings suggest that it is unlikely that individuals in either the UK or Germany would have 
been willing to risk investing their funds in alternative lending channels if either the actors in 
these channels were unregulated or the actors in the traditional system were highly trusted. 
The findings of this dissertation suggest that there is an inter-relationship between trust 
antecedents which can be temporal in nature, thereby facilitating trust relationships that may 
not have been established otherwise. The findings also suggest that the relative level of 
trustworthiness of substitutes is an important antecedent for trust. 
Intermediary Trust Relations in the Digital Economy 
In addition to the introduction of regulatory reforms and the erosion of trust in the period 
following the financial crisis, there occurred technological developments with the potential to 
create long term structural change in the financial system. These developments are effectively 
digitalising economic activity with the potential to enable more distributed and decentralised 
infrastructure for the transfer of value in the financial system. Technologies facilitating 
decentralised and distributed value exchange, such as blockchain systems, have been 
heralded by some scholars as ‘trustless’ systems which eliminate the need for trusted 3rd party 
intermediaries (Pilkington, 2016). 
The impact on trust relations associated with the digitalisation of the economy has important 
implications for the organisation of economic activity yet remains relatively understudied by 
trust scholars. The P2B lending platforms analysed in this dissertation are one example of the 
digital platform business models and organisational forms emerging in the economy. The 
analysis in this dissertation indicates that the P2B platforms have significant mediating 
influence in their relationship between investors and borrowers despite these being referred to 
as a ‘peer’ relationship implying a dyadic trust relationship. While the ‘P2B’ phenomenon has 
been described as a ‘distributed’ form of finance contributing to the ‘democratisation’ of the 
financial system, the findings of this dissertation suggest that the opposite has occurred: 
platform business models are contributing to the centralisation of the financial system as a 
result of increasing influence in their trust relations with counter-parties on each side of the 
platform who have no direct relationship with each other. In the context of Zucker’s taxonomy, 
these emergent digital platforms represent powerful new forms of institutional-based trust. 
Theoretical Contribution to the Varieties of Capitalism Framework 
The findings of this dissertation make two theoretical contributions to the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature. First, it extends our understanding of both the sources and forms of 
patient capital, the presence of which is a litmus test for determining whether a given economy 
is an LME or a CME. Second, it informs a gap in the VoC literature regarding the financing of 
small firms versus large firms in the economy, with implications for the CME to LME 
convergence debate. Each of these contributions is discussed in more detail below. 
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Sources and Forms of Patient Capital  
Patient capital has emerged as a contested topic among scholars debating its definition, 
sources, and merits (Deeg et al., 2016) and this research project informs the conceptualisation 
of patient capital in several respects. First, the findings of this dissertation provide evidence 
that non-bank sources of patient capital, in this case individuals investing in mini-bonds, are 
available to firms in both CMEs and LMEs. However, there is extreme variation in the 
availability of mini bond patient capital between the two economies, with issuance volume in 
Germany of approximately €8.2 billion versus only €0.3 billion in the UK during the same 
period.  
This finding provides a contrary perspective to recent literature challenging the VoC premise 
that the availability of patient capital is a defining characteristic of a financial system embodied 
in the ideal-type CME. Contributions by Deeg and Hardie to a special Issue of Socio-Economic 
Review in late 2016, for example, examined several non-bank sources of patient capital and 
found several forms that were similarly available to firms in both CMEs and LMEs (Deeg et al., 
2016). The analysis in this dissertation clearly reveals mini bonds as a source of patient capital 
particular to Germany. Furthermore, the analysis suggests it acts as a compliment to rather 
than a substitute for bank financing, suggesting it potentially reinforces rather than undermines 
traditional bank financing as a source of patient capital for SMEs in CMEs like Germany. 
This dissertation’s findings contribute a fuller understanding of patient capital as a social 
relation. In studying sources of patient capital, researchers are confronted with the challenge 
of isolating the influence of relationships at the personal versus organisational level between 
providers and recipients of patient capital. The theoretical conceptualisations of patient capital 
proposed by scholars have been problematic, particularly in explaining the source of investor 
patience117.  On the one hand, these models seek to explain patient capital in a relational 
context, yet on the other hand they often assume calculative investor behaviour aimed at 
maximising investment returns that is arguably more transactional than relational. This may 
reflect a bias towards assuming that the non-bank sources of patient capital are institutional 
rather than individual investors like those studied in this dissertation.  
Small Firms and the VoC Convergence Thesis 
The propositions of the VoC model have been the subject of vigorous debate amongst scholars 
since Hall and Soskice’s for almost 20 years since the publication of the book by Hall and 
Soskice, with the criticisms being more prominent than well-supported confirmations. One of 
the most contested VoC propositions is the claim that the institutional arrangements of CMEs 
and LMEs are resistant to converging, with many critics arguing financialisation in the global 	117	An	example	is	the	three-step	process	proposed	by	(Deeg	&	Hardie,	2016)	for	determining	the	level	of	patience	of	investors.	
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economy leading to the encroachment of the bank-based financing of firms in CMEs by market-
based forms of financing more prevalent in LMEs.  
Section 2.2.1 of this dissertation highlighted the greater importance of SMEs relative to large 
firms in the German economy, with SMEs represent 99.5% of enterprises, 62.5% of 
employment and 53% of gross value production in the economy. Given that, despite their 
considerable weight in the economy, small and medium-sized small firms have received 
relatively little attention as an object of study by VoC scholars, the findings of this research 
project broaden the perspective of the convergence debate. While there may be some merit in 
this argument in relation to large firms, the analysis of financing for small firms in this research 
project suggests there are social and institutional arrangements particular to CMEs like 
Germany that are incompatible with market-based forms of financing which are additional 
sources of resistance to convergence. 
7.2.2 Contribution to Policy-Making and Regulation 
The empirical findings regarding the impact of the policy and regulatory environment on the 
development of the alternative finance channels in the UK and Germany makes a valuable 
contribution to the development of evidence-based policy-making and regulation in financial 
services.  The rapid pace of innovation in financial services has presented policy-makers and 
regulators with a dilemma. On the one hand, disruptive financial innovation offers the 
opportunity to produce positive policy outcomes, such as inclusive and sustainable 
development, that are less likely to be delivered by incumbent providers seeking to maintain 
the status quo. On the other hand, these innovations introduce new risk into the financial 
system, and the resource-constrained regulators in many countries are struggling to 
understand the consequences of these innovations.   
7.2.3 Contribution to Industry Practice 
The empirical findings produced by the research project are relevant to the practice of several 
actors involved in lending to SMEs. The research findings regarding the role of 
credentialisation in the production of institutional trust in the UK P2B market has already 
influenced the market practices of some P2B platform operators in other areas of the world. 
For example, in April 2018 five of the largest P2B lending platforms in Singapore created an 
industry association at the initiative of one of the platform founders after he had been presented 
with some of the empirical finding of the research by the dissertation author (Singapore Fintech 
Association, 2018). More broadly, the research can inform start-ups introducing novel financial 
services products about the benefits of seeking regulation given it is potential source of trust 
production relied on by trustors. 
Finally, the high level of defaults in the listed mini-bond market in Germany suggest that 
individual investors need to be aware that the process of categorisation can produce excessive 
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trust and thus underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes for the trustor. The regional 
financial exchanges promoted these bonds as ‘Mittelstand bonds’ in the knowledge that 
investors would therefore assume the issuers were trustworthy Mittelstand companies when, 
in fact, many did not have the attributes of Mittelstand firms. 
7.3 Limitations of the Analysis  
There are two limitations of the analysis that need to be highlighted.  First, the ambitious scale 
of the primary data collection introduced some practical limitations in the amount of data that 
could be collected. The logistical challenges of collecting large sets of transaction, survey and 
interview data for two lending channels across two economies (with different languages), 
Individuals and SMEs are very reluctant to share data, particularly in Germany, and this was a 
factor in not being able to obtain either transaction data, investor survey data or interview data 
from P2B investors in the German market. The survey data collected from P2B platforms in 
Germany provided an accurate sizing of the market, however more detailed analysis of P2B 
investor behaviour in Germany was not possible. 
Second, the scope of the analysis included the investors in the mini-bond and P2B channels 
but excluded an analysis of the borrowers in each channel.  An analysis of the SMEs using 
these channels and the outcomes of the loans made could determine whether the economic 
impact of these loans is accretive to the loan activity in the incumbent bank lending channel. 
This is an important question for policy-makers in determining the level of policy support for 
innovation challenging incumbent practices and one that remains to be addressed. 
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
The findings of this research project raise a number of new questions which deserve the 
attention of scholars in the fields of the sociology of finance and comparative institutionalism 
and suggest directions for future research. New forms of data are emerging that provide 
scholars with an unprecedented opportunity to investigate the influence of social variables on 
the finance practices of actors in the economy. According to IBM, 90% of the world’s data has 
been produced in the past 24 months, and much of that data is unstructured social data (IBM, 
2018). For example, this research project revealed the influential role played by word-of -mouth 
communication amongst investors in producing process-based trust. Additional analysis 
outside the scope of this dissertation suggests that certain investors may be particularly 
influential in propagating contagion effects resulting in clustering of new investors, and 
potentially offering new insight into the social mechanisms in investment decision-making. 
Gaining a fuller understanding of the importance of social movements in generating values as 
a form of characteristic-based trust also merits research. 
The increasing use of advanced technology in financial intermediation raises a number of 
questions about the nature of trust in finance relationships. In 1994, Bill Gates made the 
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prescient statement that ‘banking is necessary, banks are not’118. Gates was challenging the 
prevailing institutional logic that banks were physical ‘bricks and mortar’ premises where one 
went to obtain the services of banking, such as payments, loans and deposits. Gates argued 
that technological advances in data communications and computer processing would enable 
the decoupling of banking services from bricks and mortar premises. This new logic potentially 
encompasses a second order effect: the fractionalisation of the activities that currently 
constitute banking operated and delivered by a broad array of actors on decentralized market 
infrastructure. Such an evolution of the financial system would have a profound impact on the 
workings of the financial system at the local, national and international level and present social 
scientists with a rich terrain for investigating the consequences for society of what may be a 
period of profound institutional change in the financial systems of economies.  
There are many potential manifestations of this change deserving of research focus.  The data 
collected for this project included information about gender participation in P2B lending, which 
indicates that the proportion of female business owners obtaining P2B loans may be higher 
than women business owners obtaining loans from banks lenders. Zucker refers to 
characteristic-based trust as a ‘free’ form of trust (Zucker, 1986:61). While this may be true 
from a trustee’s perspective, it is not true from a broader societal perspective if the source of 
trust relied on by lenders is characteristic-based and the lender and potential borrower are not 
part of the same value-sharing community. In contrast, financial innovation can also act as an 
inequality wedge. For example, demutualization is one potential outcome of using machine 
learning and artificial intelligence to more granularly define the risk categories used in the risk-
based pricing of insuring or lending to individuals and firms. While these new analytics could 
improve access for some, they could further marginalise others.  
This dissertation has drawn on the conceptualization of trust production used by Lynne Zucker 
in her investigation of the development of the US economy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. In her study, Zucker argues that institutional-based forms of trust emerged 
in substitution for intra-locally produced forms of trust that had lost their legitimacy as the 
economy underwent structural change. The empirical findings of this research project indicate 
the reverse can also occur. The global financial crisis was a shock that eroded institutional 
trust, and so many of the individual investors in this study expressing distrust in the incumbent 
financial system and societal institutions retrenched to making investments that relied on intra-
local forms of trust. While there is some evidence that institutional-based sources of trust have 
recovered since the crisis, there is also evidence that distrust of institutions and retrenchment 
	118 This quote has been widely attributed to Gates but the dissertation author has been unable to find the original 
source. 
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to the familiar remains a powerful global phenomenon which is deserving of study across the 
social sciences. 
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Appendix	1:	Survey	Questionnaire	Distributed	to	German	and	UK	P2B	Lending	Platforms		
	 	
Repeat&Funding&Rate:&What&percentage&of&entities&(business/individuals/organisations)&have&successfully&raised&
funds&more&than&once&on&your&platform?
Number
Female&Fundraiser:&What&percentage&of&successfully&funded&entities&are&owned&or&run&by&women?&
Female&Funder:&What&percentage&of&individual&funders&(investors,&backers&or&lenders)&are&women?
High&Risk
Very&Low&Risk Low&Risk Medium&Risk High&Risk
Very&Low&Risk Low&Risk Medium&Risk High&Risk
Very&Low&Risk
Very&Low&Risk Low&Risk Medium&Risk
Low&Risk Medium&Risk
Very&Low&Risk Low&Risk
&2015&Q2& &2015&Q3& &2015&Q4&
&2015&Q1& &2015&Q2& &2015&Q3& &2015&Q4&
Medium&Risk High&Risk
High&Risk
Very&Low&Risk Low&Risk Medium&Risk High&Risk
Very&Low&Risk Low&Risk Medium&Risk High&Risk
Acceptance&Rate&
Number
City/Town:
What&year&did&your&business&incorporate:
What&year&did&your&business&begin&trading:
&2015&Q1& &2015&Q2& &2015&Q3& &2015&Q4&
&2015&Q1& &2015&Q2& &2015&Q3& &2015&Q4&
&2015&Q1& &2015&Q2& &2015&Q3& &2015&Q4&
&2015&Q1& &2015&Q2& &2015&Q3& &2015&Q4&
Platform&Name/Company:
Business&Failure&Rate:&what&percentage&of&businesses&that&raised&finance&have&since&failed&despite&successfully&
raising&finance&through&your&platform?
Balance&Sheet&Lending:&If&your&platform&facilitates&balance&sheet&lending&what&percentage&of&your&purchased&loans&
are&subsequently&sold&via&a&securitisation&or&other&form&of&refinancing?
Successful&Funding&Rate:&Of&those&accepted&to&your&platform,&what&percentage&are&successful&at&raising&funding&on&
your&platform?&
Number
&2015&Q1&
Institutional&Funding&Volumes
Platform&Acceptance&Rate:&Of&the&entities&(businesses/individuals/organisations)&that&apply&to&your&platform,&what&
percentage&are&accepted?&
How&much&finance&in&total&was&successfully&raised&by&entities&(e.g.&individuals,&businesses&and&other&organisations)&
through&your&platform?&
How&much&finance&was&successfully&raised&only&for&UK&businesses&(this&will&exclude&finance&raised&for&individuals,&
not&for&profits&and&nonZuk&businesses)&?
How&many&UK&entities&(e.g.&individuals,&businesses&and&other&organisations)&in&total&have&raised&finance&through&
your&platform&?
How&many&investors/funders&(retail&and&institutional)&have&actively&provided&funding&via&your&platform&in&2015?
Institutional&Funding:&If&applicable,&what&percentage&of&your&platform's&total&funding&volume&is&funded&by&an&
institutional&investor&(e.g.&Bank,&VC,&Fund)?
Institutional&Funding&Average&%
Number
Default&Rate:&If&your&platform&provides&debt&to&businesses,&please&indicate&the&historical&default&rate&to&date.
Overseas&Funding&Inflow:&What&%&of&funding&raised&through&the&platform&for&UKZbased&businesses&came&from&
investors/funders&outside&of&the&UK?
Overseas&Funding&Outflow:&What&%&of&funding&raised&through&the&platform&went&to&businesses&that&are&NOT&&
based&in&the&United&Kingdom?
Perception&of&proposed&national&regulation
Funder&Sophistication:&Based&upon&platform&activity&from&2013&through&present,&what&percentage&of&funders&
(investors,&backers&or&lenders)&are&categorized&as&sophisticated&or&highZnet&worth&individuals?
AutoZselection/AutoZBidding:&Based&upon&platform&activity&from&2013&through&present,&please&indicate&the&
percentage&of&investors&that&use&autoZselection/autoZbidding&when&providing&funds?
Innovative&Finance&ISA:&If&applicable&to&your&platform&activities,&what&%&additional&growth&in&volume&do&you&expect&
from&the&introduction&of&the&Innovative&Finance&ISA&in&2016?
Average&Deal&Size:&What&is&the&average&loan&size?
Average&Number&of&Investors:&What&is&the&average&number&of&participating&funder/investor&per&loan?
Portfolio&Diversification:&What&is&the&number&of&loans&on&average&in&the&portfolios&of&nonZinstitutional&
funders/investors&on&your&platform?
Perception&of&regulatory&approach&to&online&and&social&media&promotion
Any&other&comments
Total&Number&of&Active&Investors/Funders&that&are&Institutions.
Based&on&the&type&of&alternative&finance&your&platform&operates,&what&are&your&perceptions&of&the&following&
regulation?
Perception&of&existing&national&regulation
Perception&of&local/state/provincial&regulation&(if&applicable)
Excessive&and&too&
strict
To&what&extent&do&you&see&the&following&factors&as&a&risk&to&the&continued&growth&of&the&alternative&finance&
sector?
Excessive&and&too&
strict
Adequate&and&
appropriate
Excessive&and&too&
strict
Excessive&and&too&
strict
Adequate&and&
appropriate
Adequate&and&
appropriate
OpenZEnded&Response
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&Changes&to&regulation&(beyond&what&has&already&been&specified&by&the&FCA)
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&Cancellation/removal&of&tax&incentives&(&i.e.&SEIS,&EIS,&SITR,&IF&ISA)
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&Fraud&involving&one&or&more&highZprofile&campaigns/deals/loans
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&Notable&increase&in&default&rates/business&failure&rates
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&The&collapse&of&one&or&more&wellZknown&platforms&due&to&malpractice
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&Cyber&security&breach
Risk&to&P2B&market&development:&Potential&'crowding&out'&of&retail&investors&as&institutionalisation&accelerates
Country:
Which&of&the&following&best&describes&the&alternative&finance&activity&that&your&platfrom&facilitates? PeerZtoZpeer&
business&lending
PeerZtoZpeer&
consumer&lending
Equity&
crowdfunding
RewardZbased&
crowdZfunding
Adequate&and&
appropriate
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Appendix	2:	Data	Field	Items	for	UK	P2B	Platform	Loan	Transactions		
Borrower Details Database 
Field Description 
Borrower_ID Unique borrower ID  
Borrower_Type e.g. retail, SME, institutional etc. 
Date_Registered Date borrower registered with platform 
Borrower_Gender M/F 
Borrower_Age  
Postcode First 4 digits 
Marital_Status e.g. single, married, widowed etc. 
Residential_Status e.g. Owner occupier, tenant etc. 
Employment_Status e.g. Employed, self-employed, retired 
etc. 
Borrower_Income [In salary bands] 
Experian_Credit_Score (FCA request) External credit score  
Funds_Borrowed Total funds borrowed to date 
SME_Years_Trading Company years trading 
SME_Sector Sector the company operates in 
SME_Employees Number of employees in the company 
SME_Value Value of the company 
SME_Ann_Rev Annual revenue of the company 	
Lender Details Database 
Field Description 
Lender_ID Unique lender ID 
Lender_Type e.g. retail, institutional etc 
Date_Registered Date lender registered with platform 
First_Loan_Date Date lender funded first loan 
Lender_Gender  
Lender_Age  
Postcode First 4 digits 
Lender_Income Income band of the lender 
Funds_Invested Total funds deposited to date 
Q&A_Forum_Questons Number of Q&A threads participated 		
Borrower Loan Details Database 
Field Description 
Loan_ID Unique loan ID 
Borrower_ID Borrower ID from “Borrower Details 
Database” 
Loan_Request_Date Date loan requested 
Loan_Drawdown_Date Date loan drawdown 
Loan_Amount Amount funded 
Loan_Repayment_Type Amortizing, Bullet, Interest only etc. 
Loan_Maturity Term length 
Interest_Rate Interest rate charged 
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Drawdown_Amount Funds drawn down 
Loan_Status Status of loan e.g. current, repaid etc. 
Risk_Band e.g. A-F 
Loan_Purpose e.g. Debt consolidation, SME loan 
Property_Loan_LTV If applicable, Loan to Value ratio 
Secured_Loan Y/N 
Collateral_Information Collateral value 
Principal_Repaid Amount of principal repaid 
Interest_Repaid Amount of interest paid 
Safeguard_Contribution Amount contributed to 
Safeguard/Provision fund 
Platform_Fees Fees paid to platform 
(interest/originating fees) 
Date_Repaid Date loan concluded 
Loan_Default Y/N 
Q&A_Forum_Info Number of Q&A threads generated 
	
Lender Loan Details Database 
Field Description 
Loan_ID Loan ID from “Borrower Loan Details Database” 
Lender_ID Lender ID from “Lender Details Database” 
Funded_Date Date lender contributed to loan 
Loan_Amount Amount lent in loan by unique lender 
Repaid_Amount Total received by lender from loan 
Date_Repaid Date loan concluded 	
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Appendix 3: UK P2B Investor Survey Questions  
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Appendix 4: Interview Invitation Letter to UK P2B Investors 
 
 
Good afternoon, 
 
Thank you for participating in the Peer-ˇ2-ˇpeer lending survey at the end of 2016, which was 
the first phase of the research project being jointly undertaken by The Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (CCAF) to assist in the FCA’s 
review of the UK alternative finance industry. You indicated in your survey response that you 
were willing to be interviewed to further explore some of the topics contained in the survey 
questionnaire. You have been selected to be interviewed (by telephone), and so I’m writing 
to inquire about your availability for an interview in the coming days. 
 
I am the Executive Director of the CCAF and one of my research interests is the financing of 
small businesses. The information you provided in the survey questionnaire indicated that 
you are a P2P lender to small businesses, so I will be conducting your interview. Please note 
your availability using the following link to a 'doodle poll’, by entering your full name and 
clicking on the interview slots when you are available (the poll is set up to protect your 
identity from other participants so that we may preserve your anonymity): [ ] 
 
The interview will take approximately 40 minutes. We look forward to hearing from you 
regarding your preferred interview times. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Robert Wardrop 
Executive Director 
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 
University of Cambridge Judge Business School 
Mobile: +44(0)7834867949 
http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/ccaf 
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Appendix 5: Semi-Structured Interview Question List (UK P2B Lenders) 
 
1. Investing Motivations: 
1.1. What drew you to the sector? What was the original purpose for investing (e.g. 
financial vs non-financial)?  Has this changed over time? 
1.2. To what extent, if any, were your motivations for investing to reflect a moral 
commitment – either to supporting non-mainstream finance and/or a given project 
supported by the platform (environment, community, local SME)? 
1.3. In the last two years, do you think the platforms have tightened or relaxed their 
standards on who can raise funds? What information would you require in order to 
assess this? 
1.4. What would you be investing in if you weren’t able to invest in crowdfunded 
investments? 
2. Investing Behaviour: 
2.1. What factors determine how much you invest in crowdfunded investments as a 
proportion of your total investment portfolio? Was there a point in time when you 
shifted a significant amount of money into the sector? If so, why? 
2.2. Has the proportion of crowdfunding investments in your investment portfolio changed 
over time? (more, less, or about the same) Why? 
2.3. Has the proportion of your investments auto-selected by the platform changed over 
time? (more, less or about the same) If so, why? 
2.4. Are you looking for the platforms to provide a managed investment or do you spend 
time picking opportunities and allocating assets yourself? How much time do you 
devote to this? 
2.4.1. If you do select your own investments, does the amount of your investment 
influence the amount of time you spend considering whether to make the 
investment?  
2.4.2. What form of due diligence did you undertake to assess your selection of 
investment? Did you rely only on the information provided by the platform? What 
other information did you seek and could the platform have also provided this? 
2.5. Do you have any affinities with the businesses you have invested in?  If yes, how 
important are these in your investment decision? (possible affinities include personal 
relationships with a person connected to the business, familiarity with brand or usage 
of the product/service, preference based on geographic proximity or type of business 
sector, moral affinity with a platform’s objectives). Are there other non-financial 
returns that you feel are important?  
2.6. Do you think you are getting good value for money from these platforms? What does 
‘value for money’ mean to you in this context?  
2.7. (If investing in multiple platforms) Do some platforms offer a better risk / return 
relationship than others? If so, what characterises a ‘good’ from a ‘bad’ platform in 
your opinion and what criteria do you use to assess that? Why? 
3. Trust & Confidence:  
3.1. How do you view investments in this sector in terms of risk? How do you understand 
risk in this context? 
3.2. How important have the following actions been in establishing the level of trust 
needed by you to invest in [crowdfunded investments]? (on a scale of 1 -5 with 1 
being ‘of no importance’ and 5 being ‘very important): 
3.2.1. Co-investment by the British Business Bank in the loans of selected P2P 
platforms 
3.2.2. Introduction of regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority covering 
crowdfunding platforms 
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3.2.3. Creation of the innovate finance ISA by HM Treasury to include crowdfunded 
loans 
3.3. Are there any other factors that have been important in establishing the level of trust 
you needed before investing in [crowdfunded investments]? 
3.4. How important have the following factors been in establishing the level of trust you 
needed before using a [crowdfunding] platform? (on a scale of 1 -5 with 1 being ‘of 
no importance’ and 5 being ‘very important’): 
3.4.1. The reputation of the investors and senior management of the platform  
3.4.2. The information disclosed about total investment performance of the platform, 
e.g. returns available to investors / default rates  
3.4.3. The investment performance of your investments on the platform 
3.4.4. The data security and privacy policies of the platform 
3.4.5. Media articles written about the platform 
3.4.6. The opinion of financial advisors 
3.4.7. The opinion of people I know that have used the platform 
3.5. Are there any other factors that have been important in establishing the level of trust 
you needed before using a [crowdfunding] platform? 
3.6. Did you discuss crowdfunding investment with a friend or acquaintance living outside 
your household before making your first investment? If yes, how important was that 
discussion in your investment decision?  (on a scale of 1 -5 with 1 being ‘of no 
importance’ and 5 being ‘very important’) 
3.7. Did you recommend [crowdfunding] as a type of investment to a friend or 
acquaintance living outside your household after making your first investment? If yes, 
approximately how long after your first investment did you make the 
recommendation?   3.8. For	each	of	the	following	types	of	organizations,	please	indicate	how	much	trust	you	place	in	it	on	a	scale	of	1	to	5	(where	‘1’	means	you	have	‘absolutely	no	trust’,	and	‘5’	means	you	have	‘a	great	deal	of	trust’),	and	whether	you	trust	that	type	of	organisation	more,	less,	or	about	the	same	today	as	you	did	before	the	financial	crisis?		3.8.1. High	Street	Banks	(e.g.	Barclay’s,	HSBC,	Lloyds	Bank,	RBS,	or	Santander)		3.8.2. Mutual Banks & Building Societies (e.g. Co-operative	Bank,	Coventry	Building	Society,	Nationwide,	or	Yorkshire	Building	Society)	3.8.3. Small	&	Medium-Sized	Companies	(also	called	SMEs)	3.8.4. Large	Multinational	Corporations	(e.g.	BAE,	Apple,	Exxon	Mobil	or	G.E.)	3.8.5. Alternative	Finance	Platforms	(e.g.	P2P,	P2B,	P2C,	Crowdfunding	[equity	/	donation],	Community	Shares).		
3.9. Finally, if you were the regulator, what information would you ask platforms to 
provide directly to you as an investor? 	  
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Appendix 6: Summary Socio-Demographic Statistics for UK P2B Investor Survey 
Respondents 
 
 
 	  
 Frequency  Valid Percent 
 Cumulative 
Percent 
 Gender 
 Female 38                 10.7             10.7                 
 Male 316               89.0             99.7                 
 Other 1                   0.3               100.0               
 Total 355               100.0           
 Missing 50                 
 Total 
 Age 
 18-24 years old 3                   0.8               0.8                   
 25-34 years old 16                 4.5               5.3                   
 35-44 years old 43                 12.1             17.4                 
 45-54 years old 65                 18.3             35.7                 
 55-64 years old 113               31.7             67.4                 
 Over 65 116               32.6             100.0               
 Total 356               100.0           
 Missing 49                 
 Total 405               
 Highest_Education 
 GCSE or equivalent 25                 7.2               7.2                   
 A-Level or equivalent 27                 7.8               14.9                 
 Apprenticeship 9                   2.6               17.5                 
 Diploma 34                 9.8               27.3                 
 Undergraduate degree 150               43.1             70.4                 
 Postgraduate degree (Master) 88                 25.3             95.7                 
 PhD 15                 4.3               100.0               
 Total 348               100.0           
 Missing 57                 
 Total 405               
 Annual income 
 Less than £15,000 26                 7.5               7.5                   
 £15,001 - £25,000 41                 11.9             19.4                 
 £25,001 - £35,000 41                 11.9             31.3                 
 £35,001 - £50,000 77                 22.3             53.6                 
 £50,001 - £100,000 82                 23.8             77.4                 
 £100,001 - £150,000 44                 12.8             90.1                 
 Over £150,000 34                 9.9               100.0               
 Total 345               100.0           
 Missing 60                 
 Total 405               
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Appendix 7: Historical Transaction Data Provided by G5 Mini-Bond Issuer (1998 – 
2013) 
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Appendix 8: Questionnaire Distributed by Mail to German and UK mini-bond Investors 	
Q1.				Are	you	male	or	female?	
1☐	 Male	
2☐	 Female	
Q2.					What	is	your	year	of	birth?	
|__|__|__|__|	
Q3.					What	vocational	or	professional	training	do	you	have?		Which	of	the	following	categories	
most	closely	applies	to	you?	
1☐	 Completed	trade,	craft	or	agricultural	traineeship	
2☐	 Vocational	college		certification	
3☐	 Licenced	trade	certification	
4☐	 Technical	polytechnic	degree	
5☐	 Undergraduate	university	degree	
6☐	 Post	graduate	university	degree		
Q4.		 Regarding	employment,	which	of	the	categories	applies	to	you?	
1☐	 Full	time	employment	
2☐	 Part	time	employment	
3☐	 Retired	
4☐	 Not	working	at	the	present	time	
Q5.					Please	classify	your	occupational	status	according	to	this	list.		If	retired	or	not	working,	
then	please	classify	your	last	occupational	status.		
1☐	 Skilled	worker	
2☐	 Master	tradesman	or	foreman	
30☐	 Company	employee:	
31☐			Clerical		
32☐			Administrator	
33☐			Manager	
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34☐			Executive	management	
40☐	 Civil	servant:	
41☐			Clerical	
42☐			Administrator	
43☐			Manager	
44☐			Executive	management	
5☐	 Professional		(e.g.	solicitor,	doctor	or	academic)	
6☐	 Freelance	worker	
7☐	 Self-employed	(e.g.	company,	farm)		
Q6.				In	what	postal	code	district	do	you	live?		
|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__| 
	
Q7.				Approximately	how	long	have	you	lived	in	this	place?	
☐	 Since	year:	|__|__|__|__|	
2☐	 Do	not	recall	
Q8	.				Do	you	own	shares	in	listed	companies?	
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No	
Q9.					Do	you	currently	own	mini-bonds	issued	by	other	companies?		
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No	
Q10.		How	did	you	first	become	aware	of	the	mini-bonds	issued	by	the	Company?		
1☐	 Newspaper	or	magazine	article		
2☐	 	Radio,	TV	or	press	advertisement		
3☐	 Website	of	the	company		
4☐	 Another	website		
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5☐	 Friend,	relative	or	work	colleague			
6☐ Financial	advisor		
Q11.		Have	you	previously	attended	any	information	events	for	the	Company?	
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No	
Q12.		Do	you	currently	own	mini-bonds	issued	by	the	Company?		
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No		
If	you	do	not	own	any	of	the	Company’s	bonds	then	please	go	to	Q23.	
	
Q13.		How	did	you	place	the	order	to	buy	the	Company’s	bonds?		
1☐	 Directly	from	the	Company	
2☐	 Through	a	local	bank		
3☐	 Through	an	online	broker	
4☐	 Through	a	private	bank	
5☐	 Through	a	financial	advisor	
Q14.		How	long	have	you	owned	the	Company’s	bonds?		
1☐	 Less	than	one	year	
2☐	 Between	one	and	two	years	
3☐	 Between	two	and	three	years	
4☐	 More	than	three	years	
Q15.			When	you	first	purchased	the	Company’s	bonds,	please	indicate	if	you	were:	
1☐	 Employed	by	the	Company	
2☐	 Formerly	employed	by	the	Company	
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3☐ Employed	or	formerly	employed	by	an	entity	with	a	relationship	with	the	Company,	such	as	a	supplier,	distributor,	customer	or	research	institute	
4☐	 None	of	the	above			
Q16.	When	you	purchased	the	Company’s	bonds,	please	indicate	if	someone	in	your	household	
was:	
1☐	 Employed	by	the	Company	
2☐	 Formerly	employed	by	the	Company	
3☐ Employed	or	formerly	employed	by	an	entity	with	a	relationship	with	the	Company,	such	as	a	supplier,	distributor,	customer	or	research	institute	
4☐ An	investor	in	the	bonds	issued	by	the	Company	
5☐	 None	of	the	above	
Q17.		When	you	purchased	the	Company’s	bond,	please	indicate	if	someone	known	to	you	was:		
1☐	 An	employee	of	the	Company	
2☐	 Formerly	employed	by	the	Company	
3☐ Employed	or	formerly	employed	by	an	entity	with	a	relationship	with	the	Company,	such	as	a	supplier,	distributor,	customer	or	research	institute	
4☐ An	investor	in	the	bonds	issued	by	the	Company	
5☐	 None	of	the	above	
Q18.		If	yes,	did	you	communicate	with	any	of	the	above	persons	not	living	in	your	household	
about	the	Company	prior	to	purchasing	the	bond?	
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No	
Q19.		How	far	away	from	your	home	do	these	persons	you	communicated	with	live?	
2☐	 In	the	immediate	neighborhood	
3☐	 In	the	same	town	or	city	
4☐	 In	another	place,	about	an	hour	away		
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5☐	 Further	away	in	the	UK	
6☐	 Outside	of	the	UK	Please	provide	the	postal	code	for	one	of	these	persons	if	possible	 |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__| 
2☐	 Do	not	recall		
	
Q20.		Since	purchasing	the	Company’s	bond,	have	you	talked	to	any	persons	not	living	in	your	
household	about	the	bonds	as	an	investment?		
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No	
Q21.		If	you	did	talk	about	the	Company’s	bond	with	individuals	not	living	in	your	household,	
then	approximately	how	far	way	do	these	people	live	from	your	home?	
2☐	 In	the	immediate	neighborhood	
3☐	 In	the	same	town	or	city	
4☐	 In	another	town	or	city	about	an	hour	away	
5☐	 Further	away	in	the	UK	
6☐	 Outside	of	the	UK	Please	provide	the	postal	code	for	one	of	these	persons	if	possible	 |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__| 
2☐	 Do	not	recall	
Q22.		In	thinking	about	the	reasons	why	you	decided	to	invest	in	the	Company’s	mini-bond,	
please	indicate	how	much	do	you	agree	with	each	of	the	following	four	statements	on	a	
scale	of	1	to	5,	where		‘1’	indicates	strong	disagreement	and	‘5’	indicates	strong	
agreement:	
	
1. ‘I	purchased	the	bond	because	considering	all	the	investment	opportunities	I	was	aware	of,	I	
expected	to	obtain	the	best	possible	financial	return	relative	to	the	risk.’	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral			 Agree	 Strongly	agree		
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2. 	‘I	purchased	the	bond	because	the	Company’s	values	are	similar	to	my	values.’	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Strongly	disagree		 Disagree	 Neutral			 Agree	 Strongly	agree		
3. 	‘I	purchased	the	bond	because	I	like	the	Company’s	products.’	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Strongly	disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral			 Agree	 Strongly	agree				
4. ‘I	purchased	the	bond	because	the	coupon	rate	is	high.’	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Strongly	disagree	 Disagree	 Neutral			 Agree	 Strongly	agree		
 
Q23.		If	you	own	the	Company’s	mini-bond	or	the	mini-bonds	of	any	other	company,	please	describe	
the	largest	amount	you	have	invested	in	any	of	these	bonds,	where	‘1’	means	the	amount	is	a	
very	small	part	of	your	total	investments,	and	‘5’	means	it	is	a	very	large	part	of	your	total	
investments.	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	A	very	small	part	 A	small	part	 An	average	part			 A	large	part		 A	very	large	part	
	
	
Q24.		Are	you	a	consumer	of	the	Company’s	products	or	services?		
	
1☐	 Yes	
2☐	 No			
If	you	are	not	a	consumer	of	the	Company’s	products	then	please	go	to	Q27	
	
	
Q25.		For	how	many	years	have	you	been	a	user	of	the	Company’s	products	or	services?	
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1☐	 Less	than	one	year	
2☐	 Between	one	year	and	two	years	
3☐	 Between	two	years	and	five	years	
4☐	 More	than	five	years	
Q26.	How	often	do	you	use	the	Company’s	products	or	services?	
1☐	 Every	day	
2☐	 Once	or	twice	per	week		
3☐	 Once	or	twice	per	month	
4☐	 Once	or	twice	per	year	
	
Q27.		Please	indicate	for	each	type	of	organization	how	much	trust	you	place	in	it	on	a	scale	of	1	to	5,	
where		‘1’	means	you	have	absolutely	no	trust,	and		‘5’	means	you	have	a	great	deal	of	trust.				
27.1		High	Street	Banks	(e.g.	Barclay’s,	HSBC,	Lloyds	Bank,	RBS,	or	Santander)	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Absolutely	no	trust		 Some		distrust		 Neutral			 Some	Trust		 A	great	deal	of	trust			Do	you	trust	high	street	banks	more,	less,	or	about	the	same	today	as	you	did	before	the	financial	crisis?	 	 	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	Less	11	 	About	the	same	12	 More	13	
	
	
27.2		Mutual	Banks	&	Building	Societies		(e.g.	Co-operative	Bank,	Coventry	Building	Society,	Nationwide,	Smile	or	Yorkshire	Building	Society)	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Absolutely	no	trust		 Some		distrust		 Neutral			 Some	Trust		 A	great	deal	of	trust			Do	you	trust	mutual	banks	and	building	societies	more,	less,	or	about	the	same	today	as	you	did	before	the	financial	crisis?	 	 	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	
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Less	11	 	About	the	same	12	 More	13	
	
	
27.3		Small	&	Medium-Sized	Companies			
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Absolutely	no	trust		 Some		distrust		 Neutral			 Some	Trust		 A	great	deal	of	trust			Do	you	trust	small	&	medium-sized	companies	more,	less,	or	about	the	same	today	as	you	did	before	the	financial	crisis?	 	 	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	Less	11	 	About	the	same	12	 More	13		
27.4		Large	Multinational	Corporations		(e.g.	BAE,	Apple,	Daimler,		Exxon	Mobil	or	G.E.)	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	1	 2	 3	 4	 5	Absolutely	no	trust		 Some		distrust		 Neutral			 Some	Trust		 A	great	deal	of	trust			Do	you	trust	large	multinational	corporations	more,	less,	or	about	the	same	today	as	you	did	before	the	financial	crisis?	 	 	
☐	 ☐	 ☐	Less	11	 	About	the	same	12	 More	13			 Thank	you	for	completing	the	questionnaire.		__________________________________________________________________________________		Would	you	be	willing	to	participate	in	a	telephone	interview	with	us	to	discuss	your	views	about	mini-bonds	and	trust	in	institutions	at	time	convenient	to	you	during	March	or	April	2014?			If	so,	please	indicate	your	consent	to	participate	by	providing	the	information	requested	below,	including	either	an	email	address	or	a	telephone	number	so	we	can	contact	you,	and	signing	where	indicated.		
 1. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	withdraw	my	participation	at	any	time	without	giving	any	reason.			2. I	understand	that	my	responses	will	be	anonymised	and	only	used	for	academic		research.		
	
	
Please	tick	box	
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 	E-Mail	Address:	________________________________Telephone	number:		____________________	
 
 
 
______________________               ___________                  ______________________ Name	of	Participant Date                                  Signature 
 
 
 If	you	would	like	to	receive	more	information	about	this	project,	then	please	contact	the	researcher	(Robert	Wardrop)	via	email	at:		rhw40@cam.ac.uk.		
 
 
______________________               ___________                  ______________________ Name	of	Researcher Date                                  Signature 
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Appendix 9: Summary Socio-Demographic Statistics for Mini-Bond investor Survey 
Respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
N Min Max Mean N Min Max Mean N Min Max Mean
Age 428 21 90 63.7 192 22 93 55.1 271 28 96 60.4
Years3living3at3current3address 428 1 85 31.5 188 0 74 25.1 273 0 70 20.5
UK4+(UK)G4+(germany)G5+(Germany)
Mini4Bond+Issuer
Frequency )Valid)Percent)
)Cumulative)
Percent) Frequency
))Valid)
Percent))
)Cumulative)
Percent) Frequency
)Valid)
Percent)
)Cumulative)
Percent)
Gender
Male 368((((((((((((((( 85.6(((((((((((( 85.6((((((((((((((((( 155(((((((((((((((( 79.9((((((((((((((( 79.9(((((((((((((((((( 230((((((((((((((( 83.6((((((((((((( 83.6(((((((((((((((
Female 62((((((((((((((((( 14.4(((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((((( 39(((((((((((((((((( 20.1((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((((( 45((((((((((((((((( 16.4((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((
Total 430((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((( 275((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((
Missing 6((((((((((((((((((( (:(( (:((
Total 436((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 275(((((((((((((((
Highest)Education
Did(not(attend(university 159((((((((((((((( 37.1(((((((((((( 37.1((((((((((((((((( 59(((((((((((((((((( 30.4((((((((((((((( 30.4(((((((((((((((((( 33((((((((((((((((( 13.3((((((((((((( 13.3(((((((((((((((
Did(attend(university 270((((((((((((((( 62.9(((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((((( 133(((((((((((((((( 68.6((((((((((((((( 99.0(((((((((((((((((( 215((((((((((((((( 86.7((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((
Total 429((((((((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 248(((((((((((((((
Missing 7((((((((((((((((((( (:(( (:((
Total 436((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 248((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((
Employment)Status
Full(time(employment 156((((((((((((((( 36.1(((((((((((( 36.1((((((((((((((((( 101(((((((((((((((( 52.1((((((((((((((( 52.1(((((((((((((((((( 99((((((((((((((((( 36.1((((((((((((( 36.1(((((((((((((((
Part(time(employment 18((((((((((((((((( 4.2(((((((((((((( 40.3((((((((((((((((( 23(((((((((((((((((( 11.9((((((((((((((( 63.9(((((((((((((((((( 33((((((((((((((((( 12.0((((((((((((( 48.2(((((((((((((((
Retired 242((((((((((((((( 56.0(((((((((((( 96.3((((((((((((((((( 61(((((((((((((((((( 31.4((((((((((((((( 95.4(((((((((((((((((( 135((((((((((((((( 49.3((((((((((((( 97.4(((((((((((((((
Not(working(presently 16((((((((((((((((( 3.7(((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((((( 9(((((((((((((((((((( 4.6((((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((((( 7((((((((((((((((((( 2.6((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((
Total 432((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((( 274(((((((((((((((
Missing 4((((((((((((((((((( :((((((((((((((((( 2(((((((((((((((((((
Total 436((((((((((((((( 200.0(((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 276((((((((((((((( 1.0(((((((((((((((
Occupation
Skilled(worker 5((((((((((((((((((( 1.2(((((((((((((( 1.2((((((((((((((((((( 3(((((((((((((((((((( 1.6((((((((((((((((( 1.6(((((((((((((((((((( 20((((((((((((((((( 7.4((((((((((((((( 7.4(((((((((((((((((
Craftsman,(tradesman(or(foreman 5((((((((((((((((((( 1.2(((((((((((((( 2.3((((((((((((((((((( 5(((((((((((((((((((( 2.7((((((((((((((((( 4.3(((((((((((((((((((( 3((((((((((((((((((( 1.1((((((((((((((( 8.5(((((((((((((((((
Freelance(worker 28((((((((((((((((( 6.5(((((((((((((( 8.8((((((((((((((((((( 11(((((((((((((((((( 5.9((((((((((((((((( 10.1(((((((((((((((((( 21((((((((((((((((( 7.8((((((((((((((( 16.3(((((((((((((((
Company:(Administrator/clerical 88((((((((((((((((( 20.5(((((((((((( 29.3((((((((((((((((( 69(((((((((((((((((( 36.7((((((((((((((( 46.8(((((((((((((((((( 22((((((((((((((((( 8.1((((((((((((((( 24.4(((((((((((((((
Company:(Manager/executive 187((((((((((((((( 43.5(((((((((((( 72.8((((((((((((((((( 50(((((((((((((((((( 26.6((((((((((((((( 73.4(((((((((((((((((( 113((((((((((((((( 41.9((((((((((((( 66.3(((((((((((((((
Civil(servant 59((((((((((((((((( 13.7(((((((((((( 86.5((((((((((((((((( 34(((((((((((((((((( 18.1((((((((((((((( 91.5(((((((((((((((((( 29((((((((((((((((( 10.7((((((((((((( 77.0(((((((((((((((
Self:employed(in(SME 58((((((((((((((((( 13.5(((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((((( 16(((((((((((((((((( 8.5((((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((((( 49((((((((((((((((( 18.1((((((((((((( 95.2(((((((((((((((
Self:employed(in(large(firm((>250(employees) :(((((((((((((((( :(((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((((( :((((((((((((((((( :((((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((((( 12((((((((((((((((( 4.4((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((((
Total 430((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((( 188(((((((((((((((( 100.0((((((((((((( 270((((((((((((((( 100.0(((((((((((
Missing 6((((((((((((((((((( 6(((((((((((((((((((( 6(((((((((((((((((((
Total 436((((((((((((((( 194(((((((((((((((( 276(((((((((((((((
G5?Germany G4?Germany UK3?UK
Mini?bond)Issuer
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Appendix 10: Hand-Collected Data for Mini-Bond Issues in the UK (2009 – 2015) 
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Appendix 11: Excerpts of German Mini-Bond Investor Interviews 
I = Interviewer 
 
ID: 003 
I And with the person you spoke to after investing in the [ Company X ] bonds, why did 
you talk to them and what about? Did you advise them for or against them for example? 
P I suggested it as one possibility since my acquaintance was looking for something 
performing above better than the rate of inflation and [ Company X ] bonds were one 
possibility I suggested but I'd be outraged if he'd have put all his money into it. I 
recommended spreading his options and that was just one possibility. 
I You informed that you've held [ Company X ] bonds for over 3 years. Did you wait after 
purchasing [ Company X ] bonds or did you tell that person straight away? 
P I can't exactly say but probably one or two months subsequent to the purchase. 
 
ID: 004 
I You answered that subsequent to the purchase of the bonds that you spoke to 
someone else about it, why was that and what did you discuss with that person? 
S Why? Out of interest so well in general as per how one invests well today when 
compared to today's interest levels. Yes and simply what possibilities or alternatives 
exist so that was why 
I Do you regularly speak to that person about other investment opportunities as well?   
S Yes, all the time, shares, property, anything which well, we freely swap tips yes. 
I Do you hold the viewpoint then that you influenced that person to invest in the bonds 
or did it not influence them? 
S Ahh. Let's say it was a driver to inform themselves more at least yes,  
I Did that person you spoke to later invest in [ Company X ] bonds. Do you know? 
S I think so. 
 
ID: 003 
 
I And with the person you spoke to after investing in the [ Company X ] bonds, why did 
you talk to them and what about? Did you advise them for or against them for example? 
P I suggested it as one possibility since my acquaintance was looking for something 
performing above better than the rate of inflation and [ Company X ] bonds were one 
possibility I suggested but I'd be outraged if he'd have put all his money into it. I 
recommended spreading his options and that was just one possibility. 
I Yes, of course. You informed that you've held [ Company X ] bonds for over 3 years. 
Did you wait after purchasing [ Company X ] bonds or did you tell that person straight 
away? 
P I can't exactly say but probably one or two months subsequent to the purchase. 
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I During these conversations did you influence that person towards these investments 
or did they influence you? 
P Myself not but they were probably influenced by me since they hadn't done much of 
that really. I can say that the passing on of experience was from me and not to me. 
 
 
ID: 005 
I You spoke to someone else both before and after buying [ Company X ] bonds? 
M Yes with an acquaintance that knew a bit more about securities. 
I Did you speak regularly with that person about other investment opportunities? 
M Regularly is probably an overstatement but now and then it's always good to know what 
investment possibilities exist. 
I And now to the people you've spoken to since the investment in the bonds about what 
did you discuss concerning [ Company X ] . 
M Well I spoke to a previous work colleague about [ Company X ] and recommended it 
as a serious company. 
I What arguments did you use in terms of it being serious in your opinion? 
M I'm from the Ruhr area actually. And I know [ Company X ] in [headquarters location] 
myself. The personal impression I had was surely a reason to purchase in my case. 
 
ID: 007 
I You spoke to others about the bonds or about [ Company X ]  before and after you 
invested in [ Company X ]  which also led to their purchase. 
O Yes I did, certainly. 
I Ok firstly about the people you spoke to before investing in the bonds, how important 
were those conversations for you?  
O That was my brother who recommended them and so I made contact with them.  
I So it was your brother who led you to invest in [ Company X ] without which you 
probably would not have invested in them? 
O Probably not yes. 
I  Concerning the person you spoke to after buying the bonds. Why did you speak to that 
person about [ Company X ] ? 
O Yes simply since my older sister who is really not into this kind of thing had money 
sitting there in her account and as you know interest rates these days are close to zero 
as you know so I recommended that she invest it in [ Company X ]. 
I  So the recommendation you made overwhelmingly led her to invest in [ Company X ] I 
imagine if you're saying she invested there? 
O Yes since I was and both of my brothers were with [ Company X ] so our whole family 
is now well represented at [ Company X ]. 
 
ID: 0010 
I You informed that subsequent to your purchase of [ Company X ] stocks, you spoke to 
somebody you knew about it. 
		 224	
K Yes, I always discussed such with acquaintances and friends as well as my daughter 
and son and my daughter [s.l…] probably bought some. [ Company X ] has very good 
returns in terms of investment, on the other hand that awakens mistrust in many 
people's eyes. For example, why do they return such high yields. Will they soon 
disappear or have problems? With me it was the same, I observed for a year how it 
developed. My first contact was I believe with [ Company X ] from Wirtschaftwoche 
(Germany economy magazine)  I think at some point which was an investment 12 years 
ago I believe or 14 years ago, I must check when,  but I started small with a purchase 
costing 5,000DM and then I invested more as it developed. 
I So as you made money over the years and for the reason that you wanted to let others 
know about the trust you'd built up with them? 
K Yes, yes. 
I Do you still discuss other investment opportunities regularly today with these people? 
Do you think that these discussions with your children have caused them to invest in 
the stocks or that it hasn't really influenced them?  
K  Yes, yes. 
I Has anyone or your children you've discussed the [Company X] bonds with invested in 
them? 
K Yes two acquaintances invested in them yes. 
 
ID: 0011 
I You informed that you spoke to at least one person subsequent to making the 
investment in the bonds. 
E Yes. 
I  May I ask you why you spoke to others about the [ Company X ] bonds? 
E Ah. I don't know any more now. Probably amongst friends we just discussed who was 
investing what and where, then one swaps tips right. 
I Do you talk amongst your friends about other investment opportunities regularly? 
E Yes, amongst close friends at least. 
I  Do you discuss whom you'd trust in order to be safe regarding certain bonds? 
E Yes to be safe is one thing and also to take opportunities seriously.  
I Is your viewpoint that discussions amongst friends have influenced investment 
decisions amongst those friends?  
E Yes, yes.  
 
ID: 0013 
I You informed us in the survey that you'd spoken to others subsequent to the purchase 
of [ Company X ] bonds, namely an acquaintance, why did you do that and what did 
you discuss? 
DE It was about the company itself, the offerings, duration of them, interest rates, 
conditions and the Mittelstand structure behind it rather than some anonymous large 
concern etc. 
I Did you advise this person to buy the stocks? 
DE Yes, actually. 
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I Is it your viewpoint that the discussion you had with that person influenced them to 
invest in the stocks? 
DE I think so but I can't know for sure. 
 
ID: 0014 
I You also informed that after investing in [ Company X ] bonds that you'd spoken to an 
acquaintance about the stocks or investment in these bonds. 
SU Yes - my father - but I can't say whether he bought any or not. I don’t know. 
 
I  You informed us that you've held [ Company X ] bonds for 2 or 3 years. Did you wait a 
certain amount of time then before you advised your father to invest in these bonds or 
was it directly after buying the bonds or straight away? 
SU I told him a while after the purchase. 
I So you basically kind of waited a while after regular payments came in and not before? 
SU Exactly. 
  
ID: 0016 
I You informed us that you spoke to someone else before investing in [ Company X ] 
bonds. 
B Ah that was my daughter. She'd done it so I decided to have a go too. 
I So you'd say that without the help of your daughter that you'd not have known about 
the bonds. 
B No, I don't think so. 
I Do you discuss other investment opportunities with your daughter? 
B Yes, every so often yes.  
I And you informed us that you'd spoken to other people after purchasing [ Company X 
] bonds. Why did you speak to them about it and what did you speak about? 
B Well we discussed about getting involved in financial matters, saying that we didn't get 
much for our money so I recommended looking at [ Company X ]  
I Is it your view that the conversations you had influenced the people you spoke to about 
the bonds? 
B Yes, yes, I know that from one person yes. 
 
  
 
 
 
